COURT FILE NO.: CV-20-150 (Sarnia)

DATE: 20240206

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Fiddick’s Nursing Home Limited

Plaintiff

– and –

Maria Moore and Tom Moore

Defendants

COUNSEL:

Michael Polvere, Counsel for the Plaintiff

Denis Grigoras, Counsel for the Defendants

HEARD: November 17, 2023 – via Zoom

RULING ON MOTION

MACFARLANE J.

Introduction – The Motion

1The defendants, Maria Moore (“Ms. Moore”) and Tom Moore (“Mr. Moore”), are spouses of one another. The plaintiff, Fiddick’s Nursing Home Limited (“Fiddick’s”), has sued the defendants in defamation and intentional interference with economic relations. The action arises from a series of tweets posted (or “tweeted”), or in some instances reposted (or “retweeted”), by the defendants on Twitter (the social media platform now known as “X”) and comments made by Ms. Moore that were published in a newspaper (collectively, “the Expression”).

2The defendants allege that this proceeding constitutes strategic litigation against public participation (a “SLAPP”) and bring this motion against Fiddick’s to dismiss the proceeding pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”).

3For the reasons that follow, I find that the proceeding is a SLAPP and must be dismissed pursuant to ss. 137.1(3) of the CJA.

Relevant Facts

4Fiddick’s owns and operates a nursing home in Petrolia, Ontario (“the Home”). The Home is operated with a view to making a profit for Fiddick’s. Ms. Moore’s mother, Helena Dawson (“Ms. Dawson”), was a resident at the Home through the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic (“the pandemic”), until she died on October 27, 2020.

5Both Ms. Moore and Mr. Moore have been trained and employed in the health care sector. Ms. Moore is a registered nurse, health services manager, former instructor for personal support work, and palliative-care-trained end-of-life doula. Mr. Moore is a retired paramedic.

6It is not disputed that for a period of time in 2020, government guidelines respecting access to long-term care facilities changed frequently, and Fiddick’s had determined that it should employ stricter policies that provided for more controls on access than were mandated by the Government of Ontario. Fiddick’s is proud of the fact that through the course of the pandemic, it did not have any outbreaks of the COVID-19 virus among residents at the Home, which it attributes to its strict policies.

7The defendants did not agree with these policies, and argued that by overly restricting access to residents, Fiddick’s was causing harm to them due primarily to increased isolation. There was a period of time when Fiddick’s did not permit the defendants to visit Ms. Dawson in the Home because they were not able, or not willing, to comply with Fiddick’s policies. The defendants had communicated directly with the Home’s management about their concerns.

8The Ontario Ministry of Long-Term Care (the “Ministry”) conducted an investigation over several days in August 2020, following complaints made by the defendants in relation to Ms. Dawson’s care at the Home. In its report issued September 3, 2020 (the “Report”), the Ministry found the following:

a) [Fiddick’s] has failed to ensure that every alleged, suspected or witnessed incident of abuse of a resident by anyone that the licensee knew of, or that was reported to the licensee was immediately investigated and appropriate action was taken in response to every such incident.

b) [Fiddick’s] has failed to ensure that any person who had reasonable grounds to suspect that abuse of a resident by anyone had occurred or may occur immediately reported the suspicion and the information upon which it was based to the Director.

c) [Fiddick’s] has failed to ensure that the licensee’s written policy under section 20 of the Act to promote zero tolerance of abuse and neglect of residents contained procedures and interventions to assist and support residents who have been abused or neglected or allegedly abused or neglected, identified measures and strategies to prevent abuse and neglect, and identified the training and retraining requirements for all staff, including, training on the relationship between power imbalances between staff and residents and the potential for abuse and neglect by those in a position of trust, power and responsibility for resident care, and situations that may lead to abuse and neglect and how to avoid such situations.

d) [Fiddick’s] has failed to ensure that a resident’s right to communicate in confidence, receive visitors of their choice and consult in private with any person without interference was fully respected and promoted.

9All of this was happening at a time when the media and the general public were paying more attention to long-term care facilities than at any other time in memory.

