Amy Michelle Alyea

Two appellants, both found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and incapable of consenting to medical treatment under provincial law, appealed detention orders imposed by the Ontario Review Board.

The central issue was whether an accused person incapable of consenting to medical treatment could nonetheless consent to a condition regarding psychiatric or other treatment under section 672.55(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the capacity required to consent to such a condition differs from the capacity required to consent to the treatment itself.

An accused need only understand information relevant to the operation of the condition and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of agreeing to it, including potential consequences for liberty.

The Court overruled its prior jurisprudence to the contrary and allowed the appeals, remitting the matters back to the Board for re-hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of aggravated assault (acquitted on attempted murder) and his designation as a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the verdicts were irreconcilable, and second, that the trial judge erred in failing to limit the use of bad character evidence relating to a prior assault.

The appellant also appealed the dangerous offender designation, arguing the trial judge failed to make sufficient factual findings regarding the index offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts were logically reconcilable, the jury received adequate instructions on character evidence, and the trial judge made sufficient factual findings to support the dangerous offender designation.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition concerning an NCR accused person's Charter rights.

The appellant sought systemic remedies from the Board for violations of his section 8 Charter right arising from unauthorized seizure of urine samples.

The Board found the Charter violation but declined to grant systemic remedies, determining it lacked jurisdiction to do so.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, holding that while the Board has jurisdiction to determine Charter issues and grant individual remedies, it does not have jurisdiction to impose broad systemic or institutional orders.

The Board's mandate is limited to supervising individual NCR accused persons and ensuring their conditions are least onerous and restrictive consistent with public safety.

The appellant sought judicial interim release pending appeal after being convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and trafficking a controlled substance for the benefit of a criminal organization, arising from investigations into Toronto-area gang activity.

The appellant's grounds of appeal concerned the legality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, including issues regarding mobile device identifier technology, warrantless surveillance in condominium common areas, and the naming of the appellant as a known person.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous and granted bail pending appeal, subject to strict conditions including perfection of the appeal by January 12, 2018.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to stop at the scene of an accident, impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, operation of a motor vehicle while over 80 causing bodily harm, and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The sole issue at trial was whether the appellant was the driver of the vehicle involved in the collision.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding in-dock identification evidence from eyewitnesses; and second, that the trial judge erred in noting that a passenger may have had an interest in the outcome due to her friendship with the appellant.

The appellate court found no error in either ground and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a minor who was between 13 and 16 years old during the period 1988 to 1991, when the appellant was the complainant's Big Brother.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting Big Brothers organization records as evidence of the truth of their contents when filed in reply after the close of the defence, and (2) the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because he failed to explain why he rejected corroborating evidence from the appellant's sister.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of the records and finding the trial judge's reasons adequate when read as a whole in context.

In a criminal appeal concerning workplace computer privacy, the Court held that an employee may retain a reasonable, though diminished, expectation of privacy in personal information stored on an employer-issued laptop where personal use is permitted or reasonably expected.

The police breached section 8 by conducting warrantless searches of computer data received from a school board, because the employer's authority to search for workplace purposes did not transfer to police for criminal investigation.

The majority concluded exclusion under section 24(2) was not warranted after balancing police conduct, privacy impact, and trial truth-seeking interests.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial order remained in place.

A dissent would have excluded the evidence due to serious disregard of warrant requirements.