John Raymond Mann III

The young person appealed his manslaughter conviction arising from a group assault that resulted in the victim's death.

He argued his right to silence was violated when the Crown cross-examined him using information allegedly derived from his compelled testimony at the adult co-accuseds' preliminary hearing.

He also challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on duress and aiding and abetting, and the admission of the co-accuseds' guilty pleas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no violation of the right to silence, adequate jury instructions, and that any error regarding the guilty pleas caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, a young person convicted of manslaughter, challenged the constitutionality of s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code after being denied legal aid and state-funded counsel for his appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 684 is an ameliorative, case-specific mechanism that does not infringe the equality guarantee in s. 15 and does not violate ss. 7, 10(b), or 11(d) of the Charter.

The court held that where liberty interests are engaged, state-funded appeal counsel may be constitutionally required only when necessary to make the right of appeal meaningful and effective.

Requiring an indigent appellant to demonstrate an arguable appeal for appointment of counsel to present the appeal is not unfair.

A young offender was convicted of manslaughter by a jury for his involvement in the fatal group beating of a 20-year-old victim.

The young offender was 15 years old at the time of the offence.

The Crown sought the maximum youth sentence of three years, while the defence sought time served plus probation.

The court applied the Ferguson principles to determine the facts for sentencing, finding that the young offender assisted in getting the victim into a car, prevented his escape at the park, and helped abandon him at the ringleader's home, where he died of internal bleeding.

The court rejected the defence of duress, finding the young offender had safe avenues of escape.

Emphasizing accountability and rehabilitation, the court sentenced the young offender to 2.5 years, with 18 months remaining to be served (10 months in closed custody and 8 months under community supervision).

The young person, charged with second degree murder, brought pre-trial applications seeking a stay of proceedings and the exclusion of certain evidence.

The moving party argued his right to silence was violated when he was compelled to testify at the preliminary inquiry of his adult co-accused.

The court dismissed the stay application, finding no breach of the Crown's undertaking or the right to silence.

The court ruled photographs of the moving party's hands admissible, finding their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

However, the court excluded late-disclosed DNA evidence regarding blood on the moving party's sweatshirt, finding its admission would prejudice the defence.

A subsequent request by the Crown to admit the DNA evidence in reply was denied, with the court instead providing a strong caution to the jury.

A young person charged with second degree murder brought a pre-trial application seeking a ruling that the defence of duress was available at law.

The Crown alleged the accused was a party to murder as an aider under s. 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and argued that duress was unavailable because s. 17 excludes murder.

The court held that s. 17 applies only to principals who actually commit the offence and does not govern parties who aid or abet.

Relying on Supreme Court of Canada authorities including Paquette and Hibbert, the court concluded that the common law defence of duress remains available to a person charged as a party to murder.

The defence could therefore be raised at trial if an evidentiary foundation establishing an air of reality is shown.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the drowning death of her four-year-old daughter.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred in admitting a paediatric pathologist's expert evidence regarding bruising and in failing to adequately instruct the jury on the included offence of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal found no error in admitting the expert evidence but concluded the jury instructions on manslaughter were fatally flawed, as they failed to present the defence's perspective on the appellant's intent.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a violent recidivist, was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, and theft under $5,000 against a 15-year-old stranger.

He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, consecutive to 30 months of pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5 to 1, with an order for delayed parole.

On appeal, he argued the sentences should be concurrent, he should receive 2 for 1 credit, and the delayed parole order was tainted by bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the consecutive sentences, the reduced pre-sentence credit, or the delayed parole order.

The appellant, a criminal defence lawyer who represented himself at trial, appealed his conviction for providing drugs to an inmate at the Don Jail.

He sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a jail guard suspected of drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence did not undermine the trial judge's critical factual findings, which included the inmate being searched before and after the meeting, an officer observing their hands touching, and the appellant hiding an incriminating envelope.

The court also rejected arguments regarding trial fairness, reasonable apprehension of bias, and the trial judge's handling of a letter received about the appellant.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the common intention was for the appellant to receive 90 days for the charges and 60 days for a subsequent offence, with time in custody attributable to one sentence or the other.

Based on this, the appellant had two days left on the sentence, and the Crown did not seek re-incarceration.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to time served.

The appellant, a lawyer convicted of supplying narcotics to an inmate client, brought a motion for the production of third-party records in the possession of the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services.

The records related to allegations that a correctional officer had smuggled contraband into the jail.

Applying the McNeil framework, the Court of Appeal balanced the appellant's right to access potentially relevant material for a fresh evidence application against the privacy interests of the correctional officer.

The court ordered the production of edited versions of the documents, subject to a non-publication order.

The appellant pleaded guilty to trafficking one gram of marijuana and appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that despite the appellant's terrible criminal record, the sentence had to be proportionate to the offence under s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant pleaded guilty to his involvement as the central figure in a large-scale marijuana grow operation and was sentenced to 18 months' incarceration.

He appealed the sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's decision to prioritize general deterrence and concluding the sentence was demonstrably fit.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for having care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams.

He argued that his Charter rights under s. 8 and s. 10(b) were violated, and that the Crown failed to prove care and control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant waived his right to counsel by stating 'I'll blow first' and that there were sufficient grounds to demand a breath sample.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding of care and control based on the appellant standing beside the vehicle with keys in the ignition.