10As noted above, the Expression consisted of a series of tweets posted by the defendants, and comments Ms. Moore made that were published in a local newspaper, The Independent of Petrolia and Central Lambton (“the Independent”). Fiddick’s did not sue either Twitter or the Independent. The Expression is reproduced in Appendix “A” to these reasons.

11Fiddick’s commenced this action under the simplified procedure, r. 76 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, on October 21, 2020, six days before Ms. Dawson died. The claim alleges the Expression constitutes both defamation and intentional interference with economic relations. The defendants have defended the action, pleading various defences in relation to each of the impugned components of the Expression.

The Anti-SLAPP Analytical Framework

12The Supreme Court of Canada has described SLAPPs as “lawsuits initiated against individuals or organizations that speak out or take a position on an issue of public interest … generally initiated by plaintiffs who engage the court process and use litigation not as a direct tool to vindicate a bona fide claim, but as an indirect tool to limit the expression of others”: 1704604 Ontario Ltd. v. Pointes Protection Association, 2020 SCC 22, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 587, at para. 2 (“Pointes”).

13Section 137.1 of the CJA provides as follows:

Prevention of Proceedings that Limit Freedom of Expression on Matters of Public Interest (Gag Proceedings)

Dismissal of proceeding that limits debate

Purposes

137.1 (1) The purposes of this section and sections 137.2 to 137.5 are,

(a) to encourage individuals to express themselves on matters of public interest;

(b) to promote broad participation in debates on matters of public interest;

(c) to discourage the use of litigation as a means of unduly limiting expression on matters of public interest; and

(d) to reduce the risk that participation by the public in debates on matters of public interest will be hampered by fear of legal action.

Definition, “expression”

(2) In this section,

“expression” means any communication, regardless of whether it is made verbally or non-verbally, whether it is made publicly or privately, and whether or not it is directed at a person or entity.

Order to dismiss

(3) On motion by a person against whom a proceeding is brought, a judge shall, subject to subsection (4), dismiss the proceeding against the person if the person satisfies the judge that the proceeding arises from an expression made by the person that relates to a matter of public interest.

No dismissal

(4) A judge shall not dismiss a proceeding under subsection (3) if the responding party satisfies the judge that,

(a) there are grounds to believe that,

(i) the proceeding has substantial merit, and

(ii) the moving party has no valid defence in the proceeding; and

(b) the harm likely to be or have been suffered by the responding party as a result of the moving party’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting that expression.

No further steps in proceeding

(5) Once a motion under this section is made, no further steps may be taken in the proceeding by any party until the motion, including any appeal of the motion, has been finally disposed of.

No amendment to pleadings

(6) Unless a judge orders otherwise, the responding party shall not be permitted to amend his or her pleadings in the proceeding,

(a) in order to prevent or avoid an order under this section dismissing the proceeding; or

(b) if the proceeding is dismissed under this section, in order to continue the proceeding.

Costs on dismissal

(7) If a judge dismisses a proceeding under this section, the moving party is entitled to costs on the motion and in the proceeding on a full indemnity basis, unless the judge determines that such an award is not appropriate in the circumstances.

Costs if motion to dismiss denied

(8) If a judge does not dismiss a proceeding under this section, the responding party is not entitled to costs on the motion, unless the judge determines that such an award is appropriate in the circumstances.

Damages

(9) If, in dismissing a proceeding under this section, the judge finds that the responding party brought the proceeding in bad faith or for an improper purpose, the judge may award the moving party such damages as the judge considers appropriate.

14The purposes of the legislation are expressly set out in ss. 137.1(1), and the term “expression” is defined broadly in ss. 137.1(2). There has been a great deal of jurisprudence concerning the approach to be taken when a motion is to be brought under s. 137.1 of the CJA. These motions are typically brought by defendants who have been sued in defamation, as is the case here.

15The threshold inquiry places the burden on the moving defendant to show that:

a) the proceeding arises from an expression made by the defendant; and,

b) the expression relates to a matter of public interest.

