Michael Polvere

The appellant municipality appealed a Divisional Court order that quashed an Ontario Land Tribunal decision assuming jurisdiction over a dispute regarding a municipal servicing agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that the Tribunal's decision was interlocutory, as it only assumed jurisdiction on a prima facie basis and deferred the final determination of forum to the Superior Court.

Because the Ontario Land Tribunal Act only permits appeals of final decisions, the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appeal was allowed and the Tribunal's order was restored.

The defendants brought a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's action for defamation and intentional interference with economic relations.

The action arose from tweets and newspaper comments made by the defendants criticizing the plaintiff nursing home's COVID-19 policies and care of a resident.

The court found the expression related to a matter of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that its claim had substantial merit and that the defendants had no valid defences.

Furthermore, the court held that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression substantially outweighed any minimal harm suffered by the plaintiff.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs moved for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a 108-acre parcel of land.

The plaintiff had agreed to purchase five acres of the land from one of the co-owners for $750,000 and advanced $640,000 before the defendant purported to terminate the agreement.

The defendant argued the agreement was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds and the Planning Act.

The court found a triable issue regarding the plaintiffs' interest in the land and held that the equities favoured granting the CPL, as the property was unique and the plaintiffs had advanced 85% of the purchase price.

The defendant brought a motion seeking declarations that a 1999 construction lien judgment was unenforceable or satisfied.

The plaintiff had obtained a judgment and writ of possession for an environmentally contaminated property but never sold it.

Twenty years later, the defendant sold the property and sought to vacate the lien.

The court held that under the Limitations Act, 2002, there is no limitation period to enforce a court order, so the judgment remained valid.

However, the court found that the lien did not secure post-judgment interest, meaning the defendant had paid sufficient funds into court to vacate the lien.

The court also held that while the plaintiff was not required to sell the property, it had an obligation to account for any benefits received while in possession.

The defendant's claim for equitable set-off required a trial with viva voce evidence, and the doctrine of laches did not apply.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff contractor's action for unpaid 'extras' on a construction project.

The court found that the plaintiff's claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the limitation period for unpaid construction invoices begins to run after a reasonable time for delivery and payment has passed, which in this case was more than two years before the action was commenced.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff had no contractual right to demand final payment because it failed to provide a required statutory declaration confirming that all sub-trades had been paid.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The applicants sought an order for specific performance to compel the respondent to execute transaction documents for the sale of her shares in their jointly held companies.

The respondent refused to sign a Non-Solicitation and Non-Competition Agreement (NCA), arguing she never agreed to it.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while an NCA is commercially reasonable and standard in such transactions, there was no evidence that the respondent or her counsel had actually agreed to include it in the share purchase agreement.

The appellant brought a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal to the Divisional Court and to transfer the proceeding, after the Court of Appeal quashed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to have the appellant declared a vexatious litigant.

The court dismissed the appellant's motion, noting the Court of Appeal had already dismissed her request to transfer the file.

The court also dismissed the respondent's motion, finding the appellant's conduct, while confusing, did not meet the threshold of a vexatious litigant.

Following a Court of Appeal decision remitting the issue of damages to the Superior Court, the plaintiff sought damages under the Arthur Wishart Act after rescinding a franchise agreement due to the franchisor's failure to provide a disclosure document.

The court assessed the plaintiff's claims for lost income, non-competition covenant compliance, and office expenses.

The court awarded $22,317, covering lease payments, office insurance, and a portion of the claimed lost income, while dismissing claims for equipment costs and lost income related to the non-competition covenant.

The defendant brought a motion to remove Siskinds LLP as counsel of record for the plaintiffs, citing conflict of interest and 'lawyer as witness' concerns.

The dispute involved an internal corporate struggle over share ownership and director status in LEO Canada Inc. Siskinds LLP had acted as corporate counsel during the events giving rise to the dispute and was now acting as litigation counsel for both the corporation and one of the disputing shareholders.

The court found significant conflict of interest concerns, noting that lawyers from the firm were likely to be necessary witnesses regarding the preparation and execution of contested corporate documents.

The court ordered the removal of Siskinds LLP, directed that the corporation and the individual plaintiff obtain separate representation, and established a procedure for documentary disclosure.

The defendant brought a motion to find the plaintiffs in civil contempt for allegedly breaching an interim order that mandated joint operation of a corporation, restricted disclosure of litigation details, and required the sharing of corporate information and financial reports.

The court found that the plaintiffs intentionally breached the order by failing to provide access to corporate records and failing to deliver monthly financial reports, resulting in formal findings of contempt.

The court also found the plaintiff breached the disclosure restrictions but exercised its discretion not to make a formal contempt finding on that ground.

The allegations of failing to jointly operate the corporation were dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for farm properties, or alternatively, damages for breach of contract.

The defendants argued the agreement was unconscionable, they were coerced by real estate agents, and the property was not unique.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the validity of the agreement, rejecting the defences of non est factum and unconscionability, and held that the defendants breached the contract.

However, the court declined to order specific performance, finding the property was not sufficiently unique and damages were an adequate remedy.

Partial summary judgment was granted on validity and breach, with the issue of damages deferred to trial.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment of $2.75 million obtained against him.

The court applied the five-factor test from Mountainview Farms Ltd. v. McQueen.

The court found that the defendant had deliberately evaded service and ignored the proceedings until enforcement was imminent in Hong Kong.

The court declined to consider the merits of the defence due to the defendant's conscious decision not to participate.

The motion was dismissed, and costs of $40,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs, franchisees of the defendant, brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking declarations that the defendant franchisor breached the Arthur Wishart Act by failing to provide a disclosure document upon renewal of their franchise agreement, and breached its duty of fair dealing.

The franchisor argued it was exempt from providing a disclosure document under s. 5(7)(f) of the Act because there was no material change.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that whether the terms of the renewal agreement constituted a material change, especially in the context of the franchisor's shift toward a corporate service model, presented a genuine issue requiring a trial.