Geddes v. Schuerch, 2026 ONSC 3520

Geddes v. Schuerch, 2026 ONSC 3520

COURT FILE NO.: CV-22-904 (Chatham)

DATE: 20260615

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

MANUELA GEDDES

Plaintiff/

Defendant by Counterclaim

– and –

WERNER SCHUERCH

Defendant/

Plaintiff by Counterclaim

Steven Pickard and Aleksa Nikolic, for the Plaintiff

Natalie C. Kuehn and Victoria A. Stephenson, for the Defendant

HEARD: Trial heard September 15, 16, 17, 23, 25, 26 and October 7, 8 and 17, 2025

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HORVAT J.:

OVERVIEW

1Manuela Geddes brings this action against her father, Werner Schuerch, for a judgment that she is the beneficial owner of real property, municipally known as 12902 O’Neill Line, Ridgetown, Ontario (the “Property”). Alternatively, she seeks damages in the amount of $1.2 million for breach of trust, breach of contract, and/or unjust enrichment.

2Werner counterclaims against Manuela for damages in the amount of $500,000 for slander of title (under s. 103(4) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (“CJA”), and an order for vacant possession of the Property.

3Werner is the registered owner of the Property. Manuela and her family have resided in the house located on the Property (“Main House”) since 2013. Werner resided in a modular home located on the Property (“Modular Home”) from 2014 until 2017 when he relocated to his native Switzerland. Manuela has paid no rent, though she and her family have maintained and upgraded the house and the Property, and paid property taxes. Manuela commenced this action and obtained a certificate of pending litigation (“CPL”) over the Property in 2022.

4Manuela argues proprietary estoppel, claiming that she and Werner formed an agreement in 2013 that included Werner inviting her to reside on the Property and pay all expenses. In exchange, Werner promised to leave the Property to Manuela in his Will. Werner denies that he made any promise to Manuela to leave the Property to her in his Will.

5Manuela has not established any of the three elements of proprietary estoppel. The evidence does not support a finding that: (a) Werner represented to Manuela that she would inherit the Property in exchange for completing repairs and improvements to the Property; (b) Manuela’s reliance on the representation was reasonable; or (c) Manuela suffered any detriment as a result of her reliance. Manuela’s claim must fail.

6Werner’s counterclaim under s. 103(4) of the CJA must also fail. Obtaining a CPL was reasonable in the circumstances and merely preserved the status quo. Despite this, as Werner is the legal owner of the Property, he is entitled to his requested order for vacant possession.

BACKGROUND

7Werner moved to Canada from Switzerland in 1994 with two of his three children: Manuela and Marcel. Werner’s son Sascha remained in Switzerland.

8In the spring of 1994, Werner purchased the Property, which included a farm parcel. Werner continues to be the sole registered owner of the Property. Werner operated the Property as a pig farm, and he built the Main House on the Property.

9In 2013, Werner retired from farming. He then severed the Property and sold the farm parcel. Manuela assisted Werner with severing the Property, as well as with the accounting and other activities respecting the Property.

10In December 2013, Manuela and her husband David moved into the Main House with Werner.

11On December 16, 2013, the local municipality approved Werner’s zoning amendment to permit a garden suite, including a modular home, to be erected on the Property.

12In or about June 2014, the Modular Home was erected on the Property and Werner moved into it.

13On July 22, 2014, Werner executed a Will (“2014 Will”) that directed that the Property be transferred to Manuela on Werner’s death. The remainder of his estate was to be distributed 40 percent to Sasha and 60 percent to Marcel. Marcel was also given a right of first refusal to purchase the Property if Manuela wished to sell the Property.

14On July 29, 2014, Werner attended at his lawyer’s office with Manuela and David to discuss the Property and their arrangements. On August 1, 2014, Werner’s lawyer wrote to Werner and copied Manuela (the “Mahoney Letter”) summarizing the meeting as follows:

As you know, Werner is the registered owner of the home in which Manuela and David reside as tenants. Manuela and David indicated a desire to make a capital improvement to the home, including replacement of the roof and potentially other improvements which they wish to make. They wish to ensure that if their tenancy were terminated for any reason, that they would be compensated for the various capital improvements made.

I suggested that Werner could give a mortgage to Manuela and David to the extent of the capital improvements, with no payments being required and no interest being charged. Payment would only come in the event of termination of the tenancy. Werner expressed some concern that any such improvements would depreciate over time with no corresponding deduction on principal balance owing on the mortgage. For this reason, Werner was reluctant to give such a mortgage, as he indicated that no rent was being charged for the home, and he was of the opinion that this situation should offset his obligation to pay back any such mortgage.

I understand that further consideration will be given to this issue.

Werner also expressed a desire to have continued access to the home in which Manuela and David reside. Werner requires approximately 500 sq. Feet in the lower level of the home, which he can utilize for storage purposes. After some discussion, a suitable area was chosen by Werner and agreed to by the parties.

Werner also wanted the ability to store 2 motor vehicles in the garage and again it was generally agreed that he be offered to park 2 of his vehicles, back to back and that he be afforded access to such area through the double doors in the garage.

It was further agreed that Manuela and David would be responsible for the clearing of snow for the driveway during the winter months and David would acquire the appropriate equipment to do so. Werner would assist from time to time with such snow removal as circumstances dictate.

We further understand that the water supply has been terminated to the property as a result of a fire which took place on the Van Goudswaard property. We further understand that Werner has been forced to put a new well on his property, the cost of which is still to be determined. As requested, we shall correspond to the Van Goudswaard’s lawyer to see about the possibility of an insurance claim to compensation Werner at least partially for the cost of the new well. We will advise you when we have had some response from the Van Goudswaard’s lawyer.

15From 2014 to 2016, Werner contributed $2,000 towards the property taxes.