16If the moving defendant fails to meet its burden, the motion must be dismissed, and the proceeding will continue.

17If the moving defendant meets the threshold inquiry, the burden shifts to the responding plaintiff to show under s. 137.1(4) that:

a) there are grounds to believe that the proceeding has substantial merit;

b) there are grounds to believe that there are no valid defences to the claims; and,

c) the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s expression is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the plaintiff’s action to proceed outweighs the public interest in protecting the defendant’s expression.

18In Armstrong v. Farahi, 2023 ONSC 5069, my colleague, Cook J., recently summarized the process of a s.137.1 anti-SLAPP motion as follows, at para. 29:

A motion under s. 137.1 is not a motion for summary judgment. It does not involve adjudication of the merits of the underlying action. Rather, the review is a screening process, normally utilized at an early stage of the proceedings on a limited factual record, used to identify and terminate litigation that would unduly limit expression on matters of public interest. The analysis must remain focussed on the statutory criteria and not devolve into a disguised adjudication on merits. [Footnote omitted].

Analysis

a) The Threshold Issue: Does the Proceeding Arise From an Expression Concerning a Matter of Public Interest pursuant to ss. 137.1(3)?

19It is not disputed that the Expression comes within the meaning of the term “expression” in ss. 137.1(2) of the CJA, and that this proceeding arises from the Expression in the sense that the Expression forms the factual basis for the alleged causes of action against the defendants. However, Fiddick’s argues that the Expression relates purely to a private dispute between the defendants and Fiddick’s with respect to Ms. Dawson’s care at the Home, and not a matter of public interest. I disagree.

20In Pointes, at paras. 26-28, the Supreme Court held:

[26] [W]hat does “relates to a matter of public interest” mean? These words should be given a broad and liberal interpretation, consistent with the legislative purpose of s. 137.1(3).

[27] The expression should be assessed “as a whole”, and it must be asked whether “some segment of the community would have a genuine interest in receiving information on the subject”.

[28] The statutory language used in s. 137.1(3) confirms that “public interest” ought to be given a broad interpretation. Indeed, “public interest” is preceded by the modifier “a matter of”. This is important, as it is not legally relevant whether the expression is desirable or deleterious, valuable or vexatious, or whether it helps or hampers the public interest — there is no qualitative assessment of the expression at this stage. The question is only whether the expression pertains to any matter of public interest, defined broadly. The legislative background confirms that this burden is purposefully not an onerous one.

[Citations omitted, emphasis in original].

21Respectfully, the position advanced by Fiddick’s attempts to introduce a qualitative assessment of the Expression at the threshold stage, and narrowly paints the Expression as being unrelated to the pandemic and the obvious and enormous public interest in the quality of care provided in long-term care homes at that time. This position is contrary to the broad approach mandated in Pointes. The fact that the Expression relates to matters of public interest is indeed self-evident from the Ministry’s investigation and Report, which was done in the course of its public regulatory function.

22Accordingly, I find that the defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that the Expression relates to a matter of public interest.

b) The Merits-Based Hurdle: Are There Grounds to Believe that the Proceeding Has Substantial Merit and that the Defendants Have no Valid Defence pursuant to paragraph 137.1(4)(a)?

23Fiddick’s has asserted claims in both defamation and intentional interference with economic relations in its statement of claim. Both claims arise from the Expression; however, Fiddick’s did not even mention the latter tort in its factum or in the body of Michael Fiddick’s affidavit sworn August 29, 2023, in response to the motion. In my view, the claim for intentional interference with economic relations either has no merit or has been abandoned or subsumed in the defamation action. I will therefore consider the “merits-based hurdle” with reference to the claim asserted for defamation.

24The Supreme Court considered in Pointes what is necessary to find that there are grounds to believe that a proceeding has substantial merit, concluding, at para. 54, that “the plaintiff must satisfy the motion judge that there are grounds to believe that its underlying claim is legally tenable and supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief such that the claim can be said to have a real prospect of success.”

