Karen M. Weiler

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to set aside minutes of settlement in matrimonial proceedings.

The parties had been in a common-law relationship from 1985 to 1999 and had two adult children.

They lived in Canada, England, and Ireland before separating.

The appellant sought to set aside a 2006 settlement agreement on grounds of non-disclosure of assets, including a Spanish property and stock options.

The trial judge found that while the respondent had failed to disclose certain assets, the agreement was fair and the non-disclosure was not material to the appellant's decision to settle.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact.

The appellant mother appealed a contempt finding by the motion judge for withholding the children from the respondent father in violation of a parenting schedule.

The motion judge found the mother in contempt and imposed double make-up time as a penalty, which the mother subsequently complied with.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The appeal regarding the penalty was found to be moot as it had been completed.

The court also upheld the motion judge's continued jurisdiction over the matter in this high-conflict family law case, citing best practice principles.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a CCAA judge's decision dismissing their motion to reinstate other post-employment benefits (OPEBs) to retirees of U.S. Steel Canada Inc. The CCAA judge had dismissed the motion but ordered a one-time payment of $2.7 million towards benefits.

The Court of Appeal applied the stringent test for leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings and found no prima facie merit to the appeal.

The court emphasized the broad discretion of the CCAA judge and the fact-specific nature of the decision, which did not raise issues of significance to insolvency practice.

Leave to appeal was denied with costs fixed at $2,500.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's order striking out their statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, permitting the appellants to amend their pleading.

This costs endorsement addresses the allocation of costs for both the appeal and the underlying motion.

The court found that the appellants' modest success on appeal did not warrant costs in their favour, as it represented a further indulgence to correct pleading deficiencies that multiple prior iterations and a case conference had failed to remedy.

The motion judge's costs order in favour of the respondents was varied downward by $5,000 to reflect the appellants' limited success.

The appellant wife appealed an order terminating her spousal support and life insurance obligations upon the respondent husband's retirement.

The respondent, a surgeon earning over $250,000 USD annually, sought to terminate support effective June 1, 2016, when he planned to retire with projected income of $35,000-$40,000 USD annually.

The application judge found a material change in circumstances and terminated the support.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in concluding the parties would be in financially similar circumstances post-retirement.

The court held that the support should be reduced rather than terminated, and remitted the matter for recalculation.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's decision to strike paragraph 25 of their statement of claim, which alleged that the respondent West Face distributed a defamatory report to unnamed third parties whose identities were known to West Face.

The appellants had already established a prima facie case of defamation by alleging publication to named persons at a specified time and place.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in striking the paragraph, finding that the appellants had demonstrated they were proceeding in good faith with a prima facie case and were not on a fishing expedition.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the order striking paragraph 25.

The appellant appealed a final judgment in a divorce application following a 31-year marriage.

The trial judge awarded an equalization payment of $90,218.31, imputed income of $12,500 to the appellant for spousal support purposes, and ordered child support based on the respondent's income of $70,000.

After trial, the respondent declared personal bankruptcy, and the appellant successfully moved to have the respondent's RRSPs vested in her.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the equalization payment calculation, the imputed income for spousal support, the child support award, and sought an order for health and dental insurance coverage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis and noting that the equalization payment was eliminated by bankruptcy.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for sexual assault and invitation to touching a person under the age of 14 for a sexual purpose.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and addressed all material issues.

The sentence appeal was allowed on the basis that the trial judge imposed a sentence exceeding the Crown's submissions without providing notice or opportunity for further submissions, constituting an error in principle.

The appellate court reassessed the sentence and imposed a global sentence of six years (44 months consecutive to the prior 28-month sentence) rather than the trial judge's six years and four months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching.

He raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge interfered with defence counsel's cross-examination of the complainant, diverting counsel from relevant lines of inquiry; and second, that the trial judge's reasons were unbalanced, favoured the Crown, and failed to resolve material conflicts in evidence or meaningfully scrutinize the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding that the trial judge's interventions were appropriate and necessary to ensure fair treatment of the witness and clarity of evidence, and that her reasons were careful, detailed, and balanced.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order made by Justice Conway of the Superior Court of Justice regarding production of materials and privilege issues.

The appellant did not attend the motion before Conway J., although properly served.

The respondents did not object to the order.