16On November 3, 2016, Ms. Downs met with Werner at her office. Werner instructed his lawyer, Ms. Downs, to make the following changes to his Will:

(a) The provision related to leaving the Property to Manuela was to be deleted in full.

(b) Manuela was to be left a right of first refusal to buy the Property at fair market value.

(c) If Manuela did not purchase the Property, then Marcel would be given an option to purchase the Property at fair market value. If Marcel did not purchase the Property, then Sasha would be given the option.

(d) Werner’s estate is to be distributed 35 percent each to Manuela and Marcel, and 30 percent to Sasha.

17On November 8, 2016, Werner executed a Codicil to his 2014 Will. The Codicil states:

I HEREBY revoke paragraph III (b), (c) and (d) of the Last Will and Testament and substitute the following:

(b) I DIRECT that my daughter, Manuela Schuerch, be given the first right of refusal to purchase my property, consisting of a house and 3.8 acres, located at Part Lot 11, Concession 8, being Part 1, 2, 3, & 4, Plan 24R-9557, Howard Township, Municipality of Chatham-Kent, for “fair market value”, which right of first refusal must be exercised within one-hundred and twenty (120) days of my death. In the event that my daughter, MANUELA SCHUERCH, does not wish to purchase the said property, I DIRECT that my son, MARCEL SCHUERCH, shall be given the first right of refusal to purchase the said above noted property for “fair market value”, which right of first refusal must be exercised within 90 days of MANUELA'S decision not to act on her right of refusal. In the event that my son, MARCEL SCHUERCH, does not purchase the said property, I direct that my son, SASHA SCHUERCH, shall be given the first right of refusal to purchase the said above-noted property for “fair market value”, which right of first refusal must be exercised within 90 days of MARCEL'S decision not to act on his right of refusal.

(c) Unless the aforementioned right of refusal is exercised as in Paragraph III (b) above, my daughter, MANUELA SCHUERCH, shall vacate the house located on the above-noted property no later than one (1) year from my date of death. Upon my death, my daughter, MANUELA SCHUERCH, shall pay all of the utilities and all realty taxes of the property, while she and her family are in possession of the property after my death, until she and her family vacate the property. Upon MANUELA SCHUERCH's vacancy from the property, my estate will pay all expenses of the property until it is sold…

18Werner did not advise Manuela of the Codicil.

19In late summer 2017, Werner decided that he wanted to move back to his native Switzerland.

20In September 2017, Werner, Manuela, David, and Marcel met with Werner’s lawyer, Ms. Downs, to discuss how the Property would be looked after while Werner was away. On September 21, 2017, Werner granted power of attorney over property jointly to Manuela and Marcel and the three entered into a trust agreement (the “Trust Agreement”). The Trust Agreement provides:

(a) In the recitals:

(i) Werner is moving to Switzerland on October 1, 2017 “for an indefinite period of time”;

(ii) Marcel and Manuela maintain the Property while Werner is out of the country;

(iii) Werner holds sole title to the Property;

(b) The House “which is currently occupied by Manuela and her family, shall continue to be maintained and all expenses of the property paid for by Manuela her family, including the property property [sic] taxes, save and except the costs associated with the modular home located on the property”;

(c) The Modular Home “shall remain vacant for as long as Werner so instructs, and Manuela shall ensure that [M]odular [H]ome continues to have electricity and gas as long as Werner so instructs”;

(d) “Marcel and Manuela agree that they shall not rent out the [M]odular [H]ome to a third party unless they receive Werner's express written permission and instruction”;

(e) “It is agreed that Manuela shall act on behalf of Werner with respect to dealing with the municipality and the neighbor and any related third parties, concerning matters affecting [the Property], including a livestock issue, the neighbour's proposed fence, and any ancillary matters, however, Manuela does not have Werner's permission to settle any of these matters without Werner's express written permission”;

(f) “Marcel and Manuela have Werner's permission to enter the [M]odular [H]ome, upon his vacancy, to remove furniture located within the [M]odular [H]ome as they may wish from time to time”;

(g) “Marcel and Manuela agree to attend and enter into the [M]odular [H]ome from time to time to ensure it is in good order and to ensure there are no leaks or damage to the [M]odular [H]ome as a result of its vacancy for Werner”;

(h) If the Modular Home is still located on the Property as of January 1, 2020, “Werner will pay $2,000.00 annually to the property taxes of the entire land”; and

(i) “Marcel and Manuela are bare trustees holding the [P]roperty in trust for Werner for as long as he so instructs and in accordance with the wishes outlined in his Last Will and Testament.”

21Werner’s portion of the property taxes were being paid and were being taken, with his consent, from his bank account up until the end of October of 2018.

22On September 21, 2017, Werner executed a Second Codicil regarding his CIBC silver share certificates, transferring them to Manuela and Marcel.

23On May 3, 2021, Manuela emailed Katelyn Parry from Ms. Downs’ office from Werner’s email address stating: “I was talking with you earlier today about transferring my father ( Werner Schuerch ) property to me, Manuela Schurch - Geddes (daughter) The property is located at 12902 O’Neill line in Ridgetown, Ontario.”

24On September 22, 2021, Ms. Parry wrote to Werner stating: “I understand from your daughter Manuela that you intend to transfer title to your property located at 12902 O’Neill Line, Ridgetown, Ontario, to her. I am writing to you to confirm that this is in fact your intention. Kindly confirm by return email and advise whether you would like us to move forward with this transaction.”

25On September 30, 2021, Ms. Parry wrote to Manuela recommending that she obtain independent legal advice. Manuela did not obtain independent legal advice in response to this suggestion.

26On October 8, 2021, Marcel called Ms. Parry to advise that he talked to Werner and Werner had no intention of transferring title to the Property to Manuela and that Werner would be sending an email to that effect.

27On October 9, 2021, Werner responded to Ms. Parry’s email regarding transferring the Property to Manuela and stated: “I do not want that.”