25The Supreme Court continued, at para. 60, to explain elements of a finding that there are grounds to believe that the moving party has no valid defence – the second part of the merits-based hurdle:

In summary, s. 137.1(4)(a)(ii) operates, in effect, as a burden-shifting provision in itself: the moving party (i.e. defendant) must put potential defences in play, and the responding party (i.e. plaintiff) must show that none of those defences are valid in order to meet its burden. Mirroring the “substantial merit” prong, under which the plaintiff must show that there are grounds to believe that its claim has a real prospect of success, the “no valid defence” prong requires the plaintiff, who bears the statutory burden, to show that there are grounds to believe that the defences have no real prospect of success. This makes sense, since s. 137.1(4)(a) as a whole is fundamentally concerned with the strength of the underlying proceeding. [Emphasis in original].

26In Park Lawn Corporation v. Kahu Capital Partners Ltd. et al., 2023 ONCA 129, 165 O.R. (3d) 753, at para. 18 (“Park Lawn”), leave to appeal refused, 2023 CanLII 100618 (S.C.C.), the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that the motion judge had “observed that a s. 137.1 motion is not a determinative adjudication of either the merits of the claim or the existence of a defence. That said, the claim must have a real prospect of success; a possible or arguable case is insufficient. Concomitantly, the defences in play should not have a real prospect of success.” This finding was not challenged on appeal and is consistent with the direction given by the Supreme Court in Pointes.

27The Supreme Court confirmed the essential elements of a claim in defamation in Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, at para. 28:

A plaintiff in a defamation action is required to prove three things to obtain judgment and an award of damages: (1) that the impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person; (2) that the words in fact referred to the plaintiff; and (3) that the words were published, meaning that they were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff.

28There were no cross-examinations conducted, so the record in this motion consists only of the pleadings and the affidavits filed by the parties. I note that particularly because of the limited evidentiary record before the Court, any findings I make are for the limited purpose of this motion.

29In reviewing the Expression and the claims advanced by Fiddick’s, I find that there are grounds to believe that there is some merit to a portion of its claim. The defendants have admitted that certain of the tweets are capable of a defamatory meaning, for example, the tweet naming Fiddick’s as a “culprit” and a “control freak”. The statements made by Ms. Moore in the Independent article would also likely be found to be defamatory. However, there are also many tweets, and retweets, that make no reference to Fiddick’s and would not tend to lower Fiddick’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person. I do not consider them to be defamatory. There are also several tweets which might be found to be defamatory, but I consider it unlikely.

30For those portions of the Expression that might be found to be defamatory, I find that all of the defences raised by the defendants (i.e., the hyperlink defence, the bane and antidote defence, the responsible communication defence, the lesser defamatory meaning defence, and the fair comment defence) have a genuine prospect of success at trial in relation to the respective parts of the Expression for which the defences are raised.

31On the totality of the evidence before me, and considering the Expression and the proceeding holistically, I find that Fiddick’s has failed to show that are grounds to believe that its underlying claim is legally tenable and supported by evidence that is reasonably capable of belief such that the claim can be said to have a real prospect of success. Moreover, I find that Fiddick’s has failed to show that there are grounds to believe that the defences have no real prospect of success.

c) The Public Interest Hurdle: Is the Harm Likely to Be or Have Been Suffered by Fiddick’s as a Result of the Expression Sufficiently Serious that the Public Interest in Permitting the Proceeding to Continue Outweighs the Public Interest in Protecting the Expression pursuant to paragraph 137.1(4)(b)?

32Although Fiddick’s has failed to clear the merits-based hurdle, I will nevertheless consider public interest hurdle, which is referred to throughout the caselaw as the “crux of the analysis”: Pointes, at para. 61. Even if the claim had successfully fulfilled the requirements of para. 137.1(4) of the CJA, “it remains vulnerable to summary dismissal as a result of the public interest weighing exercise under s. 137.1(4)(b), which provides courts with a robust backstop to protect freedom of expression”: Pointes at para. 53.