The Court of Appeal found that the issues were best litigated before Conway J. in the context of the ongoing proceeding, as she was in a better position to tailor an order to the specific circumstances and issues relating to production orders and protection of privileges.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent estate trustee and the non-party respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from an attack on the victim in his bedroom.

The appellant was acquitted of attempted murder, unlawful confinement, and assault with a weapon.

The trial judge found the appellant was one of three assailants based on evidence including his association with known assailants before and after the attack, the presence of the victim's blood on the appellant's pants, and corroborating testimony.

The Court of Appeal rejected four grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of one count of break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence, two counts of break and enter and commit an indictable offence, and three counts of possession of break-in instruments, arising from three Subway restaurant break-ins in Sault Ste.

Marie over five days in July 2012.

The Crown relied on similar fact evidence to connect the appellant to all three incidents.

On appeal, the Court found that the trial judge erred in his use of the appellant's criminal record and made material misapprehensions of the evidence regarding DNA on a balaclava, the appellant's cast on his right arm, and glass particles on his clothing.

These errors were essential to the trial judge's reasoning process and undermined the fairness of the trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon (a lamp) entered by Justice Jane E. Kelly on May 15, 2012.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: misapprehension of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, and insufficiency of reasons/unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, no reversal of the burden of proof, and that the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the evidentiary concerns and met the functional requirements for appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent was injured while walking the appellant’s dog when the dog suffered a seizure, escaped its collar, fell down an icy embankment, and bit her while she attempted to retrieve it.

The motion judge held that the respondent was not an “owner” under the Dog Owners’ Liability Act because she did not exercise “dominion and control” over the dog, and therefore allowed her statutory claim but dismissed her negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in interpreting “possesses” in the Act: possession includes physical possession and control immediately before a bite or attack.

Because the respondent was exercising actual control over the dog just prior to the incident, she fell within the statutory definition of “owner,” barring her claim under the Act.

The negligence claim was also properly dismissed because the injury was not reasonably foreseeable and the respondent’s voluntary decision to descend the icy slope constituted an intervening act breaking the chain of causation.

An appeal from a conviction for assault causing bodily harm and the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in the conviction.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and set aside the conviction for assault causing bodily harm, substituting in its place a conviction for common assault.

The sentence had already been served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, challenging the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest and subsequent search.

The appellant argued that police lacked sufficient grounds for arrest based on information from a confidential informant, contending there was insufficient information regarding the informant's source of knowledge and that inadequate corroboration was provided.

The appellant also alleged the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof on the Charter s. 8 voir dire.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the test from R. v. Debot and that the totality of circumstances supported reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion to remove the respondent as estate trustee of their father's wills pending litigation over the wills' validity.

The appellant challenged the wills, which left the bulk of the multi-million dollar estate to the respondent, citing lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, and the respondent's conflict of interest in intermingling the family business with his own company.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by prematurely deciding the ultimate issue of testamentary capacity and by ignoring the respondent's significant conflicts of interest.

The respondent was removed as trustee pending the litigation, and an independent trustee was appointed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to change a final custody order that had granted him sole custody of his two sons and required them to attend a reunification program.

The younger son had repeatedly run away and refused to live with the appellant or attend the program.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the son's extreme resistance constituted a material change in circumstances and that it was no longer in his best interests to enforce the custody order.

The court also dismissed the son's cross-appeal seeking a declaration that he had withdrawn from parental control, finding the motion judge's order that no person had custody or access rights over him was sufficient.

The appellant, an investment advisor, appealed a trial decision dismissing his claim for additional compensation under a letter agreement.

The trial judge found the agreement ambiguous regarding its application to Capital Markets transactions and relied on the parties' subsequent conduct to conclude it did not apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while subsequent conduct is not part of the factual matrix, it is admissible to resolve ambiguity.

The trial judge made no extricable error of law in finding ambiguity and properly weighed the appellant's subsequent conduct, which was overwhelmingly consistent with the respondent's interpretation.

The appellants appealed an order striking out most of their causes of action without leave to amend.

The action arose from a consulting agreement and alleged breach of trust and fraudulent diversion of funds by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, permitting the appellants to amend their statement of claim to include a breach of trust claim against the corporate owner of the properties and a personal liability claim against the individual respondents for fraudulent diversion of funds, finding the motions judge erred in restricting the piercing of the corporate veil to sham corporations.