28On November 5, 2021, Werner wrote an email to Marcel, which Marcel forwarded to Ms. Parry, that stated:

Hello, Katelyn, my [Property], I would like to sell to my son Marcel Schuerch for $500,000 and consider it part of his inheritance. Since my daughter Manuela has been living in the house for free for a few years, she has only to pay the property tax. I would like to give her notice of eviction for January 21, 2021. This is sufficient according to Canada law. Can get information from the Municipality whether the property tax has been paid or something is still open. If something is unclear or you have any questions, you can contact Marcel. He is informed about everything.

29Werner and Marcel decided to wait until after Christmas to formalize the purchase of the Property.

30On January 19, 2022, Marcel signed the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (“APS”).

31On January 24, 2022, Werner wrote an email to Ms. Parry stating:

Hello Katelyn Parry and Paula Daws. I am selling [Property]. send Manuela Geddes Schurch the notice of termination as of March 31st 2022 if that is ok please send me an email or give me a phone call 041 76 739 1745 many thanks Werner Schuerch.

32On January 26, 2022, Werner informed Manuela that he intended to sell the Property to fund his retirement. He offered the Property to Manuela for purchase for $500,000. She refused. Werner signed the APS with Marcel on this date.

33On February 10, 2022, Manuela commenced this action by issuing a statement of claim.

34On February 15, 2022, Manuela registered a CPL without notice to Werner.

35On December 19, 2022, Werner’s motion to set aside the CPL was heard. For reasons released on March 17, 2023, Carey J. dismissed Werner’s motion. Justice Carey’s reasons are reported at 2023 ONSC 1775.

36In April 2023, Manuela and David changed the locks to the Modular Home.

37On November 21, 2023, Bezaire J. heard competing motions with respect to the Property. Manuela sought a prohibitive injunction stopping Werner from using or accessing the Property. Werner sought a mandatory injunction removing Manuela and her family from the Property. Justice Bezaire dismissed both motions for exclusive possession. Instead, and to preserve the status quo, she ordered Manuela and Werner to respectfully share the Property such that Manuela and her family remain in the Main House while Werner occupy the Modular Home. Justice Bezaire’s reasons are reported at 2024 ONSC 1487.

38Werner remains the sole title holder of the Property.

EVIDENCE AT TRIAL, CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY

39Manuela, David, Werner, Ms. Downs, and Marcel each testified at trial.

40Credibility and reliability are different but related concepts. Credibility is the question of whether the witness is being truthful to the best of their ability. Reliability is the question of whether the witness can accurately observe, recall, and recount the events in questions. A witness who is not credible cannot give reliable evidence. However, a witness who is credible might still give unreliable evidence because of frailties in their ability to accurately observe, recall and recount events accurately. Common sense assumptions underlie credibility and reliability assessments: R. v. H.C., 2009 ONCA 56, at para. 41; R. v. Kruk, 2024 SCC 7, [2024] S.C.J. No. 7, at paras. 71-79.

41In this case, I have some concerns about the credibility and reliability of Manuela’s, David’s and Werner’s evidence. I have no hesitation accepting the evidence given by Ms. Downs and Marcel.

42My concerns with Manuela’s evidence stem from the evidence she gave concerning the use of the Modular Home while Werner was in Switzerland, the guests who stayed in the Modular Home, and the state of the Modular Home in recent years. She went to great lengths to explain away her unauthorized use of the Modular Home, rather than simply acknowledging the evidence that she was presented with. Similarly, when presented with numerous photographs of the interior and exterior of the Modular Home, Manuela refused to acknowledge that more than 15 or 20 minutes were required to make it livable for Werner. Her unwillingness to stray from her position when presented with plain evidence to the contrary causes me concern about her evidence as a whole.

43Manuela’s evidence was also at times inconsistent when it came to Werner. Throughout her evidence, Manuela referred to Werner as a “heavy alcoholic” and that “most of the time he’s drunk.” She described him as someone who cannot be trusted and who cannot be taken seriously. Manuela took every opportunity to try and denigrate Werner when it suited her evidence. Yet, as outlined below, she asks that I accept that Werner made her a promise that was reasonable for her to rely on.

44David’s evidence was generally based on information relayed to him by Manuela. Given his spousal relationship to Manuela, and interest in the Property as a result, it should not be surprising that their evidence aligned in phrasing and tone. His evidence with respect to certain improvements and receipts that he tendered was inconsistent and speculative. For example, at times, it appeared that David was guessing what receipts were for, such as when a receipt for chemicals for washing the deck suddenly became a receipt for mulch. Also, much like Manuela, David repeatedly described Werner as a drunk. He explained that serious conversations could not be had with Werner when he was in this state.

45Werner’s evidence with respect to timelines and dates is not reliable. He could not pinpoint specific dates, or years, and his timeline of events did not always accord with the written record or with the memories of other witnesses. For example, he believed that the Modular Home was approved by the Municipality after Manuela and David’s wedding and their trip to Europe in 2014, and not before Manuela and David moved into the Main House. Werner’s inability to recall specific dates is not fatal to his overall evidence, however. That he did not have a good grasp of dates is understandable given the amount of time that has passed since many of the events in question. Additional factors potentially impacting his recollection of dates are Werner’s age, the fact that he had a stroke, that he was giving evidence through an interpreter, and that he was giving evidence from Switzerland. Also, his evidence became more challenging the longer that he was on the witness stand and the later into the evening (local Swiss time) that the court day went.

46While Werner’s recollection of dates was not ideal, his memory is not necessary to establish a timeline. His evidence otherwise was, in my view, both credible and reliable. He was clear when he did not know the answer to something and said that he did not know. He did not speculate, and he did not attempt to piece together events or information to craft an answer to a question that was favourable to his position. There was nothing in Werner’s evidence to suggest that he was not credible or that he was lying.