33The Court of Appeal summarized the analysis required by para. 137.1(4) of the CJA in Park Lawn, at para. 38:

To address the objectives of the legislation, it bears repeating that the emphasis of the motion should be on the “crux” or “core” of the analysis, namely the weighing exercise. This should not involve a trial of the issue or as some have put it, a “trial in a box”. Rather, the motion is a screening procedure. At the third stage of the test, the weighing exercise, a technical, granular analysis is not required. Instead, … the motion judge should step back and ask what is really going on. [Citations omitted]

34On the question of harm, the Supreme Court held in Bent v. Platnick, 2020 SCC 23, [2020] 2 S.C.R. 645, at para. 144 (“Bent”):

General damages are presumed in defamations actions, and this alone is sufficient to constitute harm. However, the magnitude of the harm will be important in assessing whether the harm is sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighs the public interest in protecting the expression. General damages in the nominal sense will ordinarily not be sufficient for this purpose. [Citations omitted].

35Bent explains that the focus of the public interest hurdle is not simply whether it is likely, assuming the claim is successful that Fiddick’s has suffered or will suffer harm as a result of the Expression, but what is the gravity of that harm? In other words, is the harm serious? I note that although damages are presumed in defamation cases, a corporate plaintiff cannot be compensated for hurt feelings or by an award of aggravated damages. As the Court of Appeal noted in Walker et al. v. CFTO Ltd. et al. (1987), 1987 CanLII 126 (ON CA), 59 O.R. (2d) 104 (C.A.), at p. 113:

A company whose business character or reputation (as distinct from the character or reputation of the persons who compose it) is injuriously affected by a defamatory publication is entitled, without proof of damage, to a compensatory award representing the sum necessary to publicly vindicate the company's business reputation. But a company has no feelings and, therefore, as Lord Reid notes in Lewis et al. v. Daily Telegraph, Ltd., “[a] company cannot be injured in its feelings, it can only be injured in its pocket”. Hence, unlike an individual, a company is not entitled to compensation for injury to hurt feelings or, it follows, to compensation by way of aggravated damages for a loss of this nature. [Emphasis added, citation omitted].

See also Skafco Limited v. Abdalla, 2020 ONSC 136, 62 C.C.L.T. (4th) 14, at para. 20.

36Taking the wording of para. 137.1(4) of the CJA, the question at this stage is this: what is the seriousness of the harm that is likely to be or have been suffered by Fiddick’s as a result of the Expression? The harm does not need to be monetized for the purpose of demonstrating the existence of harm: see Bent, at para. 149; and Pointes, at para 71. However, in order to properly weigh the competing public interest considerations, there must be some evidentiary basis to assess the magnitude of the alleged harm.

37Fiddick’s asserted in its factum that it has suffered grievous reputational damage. Namely, because the plaintiff is a private long-term care facility, its expertise and skills are synonymous with its name.

38There is no evidence to support this statement. The only evidence filed by Fiddick’s was the affidavit of its principal, Michael Fiddick, sworn August 29, 2023. Mr. Fiddick gave no evidence, whatsoever, as to the business reputation of Fiddick’s either before or after the Expression was published, and certainly no evidence of any actual business losses alleged to be attributable to the Expression. Given that nearly three years had passed since the publication of the Expression when that affidavit was sworn, I infer that Fiddick’s is likely to suffer or has suffered no more harm that could be compensated by nominal damages as a result of the Expression (assuming that the Expression were proven to have been defamatory). For that reason, I find that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue is minimal.

39Balanced against the question of harm is the question of protecting the Expression as free speech. Specifically, what is the magnitude of the public interest in protecting the Expression? This involves an assessment of the quality of the Expression, and the motivation behind it: see Pointes, at para. 74.

40The overall context of the Expression is important. The defendants have both worked in the healthcare sector, and had a specific and urgent interest in advocating for Ms. Dawson’s care in the last months of her life. This advocacy took several forms:

a) Direct communications, both orally and in writing, with Fiddick’s;

b) Complaining to the Ministry; and,

c) Parts of the Expression.

