Timothy E. Breen

The applicant was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He claimed his Charter rights were violated when police detained him overnight until he was sober, rather than releasing him to a responsible adult.

The trial judge found a minor breach and granted a sentence reduction, but refused a stay of proceedings.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed his appeal.

The applicant sought an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed appeal lacked merit and did not raise issues of significance to the general administration of justice.

The respondent pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced to two years less a day in a provincial reformatory, followed by three years' probation, after receiving credit for pre-trial custody.

The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred in principle by misapprehending the parties' positions and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal held that while the sentencing judge's supplementary reasons could not be considered, the original error did not significantly impact the reasoning.

The Court concluded the sentence, though at the low end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of paying for sexual services from a person under 18 years of age.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding his defence of mistake of age.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge gave conflicting and confusing instructions on the burden of proof concerning whether the appellant took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give proper weight to the parity principle, treated a prior sentence as a floor, and failed to adequately consider his rehabilitative potential.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge drew valid distinctions between the appellant and his co-accused, did not treat the prior sentence as a floor, and appropriately prioritized general and specific deterrence over rehabilitative potential.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing during an altercation.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in summarizing the pathologist's evidence regarding the deceased's mobility after being stabbed, and in instructing the jury on self-defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's summary of the pathologist's evidence left an inaccurate impression and constituted reversible error.

The Court also found the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that a person defending themselves cannot be expected to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of necessary defensive action.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and that the trial judge misapprehended defence expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that trial counsel's failure to prepare the appellant for cross-examination on his police statements, the ill-advised decision to call certain defence witnesses, and the failure to cross-examine the complainant on prior inconsistent statements constituted ineffective representation that prejudiced the defence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in her treatment of the defence urologist's expert evidence by misapplying the burden of proof.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who was nearly 18 at the time of the offence, was convicted of second degree murder for the brutal killing of an elderly neighbour during a planned robbery.

The trial judge sentenced the appellant as an adult to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for seven years, finding that a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to hold him accountable or protect the public.

The appellant appealed the adult sentence, arguing the trial judge overemphasized the seriousness of the offence and failed to recognize the similar lengths of youth and adult sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly balanced all statutory factors and correctly recognized that an adult sentence provides necessary life-long state supervision.

The appellants appealed their eight-year sentences, which were significantly higher than the Crown's recommendations at trial.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences constituted an error in principle given the Crown's recommendations, the appellants' ages, and their prospects for rehabilitation.

The sentences were reduced to six years.

In a subsequent addendum, the Court clarified that the two months of pre-trial custody credit granted by the trial judge applied to the reduced six-year sentences, leaving five years and ten months to be served.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for assault.

He argued that the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to advance an alternative theory of liability based on his statement, and that the trial judge unreasonably concluded the assault created a risk of bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no unfairness in the alternative theory and holding that the trial judge's conclusion regarding the risk of bodily harm was reasonable.

The appellants appealed their 8-year sentences, which were significantly higher than the Crown's recommendations at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the 8-year sentences constituted an error in principle given the Crown's recommendations, the ages of the appellants, and their prospects of rehabilitation.

The appeals were allowed and the sentences were reduced to 6 years for each appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for simple assault, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable because medical evidence was inconsistent with the violent assault described by the principal Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to rely on substantial circumstantial evidence, including blood spatters and injuries, to find the appellant committed a simple assault.

The appellant pled guilty to assault causing bodily harm following a racially motivated group attack on a disabled victim.

He appealed his five-year sentence, arguing he received insufficient credit for pre-trial custody and that his sentence offended the parity principle compared to his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's role as the instigator, his use of racial slurs, and his extensive criminal record distinguished him from his co-accused.

The court also upheld the trial judge's decision to limit pre-trial custody credit, concluding the overall sentence was fit given the brutal and senseless nature of the attack.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of two accomplices who were granted immunity and witness protection.

The trial judge warned the jury to be cautious in accepting their testimony and that it would be unsafe to rely on their evidence alone, but instructed that they could rely on it if convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it was true.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning was thorough and complete, and properly alerted the jury to the dangers of accepting the accomplices' testimony without corroborating evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in resolving inconsistencies in the child complainant's evidence and that the Crown improperly split its case by using his police statements only during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The court held that the trial judge's credibility assessment was supported by confirming evidence and entitled to deference.

Furthermore, the Crown's use of the voluntary statements during cross-examination was solely for assessing credibility and did not constitute improper case splitting.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the trial judge's final instructions to the jury were inadequate.

The appellant contended that the trial judge failed to adequately review the evidence relating to the defence position, failed to instruct on prior inconsistent statements and recent complaints, and failed to properly instruct on party liability.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's charge was deficient in failing to reframe the defence position, the error was harmless and the curative proviso applied given the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The young person appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge's decision ordering a new trial after an acquittal.

The trial judge had excluded the complainant's cross-examination when assessing the admissibility of his disclosure to his mother under the necessity inquiry.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred, as the cross-examination was relevant to the necessity inquiry.

While disagreeing with the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge that the evidence should necessarily have been admitted, the Court of Appeal declined to apply the proviso to sustain the acquittal, as the excluded evidence may have affected the outcome.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexual interference, incest, and assault causing bodily harm against the complainant, and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give limiting instructions regarding prior consistent statements, discreditable conduct, and witness opinions on credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error given the defence's tactical decisions at trial, the lack of objections, and the overall fairness of the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-year term was within the permissible range for the grave sexual exploitation and physical abuse inflicted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing the trial judge's finding of joint enterprise was unreasonable and based on a misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence from independent witnesses that the appellant and the deceased were racing, and concluding the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence.

The accused chased a stolen vehicle at high speeds and struck and killed a police officer who had stepped onto the highway to deploy a spike belt.

The accused was acquitted of criminal negligence causing death but convicted of the included offence of dangerous driving.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, arguing the defence closing address was unfair and the jury instructions on causation were misleading.

The accused appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly interrupted the defence closing and erred by instructing the jury to consider his driving throughout the entire chase rather than just at the point of impact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge's caution to the jury adequately addressed the defence closing, the causation instructions were proper, and the dangerous driving charge correctly encompassed the continuous transaction of the chase.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of three accused charged with driving while disqualified.

The accused had signed standard pre-printed prohibition orders that failed to set out the full penal consequences of driving while disqualified, as required by s. 260(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the presumption of regularity should apply to cure the defective forms.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that the presumption of regularity did not apply because the written forms were explicitly deficient and there was no reason to presume the court clerk went beyond the written terms when explaining the orders.