47Ms. Downs is the only witness at this trial who does not have an interest in the outcome of this litigation. Her answers were clear, concise, and responsive to the questions asked. She refused to guess or fill in blanks when she did not know the answer to a question, and she was entirely unbiased in her testimony. Ms. Downs’ evidence was highly credible and reliable, and I accept her evidence in its entirety. The key takeaway from Ms. Downs’ evidence was her insistence that Werner wanted to treat each of his children equally and did not want any one of them to benefit disproportionately. I accept her evidence in its entirety.

48During his evidence, Marcel was clear when he did not know the answer to a question and did not try to guess or speculate. When challenged in cross-examination with an inconsistency in whether the Will and Codicil were discussed at the 2017 meeting at Ms. Downs’ office, Marcel corrected himself and adopted his prior evidence that only the Codicil was discussed. Marcel’s evidence was consistent with the documentary evidence, including emails. Although Marcel arguably has an interest in the outcome of this action, he did not attempt to speculate or recreate events. Rather he simply stated he did not know when he did not know the answer to a question. He was candid, forthright, and clear. Marcel was, in my view, an entirely credible and reliable witness.

THE ISSUES

49The following issues are before me:

1. Is Manuela entitled to relief based on proprietary estoppel?

(a) Was a representation or assurance made to Manuela on the basis that Manuela expected that she will enjoy some right or benefit over the Property?

(b) Did Manuela rely on that expectation by doing or refraining from doing something in the circumstances, and is the reliance reasonable in all the circumstances?

(c) Did Manuela suffer detriment because of her reasonable reliance such that it would be unfair or unjust for Werner to go back on his word?

2. If Manuela is entitled to relief based on proprietary estoppel, what is the appropriate remedy?

3. Is the Statute of Frauds an available defence to Werner? If so, does it bar Manuela’s claim?

4. Is Werner entitled to damages under s. 103(4) of the CJA?

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Manuela is not Entitled to Relief based on Proprietary Estoppel

50To establish an entitlement to relief based on proprietary estoppel, a claimant must satisfy each of the following elements, on a balance of probabilities:

(a) a representation or assurance is made to the claimant, on the basis of which the claimant expects that they will enjoy some right or benefit over property;

(b) the claimant relies on that expectation by doing or refraining from doing something, and their reliance is reasonable in all of the circumstances; and

(c) the claimant suffers a detriment as a result of their reasonable reliance, such that it would be unfair or unjust for the party responsible for the representation or assurance to go back on their word and insist on their strict legal rights: Cowper-Smith v. Morgan, 2017 SCC 61, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 754, at paras. 15, 19, 23, 43, 64; Metske v. Metske, 2025 ONCA 418, leave to appeal refused, 2026 CanLII 44895, at paras. 43-44.

51For the reasons that follow, I find that Manuela has not made out a claim in proprietary estoppel.

(a) Was a representation or assurance made to Manuela on the basis that Manuela expected that she will enjoy some right or benefit over the Property?

52A representation or assurance may be express or implied, but it “must be unambiguous and must appear to have been intended to be taken seriously:” Cowper-Smith, at paras. 15, 26; Metske, at para. 46. The question then is, did Werner make a representation or assurance to Manuela that was unambiguous and intended to be taken seriously? Specifically, did Werner make a promise to Manuela that she would be gifted the Property in his Will as her inheritance.

53Manuela and Werner agree that in 2013, the two made an oral agreement that contained the following terms:

(a) Manuela would maintain the Property, including paying regular expenses and making repairs and improvements.

(b) The tax burden would be split, with Werner paying the property taxes associated with the Modular Home and Manuela paying the remainder of the property taxes.

(c) Manuela would live in the Main House.

(d) Werner would live in the Modular Home.

54Where Manuela and Werner differ is that Manuela says that her being gifted the Property by Werner as her inheritance was a term of their 2013 Agreement. Werner, on the other hand, says that Manuela being permitted to live in the Main House rent-free was a term of the agreement.

55Manuela testified that Werner mentioned leaving the Property to her several times prior to their agreement in 2013 because she assisted him with the Property and the farm. In 2013 when Werner decided to retire, Manuela also assisted Werner with the severing and selling the farm portion of the Property. Manuela and David’s evidence was that they decided to move to the Property in December 2013 because the Property was going to be willed to Manuela.

56David explained that the agreement made between Werner and Manuela in 2013 was that he and Manuela would stay in the Main House and they would look after it, pay all expenses, and look after Werner as he would reside in the Modular Home. David expressed that the Main House would be his and Manuela’s if they took care of Werner. The fact is, however, that neither Manuela nor David had to take care of Werner because he moved to Switzerland in 2017 and has since lived there without the assistance of Manuela.

57There was some confusion in Werner’s evidence regarding the 2013 Agreement. Werner was asked several times in his direct examination about whether leaving the Property to Manuela in his Will was part of the 2013 Agreement, ultimately answering no. During cross-examination, counsel for Manuela fairly put this question and the inconsistencies in Werner’s prior evidence to him. After being given the opportunity to explain the inconsistencies, Werner was not clear with his answer and explained that it was always his view that while he was alive, the Property belonged to him. He further added that given the way Manuela behaved, he could not keep to that agreement, referencing the 2013 Agreement.

58Manuela testified that Werner showed her his 2014 Will which was executed on July 22, 2014. Werner ultimately agreed in his evidence that he did show the Will to Manuela, but he was unclear on when that occurred. This is what Manuela relies on as the representation or assurance made by Werner with respect to the Property.

59Werner’s position is that the 2014 Will was just a gift and did not form part of any agreement or promise. Given the facts of this case and the evidence before me, the determination of whether Werner made a representation or assurance to Manuela that she was to inherit the Property is essentially a “he said, she said” determination. In these circumstances, I prefer the evidence of Werner over that of Manuela.

