Steven Pickard

The plaintiffs, a congregation that broke away from the British Methodist Episcopal Church ("BMEC") and a new incorporated church, brought a motion seeking an order conveying title to a historic 1866 church property — established by freed slaves who arrived via the Underground Railroad — to the trustees of the new church.

They also sought to add the Director of Titles as a party on the basis that the BMEC had filed a fraudulent Application to Change Name on the land titles register, and argued the BMEC's proprietary claim was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court dismissed the motion to convey title, finding the plaintiffs failed to establish by evidence or legal principle that they were the present-day successors of the original Bethel Congregation trustees, and that the BMEC Act, 1913 conclusively vested the property in the BMEC.

The court further held that a vesting order application is not an action to "recover" land within the meaning of the Real Property Limitations Act, and that the BMEC's unregistered statutory interest was not extinguished.

The Application to Change Name was found not to be a fraudulent instrument but was ordered deleted from the register as made in error through an incorrect process.

Following a prior motion decision, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful moving party sought partial indemnity costs after prevailing on the motion.

The responding party argued that any costs should instead be borne by a third party municipality, alleging administrative error and a breached undertaking not to take a position on the motion.

The court found the municipality had merely consented to the motion and had filed no evidence or submissions beyond that consent.

As there was no pleading supporting liability against the municipality, the court ordered the unsuccessful responding party to pay partial indemnity costs to the moving party.

The appellant, a coalition of landlords, appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a municipal residential rental licensing by-law enacted as a pilot project.

The appellant argued the by-law was arbitrary, enacted in bad faith, and ultra vires due to alleged violations of the Charter, the Residential Tenancies Act, and privacy legislation.

The Court of Appeal applied a deferential standard of review to municipal decisions and found the by-law was passed in good faith for valid health and safety purposes.

The court dismissed all constitutional and statutory challenges, concluding the by-law did not restrict marketing, permit unlawful entry, interfere with subletting, encroach on criminal law powers, or require disclosure of protected personal information.

The appellant, Essex Condominium Corporation No. 125 (ECC 125), appealed a partial summary judgment that dismissed its claim for unpaid common expense fees against the respondents based on a limitations defence.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by reversing the burden of proof on the issue of discoverability under the Limitations Act, incorrectly placing the onus on the plaintiff to disprove that its claim was statute-barred.

The Court clarified that the burden remains on the defendant to prove the claim was discoverable.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the summary judgment, and directing the claim for unpaid common expense fees to proceed to trial.

The defendants, Wildwood by the Lake Leaseholders Association and three individual board members, moved for summary dismissal of two actions brought by the plaintiff, a former board member.

The plaintiff alleged defamation arising from an investigation into her alteration of a job description document and subsequent reprimand.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motions, finding substantial factual disputes and witness credibility issues that require a trial.

The judge emphasized that the case was not suitable for summary judgment, particularly given the need for credibility assessments and the potential for the defence of qualified privilege to be defeated by malice or by exceeding the scope of the privilege.

The court also reiterated the Court of Appeal's caution against granting partial summary judgment.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff condominium corporation's action, which included claims for unpaid common fees, an underfunded reserve fund, and breach of an oral contract regarding legal fees.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims for unpaid common fees (due to being statute-barred under the Limitations Act) and the oral contract for legal fees (finding no binding agreement due to lack of consensus and consideration).

However, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed for the claim regarding the underfunded reserve fund, as the court found a genuine issue requiring a trial and confirmed the condominium corporation's standing to pursue this claim on behalf of unit-owners.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action arising from a $200,000 real estate investment.

The plaintiffs alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment regarding the calculation of profits and holdbacks from the sale of two properties.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the enforceability of the settlement releases, alleged misrepresentations of costs, and whether the claims were statute-barred.

This appeal concerned a dispute between a real estate developer (appellant) and a home builder (respondent) arising from an agreement for the sale of land.

The appellant sought interest on the unpaid purchase price, alleging the respondent breached provisions related to commencing construction and failing to close the transaction by a stipulated outside date.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's dismissal of both claims.

The court found no evidence to support the appellant's claim regarding permit availability for construction delays and determined that the appellant's own breach in installing sanitary sewers prevented it from relying on the respondent's alleged delay.

The claim for 12% interest for delayed closing was also rejected due to a lack of proof of damages and the appellant's prior breach.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a noting of default in a four-year-old mortgage action.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing the proposed defence lacked merit.

The court considered principles of proportionality and the preference for matters to be determined on their merits.

Given the plaintiff's significant delay in prosecuting the action after the defendant made a substantial payment, and the absence of demonstrated prejudice, the court granted the defendant's motion to set aside the noting of default, allowing the defendant to file a Statement of Defence.

The appellants, landlords of student housing, appealed the dismissal of their claims for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, Charter violations, and bad faith against fire prevention officers and the City of Windsor.