41As a result of their concerns over Ms. Dawson’s care and over pandemic-related policies and living conditions affecting all residents of long-term care homes and their families, the defendants also felt an overarching interest in retweeting certain statements, not always specifically related to Fiddick’s, with which they agreed. They did this in order to advocate more generally for what they considered to be the rights of residents of long-term care facilities at a time during the pandemic when it was such a significant matter of public interest that it was quite literally front-page news.

42Ms. Moore also spoke to, and was quoted in, the Independent article following the publication of the Ministry Report. The Ministry Report found that Fiddick’s had failed in several ways, and Ms. Moore’s statements appear to have been based upon her own observations and things that were said to her by Ms. Dawson or others at the Home. If her evidence were believed at a trial, the claim in defamation arising from the Independent article would likely fail.

43Counsel referred to the “hallmarks” or “indicia” of a SLAPP, which the Supreme Court has found bear on the analysis, but only to the extent that they are “tethered” to the wording of para. 137.1(4)(b): see Pointes at paras. 78-79. In my view, three of the four indicia may be present in this case: that is, 1) a financial imbalance that strongly favours Fiddick’s; 2) the proceeding may be animated by a retributory purpose related to the defendants’ complaints to the Ministry; and, 3) the minimal damages suffered by Fiddick’s. That said, I do not make any findings as to whether these factors are conclusively present, as I do not believe that such a determination is necessary to “tip the scales” in the weighing exercise.

44In conclusion, I find that although the quality of the Expression was somewhat variable, the defendants’ motivations were not malicious. Rather, the defendants were sincerely driven by their concerns for the welfare of Ms. Dawson specifically, and residents of long-term care facilities and their families generally, at a time when such concerns were at the forefront of public interest. The weight to be accorded to the public’s interest in protecting the Expression is significant. It substantially outweighs the public’s interest in allowing the proceeding to continue.

Conclusion

45For all of these reasons, the defendants’ motion is granted, and the claim is dismissed.

46Subsection 137.1(7) of the CJA provides as follows:

Costs on dismissal

(7) If a judge dismisses a proceeding under this section, the moving party is entitled to costs on the motion and in the proceeding on a full indemnity basis, unless the judge determines that such an award is not appropriate in the circumstances.

47If the parties are unable to agree upon costs, the parties may make written submissions in strict compliance with r. 4.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as to the scale and quantum of costs in accordance with the following timetable and page limits (exclusive of any bill of costs, dockets, evidence of disbursements, costs outline, offers to settle, or authorities):

a) Defendants’ submissions delivered within 15 days of the date of this decision, limited to five pages;

b) Plaintiff’s submissions delivered within 15 days of the defendants’ delivery of their submissions, limited to six pages; and,

c) Defendant’s reply submissions delivered within five days of the plaintiff’s delivery of its submissions, limited to two pages.

48If any party fails to deliver submissions in accordance with the requirements set out above, they shall be deemed to have waived their rights with respect to the issue of costs, and the Court may proceed to make its determination in the absence of their input or give such directions as the Court considers necessary or advisable.

Appendix “A” – The Expression

• On July 22, 2020, Tom Moore tweeted:

To Fiddicks #NursingHome in Petrolia: Denying family access to residents is problematic when you cannot evaluate the changing conditions of patients and respond appropriately….

• In a further Tweet, on July 27, 2020, Tom Moore tweeted:

The responsibilities of #Ontario #LongTermCare have not ended with the keeping of Covid19 out of the building. Operators are still obligated to provide adequate staffing to ensure personal and health care for residents @onlongtermcare #Fiddicks #Petrolia.

• The same day, Maria Moore retweeted a tweet authored by Lorrie Beauchamp which stated the following:

Maybe we should start naming and identifying the culprits who are being control freaks?.

• On July 28, 2020, and further to the above tweet, Maria Moore tweeted:

Fiddicks Nursing Home, #petrolia Ontario. #forproflt provider of #ltc

• On July 28, 2020, Maria Moore tweeted,

How can #LTC organizations now move from #crisismanagement to #quality seniors car to ensure #residentsrights are being honoured? My mother's nursing home is content to be #Covid free but have lost the #resident care and #qualityoflife focus. #letusin to be with our loved ones.