60I accept Werner’s evidence that the agreement made in 2013 between him and Manuela was in relation to Manuela and her soon to be husband residing in the Main House and being responsible for expenses, maintenance, and repairs in exchange for living on the Property rent free. I acknowledge that shortly after Manuela moved into the Main House, Werner left her the Property in his Will. However, I do not accept that this was done because of an agreement between her and Werner. I accept that this was a gift, as described by Werner, and unrelated to the living arrangements between Manuela and Werner.

61In her evidence, Manuela did not pinpoint, or even attempt to estimate, when the alleged representation or assurance was made to her by Werner. She provided no details of the surrounding circumstances of when or how the representation was made. At best, on the evidence before me, or the lack of evidence before me, Manuela misunderstood the reason that Werner bequeathed the Property to her in his Will. Moving into the Main House on a rent-free basis, and maintaining the Property in exchange, makes the most sense in the circumstances. I accept Werner’s evidence that leaving the Property to Manuela in his Will was simply a gift.

62On a balance of probabilities, I am not satisfied that Werner made a representation or assurance, express or implied, that was unambiguous and intended to be taken seriously. In any event, if Werner did make a representation of assurance to Manuela that the Property would be willed to her, then I am not satisfied that it was reasonable for her to rely on the representation in all the circumstances.

(b) Did Manuela rely on that expectation by doing or refraining from doing something in the circumstances, and is the reliance reasonable in all the circumstances?

63The question under the second element is whether Manuela’s reliance on the representation that the Property would be willed to her, if I had found that such a representation was made, was a reasonable one. It is an objective question. Whether the reliance is reasonable is assessed in context. The assurance must be one that a person in the claimant’s position could sensibly act upon, given the facts known to both parties and the surrounding circumstances: Cowper-Smith, at paras. 15, 23, and 26.

64Manuela and David both testified that they would not have moved into the Main House and to the Property rent-free but for the alleged representation that the Property would be willed to Manuela on Werner’s death. They also testified that they only made repairs and improvements to the Property in reliance on this representation. Manuela presented no evidence of any lost or other opportunities.

65In my view, Manuela’s reliance on the alleged representation was not a reasonable one for several reasons. First, Manuela did not explain in her evidence why she felt that she should inherit the Property ahead of her two brothers and potentially share Werner’s estate unequally with them, particularly considering Werner’s insistence that he wanted his children to share his Estate equally. Second, it is unclear why Manuela would believe that Werner was not entitled to change his Will in the future. Third, it was not reasonable for Manuela to expect that Werner could have no rights to the Property while he was still alive. The Property remains Werner’s and he is entitled to sell it if he wishes. The only reason he has not sold the Property is because of the CPL. Fourth, Manuela’s reliance on the alleged representation is also not reasonable because she does not take into consideration that Werner’s financial circumstances may change. His only asset may end up being the Property and he may need the Property to fund his retirement. In these circumstances it is not reasonable to rely on a representation that Manuela will inherit the Property. Fifth, Werner was clear, and even emphatic, that at no point did he agree not to return to the Main House or the Property. There is no evidence to support the allegation that Werner’s intention was to give up his rights to the Property while he was alive by any means other than a sale. Manuela’s reliance on the alleged representation was, in these circumstances, unreasonable.

66The sixth reason, and in my view the most compelling, that Manuela’s reliance on the alleged representation was unreasonable, is the meeting that occurred at Mr. Mahoney’s office on July 29, 2014. The Will was executed on July 22, 2014. A week later, on July 29, 2014, Manuela, David and Werner met with Werner’s lawyer to discuss their living arrangements. The Mahoney Letter summarizes what was discussed at the meeting:

(a) Werner is the registered owner of the Main House.

(b) Manuela and David reside in the Main House as tenants.

(c) Manuela and David indicated a desire to make a capital improvement to the home, including replacement of the roof and potentially other improvements which they wish to make, and they wish to ensure that if their tenancy were terminated for any reason, that they would be compensated for the various capital improvements made.

(d) Mahoney suggested that Werner could give a mortgage to Manuela and David to the extent of the capital improvements, with no payments being required and no interest being charged. Payment would only come in the event of termination of the tenancy.

(e) Werner expressed concern that any such improvements would depreciate over time with no corresponding deduction on principal balance owing on the mortgage. He was reluctant to give such a mortgage, as he indicated that no rent was being charged for the home, and he was of the opinion that this situation should offset his obligation to pay back any such mortgage.

(f) Werner’s desire to have storage space in the basement and garage of the Main House was discussed and agreed to.

(g) It was also agreed that Manuela and David would be responsible for clearing the driveway of snow and David would acquire the appropriate equipment to do so. Werner would assist from time to time with such snow removal as circumstances dictate.

67The Mahoney Letter was copied to Manuela, and she adopted the contents of the letter in her evidence. Manuela testified that Werner started to get cold feet after moving into the Modular Home and this meeting was scheduled to put his mind at ease. Werner moved into the Modular Home a month prior. Manuela recalled that at the meeting, Mr. Mahoney discussed potential ways to have Manuela and David be tenants or possibly have a mortgage. Manuela and David also wanted to ensure that if they made capital improvements to the Property and the Main House, including the replacement of the roof, they would be compensated for the capital improvements. Based on the evidence, it does not appear that any further steps were taken following this meeting.

68Manuela’s evidence was that she never would have moved into the Main House and entered into the agreement in 2013 if there was not a guarantee that she would receive the Property by inheritance. If this was the case, it is unclear why Manuela and David were concerned and sought assurances about the capital improvements they intended to make to the Property and the Main House. This only supports my finding that not only did Manuela not reasonably rely on an alleged representation that she would inherit the Property, but no representation or assurance was made.

69In my view, the Mahoney Letter also supports the finding that there was no certainty about the arrangement made between Manuela and Werner. Werner remained concerned about protecting the Property and his interest in it, which supports his position that he had no intention of giving up any of his rights to the Property. Manuela and David also remained concerned about any funds that they invested in the Property. This is at odds with there being any representation or assurance being made that was unambiguous and intended to be taken seriously. It further supports a finding that Manuela did not reasonably rely on the alleged representation.