The claims arose after the appellants were charged with Fire Code violations for operating their properties as lodging houses, which charges were later withdrawn or acquitted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the fire prevention officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay charges, did not conduct a negligent investigation, and did not act with malice.

The court also dismissed the Papic appellants' additional claims related to property development delays, finding them to be policy decisions or lacking legal basis.

The court-appointed receiver sought approval of a vesting order, ancillary orders, and a distribution order for the unsecured creditors of Royal Timbers Inc. A creditor of a related company in receivership, Banwell Development Corporation, objected to the payment of post-receivership interest to Royal Timbers' creditors, arguing the interest should instead be paid pro rata to Banwell's creditors due to a potential shortfall in the Banwell estate.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the two receivership estates were separate and the unsecured creditors of Royal Timbers were entitled to post-receivership interest from the surplus generated by the sale of Royal Timbers' assets.

The plaintiff landlords sued the City of Windsor and its fire investigators for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution after being charged with operating non-compliant boarding, lodging, or rooming houses under the Fire Code.

The plaintiffs argued the investigators lacked reasonable grounds and were motivated by a desire to curb student housing.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the investigator had reasonable grounds to believe the properties were rooming houses based on the statutory definitions, and that he acted reasonably by seeking advice before laying charges.

The court also found no evidence of malice or oblique motive.

The appellants sought summary judgment to determine whether an insurance policy obtained by the mortgagees covered the mortgagors' interest in the property and whether the insurer could exercise subrogation rights.

The mortgagors had failed to obtain property insurance after their existing policy was cancelled.

The mortgagees obtained a policy in their own names covering only their mortgagee interest.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the policy was for the sole benefit of the mortgagees and that the mortgagees were entitled to pursue subrogation rights.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Standard Charge Term 16 of the mortgage imposed the obligation to insure on the mortgagors and that any insurance obtained by the mortgagees was permissive and for their benefit alone.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for malicious prosecution and other torts against multiple public servants and entities, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered the Rule 57.01 factors, noting the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs' unfounded allegations of malice and conspiracy, and the defendants' reasonable offers to settle.

The court fixed costs at $260,000 for the municipal defendants and $231,100 for the provincial defendants, representing an amount between partial and substantial indemnity.

The plaintiffs owned a property that was intentionally set on fire by a tenant, resulting in severe injuries to occupants.

The police and fire marshal investigated and concluded the property was an illegal rooming house with multiple Fire Code violations that contributed to the spread of the fire.

The plaintiffs were charged with arson by negligence under s. 436 of the Criminal Code, but were discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

They subsequently sued the investigating police officer, fire marshal investigators, and their municipal employers for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligent investigation, and Charter breaches.

The Superior Court dismissed the action in its entirety, finding no evidence of malice or bad faith, and concluding that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges based on the evidence gathered.

The plaintiff pharmacy brought a motion to amend its statement of claim to add four new defendants and a new cause of action for conspiracy against the existing landlord defendants.

The plaintiff alleged the landlords conspired with the proposed defendants to sell the commercial property to them and oust the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amended claim did not disclose a viable cause of action for conspiracy against the landlords, as they were merely exercising their legal right to sell their property to a bona fide third-party purchaser.

The parties were unable to agree on costs following a two-hour motion.

The court noted that the responding party's submissions suffered from hyperbole and caused unnecessary rancour, while the moving parties' costs request was wildly excessive and unsubstantiated.

The court fixed costs at $5,000 in the cause.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend its statement of claim to add a related numbered company as a defendant.

The defendants opposed, arguing prejudice and noting the plaintiff failed to request leave under Rule 48.04.

The court granted the motion, finding the failure to request leave was a technical defect that could be remedied.

The court noted the defendants and their counsel appeared to be engaged in a game of 'catch us if you can' regarding the complex ownership of the property where the materials were supplied, and found no prejudice in allowing the amendment.

The respondents brought a motion to vary a consent order, which the court determined was an interlocutory injunction, to remove restraints on their ability to deal with the assets of 1889072 Ontario Limited.

The applicant sought the continuation of this injunction.

The court found that the applicant failed to satisfy the prerequisites for an interlocutory injunction as established in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), specifically regarding a strong prima facie case, irreparable harm, and an undertaking as to damages.

Consequently, the respondents' motion was granted, and the interlocutory injunction was not continued.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from the successful motions by several defendants to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay.

The successful defendants sought full or substantial indemnity costs, alleging the plaintiff's action was frivolous or vexatious, or that there was a Mary Carter agreement.

The court found no sufficient justification to depart from the usual order of partial indemnity costs, as there were no findings on the merits of the action, nor evidence of frivolous conduct or collusion.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful defendants, specifying amounts for the motion to dismiss and the remainder of the action.