• On August 1, 2020, Maria Moore tweeted:

This is disgraceful care of our seniors. It is similar at the home where my mother is. If inside 3 tables are set up in close proximity and everyone is yelling through masks and no one is hearing. All while being timed for 20 minutes. #elderabuse.

• On August 30, 2020, Tom Moore tweeted:

I don't suppose that private #ltc nursing homes are using the "no visitor" excuse to hide their abysmal staffing shortages and neglect for residents.

• On September 27, 2020, Maria Moore tweeted:

My mother enjoyed lunch out, sun and living. parking lots around the home have families holding hands without transportation options-we r lucky. #novisitsinside except 1 day a week. #makeyourownrules in #ltc is a bad way to provide care in Ontario.

• Maria Moore retweeted a tweet, undated, authored by Kathy O’Neil, that stated:

The mood in the LTC home is a quiet foreboding. We can all see the direction this is headed. The fear is real. The change needs to be real. Homes are using subtle (and not so subtle) threats and intimidation to keep staff and families quiet. People need protection now.

• Maria Moore retweeted another tweet, undated, authored by Kathy O’Neil that stated:

Every day I live in fear that I will show up at the LTC home and the doors will be locked. There is no consequence to the home not following new visiting rules for ECs. With today's numbers the Administrator will be chomping at the bit to lock us out.

• On October 22, 2020, Maria Moore tweeted the following, accompanied by four photos of a ghoulish Halloween display in front of a house across the street from the Home:

The view from a nursing home window with locked in seniors. #halloweenhorror has its place but #dementia #sad #scared don’t need this. Too much in wrong place.

• In a further undated tweet, Maria Moore stated:

I sat with my dying mother in LTC and other residents would come and sit with me for company and talk about how they wanted to die too. Death is welcome instead of the isolation and fear.

• On September 17, 2020, Maria Moore made comments in an article authored by Heather Wright in The Independent of Petrolia and Central Lambton. Those comments were as follows:

Maria Moore says staff members told her mother to soil herself instead of helping her to a toilet. That left her in tears and upset.

Another worker reported overhearing the incident to a supervisor and submitted a statement on the incident three days later.

When we went through all of the hundred pages of notes that they had they found, a nurse had charted that my mom had said that to them. So, then they failed to advocate for my mother ... they failed to notify the director of care that this neglect went on. And there was no policies in place for reporting or ensuring that it doesn’t happen again,” says Moore.

The fourth complaint stemmed from Moore’s concern over Fiddick’s visiting policy during the pandemic. When visitor restrictions eased across the province, family members at the Petrolia home were required to either log into their medical account to prove they had tested negative for COVID-19 or give specific times and dates for their test and when the negative result was received in a signed document.

The home also didn’t offer an outdoor alternative, refusing the Moores a time to visit.

Moore says the new visiting rules are still not being followed, a month and a half later.

Moore says she is limited to visiting her mom on Wednesday every week for just two hours in her room.

Moore says, they are taking advantage of new short term visit rules. The family has bought a wheelchair accessible van to take her mother out of the home whenever they can even though nursing home staff seemed upset by the move. “There was some negativity that first day when everyone was allowed to come out, because the girl who worked at the desk said, ‘You know, I wish none of them are going out.’ ...She made it very clear she was not happy with the process.”

When Moore first raised concerns to The Independent about how Fiddicks was managing residents visitors in late July, the Director of Resident Care, Mandy Judah, said in an email 99.5 per cent of the residents and family were “favourable” to the current restrictions and “had no complaints.” Moore confirmed that saying while there was grumbling about the way visits were being conducted while people waited to connect with family, the family council was supporting the rules at the Petrolia home.

[Ms. Dawson]’s dozing off because she’s on so much more pain meds and she’s exhausted,” says Moore. “I put her words on Twitter, she says it’s so nice to be able to get out of the morgue for the day. All you do is just sit around waiting for the next person to die.”

Moore says as she complained to the home about the physical and mental health issues, she was given a form to apply to move her mother to another home - a suggestion she is taking.