70Werner’s evidence was reasonable considering the Mahoney Letter. The Property is his to do what he wants, as is his Will. Based on the Mahoney Letter, Manuela agreed at least at the time.

71Manuela’s position now -- which is essentially that once Werner showed her his Will in 2014, and showed her that the Property was her inheritance, then he was not permitted to deal with the Property again -- is simply not supported by the evidence. Manuela ignores the fact that Werner is entitled to change his mind and change his Will. While there may be consequences to changing his mind, such as a remedy available to Manuela under proprietary estoppel, the law cannot be that the Property becomes Manuela’s as soon as Werner tells her that she will inherit it upon his death, resulting in Werner losing his rights while he remains alive.

72Finally, a further reason, in my view, that Manuela’s reliance on the alleged representation was not reasonable is the 2017 meeting that occurred at Ms. Downs’ office. Werner wished to move to his native Switzerland. Ms. Downs recalled that the purpose of the meeting was to document parameters around what Manuela and Marcel would do for the Property while Werner was out of the country. Werner wanted to restrict what Manuela and Marcel could do with the Property which is why the Trust Agreement was prepared in addition to the Power of Attorney. In Ms. Downs’ view, Werner asked her to help him restrict, save, and protect the Property.

73Ms. Downs recalled that Werner wanted to protect his access to the Modular Home and the items that he had in it for whenever he wanted to return. The Modular Home was to be left vacant until Werner decided to sell it or rent it. Ms. Downs’ instructions were to prepare a document that would restrict, but enable, Marcel and Manuela to act for Werner while he was out of the country with respect to the Property.

74Manuela recalled that her inheriting the Property was discussed at this meeting, everyone in the room agreed, they all nodded their heads and that no one objected. Marcel, on the other hand, recalled that at this meeting, only Werner’s Codicil was discussed. I do not accept Manuela’s evidence that her inheriting the Property was discussed at this meeting. By this time, Werner had executed the Codicil with Ms. Downs, and it simply does not make sense that he and Ms. Downs would reaffirm at this meeting that Manuela would inherit the Property. I reject Manuela’s evidence on this point. It makes more sense that the Codicil would be discussed given that it dealt with the Property, which was the subject of the meeting. But even if the Codicil was not discussed at this meeting, in my view, it does not weaken my determination that it was not reasonable for Manuela to rely on the alleged representation that she would inherit the Property.

75Manuela testified that had she known that the Codicil existed and that Werner was willing her a first right of refusal to purchase the Property rather than the Property itself, then she would have never continued to invest in the Property. She said that she would never have signed the 2017 Trust Agreement, nor continued to pay the property taxes and the maintenance costs for a house that she would never own. It was not canvassed in Manuela’s evidence whether she would continue to live on the Property rent-free in these circumstances.

76David testified that Werner offered to him and Manuela to purchase the Property prior to Werner moving to Switzerland, but they refused. Werner also recalled that he had discussed with Manuela her purchasing the Property prior to his move to Switzerland. Werner’s evidence was “every offer was refused” and that David was of the view that Werner either gives the Property to Manuela or forget it. This evidence also supports the finding that Manuela’s reliance on Werner willing the Property to her was unreasonable and not supported in fact or evidence.

77On a balance of probabilities, I am not satisfied that Manuela’s reliance on the representation that the Property would be willed to her was a reasonable one given the facts and the surrounding circumstances. If I am wrong, and Manuela’s reliance was a reasonable one, then I am not satisfied that Manuela suffered any detriment.

(c) Did Manuela suffer detriment because of her reasonable reliance such that it would be unfair or unjust for Werner to go back on his word?

78Manuela must demonstrate some detriment or loss that she suffered as a result of relying on the alleged representation that she would inherit the Property. Benefits received by a claimant in proprietary estoppel must be considered and may offset or negate an alleged detriment: Clarke v. Johnson, 2014 ONCA 237, 371 D.L.R. (4th) 618, at para. 52; Belvedere v. Brittain Estate, 2009 ONCA 1, 94 O.R. (2d) 655, at para. 67; Sabey v. von Hopffgarten Estate, 2014 BCCA 360, 64 B.C.L.R. (5th) 221, at para. 56 citing Watts & Ready v. Storey, (1983) 134 N.L.J. 631, leave to appeal refused, 2015 CarswellBC 840; and Madi v. King, 2023 ONCA 443, at paras. 35-36, leave to appeal refused, 2024 CanLII 20251.

79Prior to moving into the Main House in December 2013, Manuela and David were renting a home in Ridgetown for $700 per month plus utilities. Manuela’s evidence was that at that point, Manuela and David were ready to purchase a home and would have purchased a home had the opportunity to move into the Main House not presented itself. There was no evidence to support Manuela’s position, and it is unclear what steps she and David took, if any, prior to December 2013 to prepare for a home purchase.

80In 2014, the roof to the Main House required replacement. David’s evidence was that they chose to install a steel roof because it would last longer, with a 40- or 50-year guarantee. David estimated that the roof cost $16,000 or $17,000 in addition to the labour he contributed which was approximately 40 hours. Werner did not contribute to the cost, but he did tell Manuela and David that the roof would need repair prior to them moving in.

81In addition to the roof, David and Manuela identified the following improvements and repairs that they had completed to the Main House and the Property:

(a) The water required immediate water treatment and a chlorine injector. Approximately two hours of labour was spent by David.

(b) The furnace was not replaced; however, a new motor was purchased.

(c) Drywall and painting: Approximately 160 hours was spent.

(d) Cleaning the smoke damage.

(e) Flooring: approximately 36 hours was spent installing the new flooring.

(f) Repair of air-conditioning after a coolant leak.

(g) Bathrooms: six to eight hours was spent scraping ceiling paint.

(h) Kitchen: clean, repaint the walls, seal the walls and ceiling, scrape the popcorn ceiling off, along with other repairs including flooring.

(i) Repair and maintenance of the lawn mower.

(j) Deck: rented a sander to sand the entire deck, stained and finished it with approximately 15 to 20 hours of time spent.

(k) Chain link fence around the Property replaced. Approximately 12 hours of labour was spent.

(l) Lighting and electrical outlets throughout the Main House were replaced. Approximately 10 to 12 hours was spent on lighting and 20 hours on electrical outlets.

(m) Installed a garden. Approximately 40 hours was spent.

(n) Tree removal and planting trees throughout the Property.

(o) Costs related to the pool.

(p) Replacement of all appliances.

(q) Installation of a playground at a cost of approximately $2,000.

(r) Garage door opener replacement.

(s) Smoke detector replacement.

(t) Basement leak repairs. Approximately three or four hours of time.

(u) Blind replacement was approximately six hours of labour.

(v) Maintenance of the Property, including mowing the grass, weed whacking and snow removal.

(w) Pressure washing of the Main House and the Modular Home.

82Werner’s evidence was that he paid about 40 percent of the expenses of the new well. Werner also testified that he paid for the new flooring in the Main House and Manuela and David installed it. While there were receipts provided, they included items that were not related to the Property, as well as some duplicates. Some were illegible receipts. Based on the documentary evidence submitted, it is difficult to conclude exactly how much was spent by Manuela and David, and to resolve whether Werner made contributions to the repairs and improvements.

83The list of repairs and improvements that Manuela relies on to ground her detriment are, in my view, nothing more than typical repairs and improvements that could be expected to be made to any home that Manuela and David would have purchased or rented had they not moved into the Main House. There is no evidence to support a finding that these were unique improvements or repairs to the Property. Countering that with living in the Main House and on the Property for 13 years without the burden of paying rent or a mortgage, there is no basis to find that Manuela suffered a loss or a detriment.

84Manuela relies on Rolston v. Rolston, 2016 ONSC 2937, to support an argument that the improvements made to the Main House and the Property are sufficient to ground detrimental reliance. That case is distinguishable. In Rolston, the plaintiff relied on her brother’s oral promise to rights to the homestead and to be reimbursed for her renovation expenditures. She sold her home and devoted the net sale proceeds and more to renovate the homestead farmhouse owned by her brother. The defendant brother, however, did not during his lifetime or in his estate arrangements, grant the plaintiff a legal interest in the homestead that included a right to reimbursement.

85In the present case, Manuela did not sell a home or suffer any comparable detriment. While she invested in repairs and improvements to the Property and the Main House, that was greatly offset by the fact that she lived rent free for 13 years. Any benefits received may affect any alleged detriment: Clark v. Johnson, 2014 ONCA 237, 371 D.L.R. (4th) 618, at para. 52.

86It was Werner who paid over $100,000 for the Modular Home, which permitted Manuela to live rent-free in the Main House with David and her family. This was a benefit to Manuela, not a detriment. Not having to pay rent is a benefit, not a detriment. Both David and Manuela confirmed that they did not pay any funds towards the ownership of the Property, including a down payment or mortgage payments, and they did not pay any rent.

87There is also no evidence of the value of the Property increasing because of the repairs and improvements. Further, there is no evidence of a missed or lost opportunity, that Manuela and David would have purchased or rented a different property, or that they would have done anything differently but for their alleged reliance on inheriting the Property.

88On a balance of probabilities, I am not satisfied that Manuela has demonstrated some detriment or loss that she suffered as a result of relying on a belief that she would inherit the Property. Any detriment that may have been suffered is outweighed by the benefits Manuela received by living rent-free on the Property for 13 years.

89In these circumstances, Manuela’s claim under proprietary estoppel must fail.

Issue 2: Appropriate Remedy for Proprietary Estoppel

90The remedy for proprietary estoppel is “the minimum relief necessary to satisfy the equity.” The court must weigh the claimant’s expectations against the detriment suffered, ensuring that the remedy is proportionate. The “reasonableness of the claimant’s expectations must be assessed in light of, among other things, the detriment the claimant actually suffered.” The claimant cannot obtain more that they expected: Cowper-Smith, at paras. 46-48.

91Given my determination that Manuela has not established a claim for relief under proprietary estoppel, I need not consider the appropriate remedy.

Issue 3: [Statute of Frauds](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-s19/latest/rso-1990-c-s19.html)

92Both parties sought to amend their pleadings at trial. The statement of claim was amended on consent. Werner then sought to amend his statement of defence and counterclaim to specifically plead the Statute of Frauds, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.19, in response. Manuela objected and did not consent to the proposed amendment. For the sake of trial efficiency and expediency, Werner did not pursue a mid-trial motion for leave to amend the statement of defence and instead argued that r. 25.07(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, requires a party to plead any matter they intend to rely on to defeat the opposing party’s claim, especially if it might take the other party by surprise.

93Section 4 of the Statute of Frauds provides that no action may be brought to enforce a contract for sale of lands or any interest in them unless the agreement upon which the action is brought or some memorandum or note thereof is in writing and signed by the party being sued or someone lawfully authorized by that party. The purpose of s. 4 is to prevent “fraudulent allegations of promises that had never been made, by requiring a formality in certain classes of agreement” and “to prevent fraudulent dealings in land based on perjured evidence:” Van, et al. v. Qureshi, et al., 2011 ONSC 5746, at para. 25; Erie Sand and Gravel Ltd. v. Seres’ Farms Ltd., 2009 ONCA 709, 97 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 49.

94Manuela argues that because Werner did not specifically plead the Statute of Frauds he is precluded from relying on it. She relies on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Severin v. Vroom (1977), 1977 CanLII 1037 (ON CA), 15 O.R. (2d) 636 (C.A.), where Estey J. stated, at para. 5:

There is no question that the law today is that the Statute of Frauds must be pleaded. The rules so specify and in Steadman v. Steadman, [1974] 2 All E.R. 977, Lord Reid at p. 981 reiterates the requirement. It has also been stated in the Courts of this country that a failure to request to amend a statement of defence to plead the Statute of Frauds is a waiver of the right to do so and an admission that the statute is not applicable. That being so, the defendant places himself in the position that the Court, either in first instance or in appeal, will dispose of the action on the basis of the pleadings as constituted, and on the basis of the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. We find on examination of all the circumstances in this case, notwithstanding the very thorough and able argument of counsel for both parties, that there are no circumstances which in the interests of justice require or justify some other course than the disposition of the case on the record as its stands. Therefore, we are all of the view that the disposition of the motion for non-suit on the basis that the Statute of Frauds is not part of the pleadings, is correct.

95Severin was recently followed by this court in Nayyer v. Wang, 2024 ONSC 137, aff’d in 2025 ONCA 412, where the court found at para. 150 that the Statute of Frauds did not apply because it was never pleaded. Similarly, I find that as Werner did not plead the Statute of Frauds, he is not permitted to rely on it as a defence.

96Given my finding that the alleged representation that Manuela would inherit the Property did not form part of the 2013 Agreement, whether the Statute of Frauds is an available defence to Werner is a moot point.

97If I am wrong with respect to the necessity of pleading the Statute of Frauds as an absolute bar to Manuela’s claim, then, given that I have found that there was no detrimental reliance, had this defence been permitted to proceed, any argument that Manuela could make regarding part performance to defeat the Statute of Frauds would fail: Erie Sand, at paras. 75, 78, 88–90; Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co., 1954 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1954] S.C.R. 725, at pp. 732–734.

Issue 4: [Section 103(4)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-c43/latest/rso-1990-c-c43.html) of the [Courts of Justice Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/rso-1990-c-c43/latest/rso-1990-c-c43.html)

98Werner brings a counterclaim for damages under s. 103(4) of the CJA. This section creates a statutory cause of action for damages if a party registers a CPL without a reasonable claim to an interest in the land. To establish a claim, a claimant must show that: (a) a CPL has been registered without reasonable cause or that the registrant had no reasonable claim to title or an interest in the lands in question; and (b) actual damages resulted: Dagarsho Holdings Ltd. v. Bluestone, 2004 CanLII 11271 (Ont. S.C.), at para 46; Aghdasi v. Asiyaban, 2024 ONSC 3472, at para. 246, aff’d 2025 ONCA 423.

99Manuela obtained a CPL without notice to Werner. Werner argues that Manuela registered the CPL for the purpose of frustrating the sale to Marcel and so that Manuela could continue to live on the Property rent free for as long as possible. He also argues that she was attempting to purchase the Property from him, while at the same time swearing an affidavit in support of the CPL stating that she was entitled to the Property.

100In my view, the present case is not one where it can be said that Manuela registered the CPL without reasonable cause or that she had no reasonable claim to title or interest in the Property. There is no evidence of malice or intent to harm in this case.

101In any event, Werner provided no evidence of damages that he suffered because of the CPL. While I acknowledge that the sale of the Property to Marcel was terminated because of the CPL, this agreement was a non-arm’s length one. Werner did not rely on an appraisal or other evidence at trial of real damage suffered. The CPL simply preserved the status quo while this action could be brought to trial.

Additional Issue: Interpreter

102During the trial, Werner sought to use a German interpreter for his evidence. Unfortunately, it was difficult to find a Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) certified interpreter and an issue arose at trial regarding the use of a non-MAG certified interpreter. Manuela took the position that Werner did not need an interpreter and objected to the use of a non-certified interpreter.

103Werner used an interpreter during his examination for discovery, and his lawyers use an interpreter to communicate with him. Manuela sends Werner emails that she translates into German using Google translate. At the pre-trial conference, Macfarlane J. ordered that “Werner Schuerch shall be permitted to testify via Zoom and requires an interpreter (Swiss German/English).” Given these facts, in my view, the need for an interpreter was established based on the record before me and the circumstances of this case and I so found. For the court to fully and completely receive Werner’s evidence at trial, an interpreter was required.

104Werner sought to qualify a non-MAG certified interpreter from Germany. Following the voir dire of her qualifications, I found that while the standard is not perfection, I had concerns with using an interpreter that may have been just good enough so as not to waste trial days. Ultimately, I was not satisfied that she was qualified to act as an interpreter in Ontario courts given: (i) her lack of any training in court interpretation or legal terminology, and in particular Canadian terminology; (ii) the vast majority of her experience was in criminal courts in Germany and appeared to be as a translator not an interpreter; and (iii) she had no understanding of the degree of precision required for court interpretation in Ontario or Canada.

105Ultimately, a MAG certified German interpreter was found and Manuela withdrew her objection.

COSTS

106I encourage the parties to attempt to settle the issues of costs. This family dispute has been ongoing since 2022. Now is the time to reconcile, put these issues aside, and find a path forward.

107If the parties choose to continue to battle, then Werner may serve and file brief written submissions of no more than three (3) double spaced pages (exclusive of any costs outlines, bill of costs, dockets, offers to settle, or authorities) by July 13, 2026. Manuela may then serve and file responding written submissions of no more than three (3) double spaced pages (exclusive of any costs outlines, bill of costs, dockets, offers to settle, or authorities) by August 10, 2026. Any reply may only be filed with leave.

108If the parties require an extension of these timelines because of ongoing negotiations, they may advise trial co-ordination.

CONCLUSION

109For these reasons, I order:

(a) Manuela’s claim shall be dismissed;

(b) Werner is entitled to vacant possession of the Property within 90 days; and

(c) the CPL shall be discharged and lifted.

Jacqueline A. Horvat