Amy Michelle Alyea

The appellant was convicted of unlawful confinement, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and uttering a death threat following a jury trial.

Approximately three years later, he was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration.

His appeal was initially abandoned but subsequently reopened.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial Crown's closing remarks, while potentially problematic, did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed on the basis that the trial judge violated procedural fairness by denying the appellant the right to make oral submissions during the dangerous offender hearing, instead requiring written submissions only.

A new dangerous offender hearing was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography and breach of probation.

On appeal, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on two grounds: (1) an admission in an agreed statement of facts regarding his mother's presence in the house was made without his knowledge or agreement, and (2) the admissibility of his video statement to police was conceded without his concurrence and without full investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if counsel's performance was deficient, a substantial body of evidence independent of the disputed admissions would have supported the same convictions.

A dual-status offender appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to decline his request for a placement review hearing as part of his annual disposition review.

The appellant had been found Not Criminally Responsible in 1997 and subsequently convicted of murder in 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding no error in declining to conduct a placement review hearing where the appellant had not requested one prior to the scheduled hearing date, other parties were not ready to proceed, and the disposition review hearing was already significantly overdue.

The court noted that the appellant remained entitled to request a placement review hearing under section 672.69(2) of the Criminal Code.

Two appellants, both found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and incapable of consenting to medical treatment under provincial law, appealed detention orders imposed by the Ontario Review Board.

The central issue was whether an accused person incapable of consenting to medical treatment could nonetheless consent to a condition regarding psychiatric or other treatment under section 672.55(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the capacity required to consent to such a condition differs from the capacity required to consent to the treatment itself.

An accused need only understand information relevant to the operation of the condition and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of agreeing to it, including potential consequences for liberty.

The Court overruled its prior jurisprudence to the contrary and allowed the appeals, remitting the matters back to the Board for re-hearing.

The appellant appealed his conviction on one count of aggravated assault (acquitted on attempted murder) and his designation as a dangerous offender with an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the verdicts were irreconcilable, and second, that the trial judge erred in failing to limit the use of bad character evidence relating to a prior assault.

The appellant also appealed the dangerous offender designation, arguing the trial judge failed to make sufficient factual findings regarding the index offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts were logically reconcilable, the jury received adequate instructions on character evidence, and the trial judge made sufficient factual findings to support the dangerous offender designation.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition concerning an NCR accused person's Charter rights.

The appellant sought systemic remedies from the Board for violations of his section 8 Charter right arising from unauthorized seizure of urine samples.

The Board found the Charter violation but declined to grant systemic remedies, determining it lacked jurisdiction to do so.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, holding that while the Board has jurisdiction to determine Charter issues and grant individual remedies, it does not have jurisdiction to impose broad systemic or institutional orders.

The Board's mandate is limited to supervising individual NCR accused persons and ensuring their conditions are least onerous and restrictive consistent with public safety.

The appellant sought judicial interim release pending appeal after being convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and trafficking a controlled substance for the benefit of a criminal organization, arising from investigations into Toronto-area gang activity.

The appellant's grounds of appeal concerned the legality of wiretap authorizations and general warrants, including issues regarding mobile device identifier technology, warrantless surveillance in condominium common areas, and the naming of the appellant as a known person.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous and granted bail pending appeal, subject to strict conditions including perfection of the appeal by January 12, 2018.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to stop at the scene of an accident, impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, operation of a motor vehicle while over 80 causing bodily harm, and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The sole issue at trial was whether the appellant was the driver of the vehicle involved in the collision.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding in-dock identification evidence from eyewitnesses; and second, that the trial judge erred in noting that a passenger may have had an interest in the outcome due to her friendship with the appellant.

The appellate court found no error in either ground and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a minor who was between 13 and 16 years old during the period 1988 to 1991, when the appellant was the complainant's Big Brother.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting Big Brothers organization records as evidence of the truth of their contents when filed in reply after the close of the defence, and (2) the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because he failed to explain why he rejected corroborating evidence from the appellant's sister.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of the records and finding the trial judge's reasons adequate when read as a whole in context.

The appellants were acquitted of first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder.

They appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred during jury selection by unilaterally ordering the use of static triers for challenges for cause, despite the appellants' requests for rotating triers and the absence of an application under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the improper use of static triers deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers, rendering the court improperly constituted to try them.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) could not apply.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in failing to answer a jury question regarding closing arguments.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered for second degree murder.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a stabbing at a party.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on opportunity, motive, and prior inconsistent statements of two witnesses who recanted at trial.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to cross-examine its own witnesses under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act, admitting their out-of-court statements as substantive evidence, and in his jury instructions regarding hearsay, post-offence conduct, and circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of possession of stolen property and driving offences after a stolen car crashed into a parked truck.

At trial, the appellant claimed a man named 'Steve' was driving.

The trial judge rejected this evidence but made three errors of law: mischaracterizing the defence as an alibi, improperly applying the adverse inference under s. 258(3) of the Criminal Code to the issue of identity, and misusing the appellant's criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found that despite these errors, the evidence against the appellant was so overwhelming that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed using the curative proviso.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

At the close of the Crown's case, the trial judge initiated an in-chambers discussion with counsel, in the absence of the accused, suggesting a plea bargain to a lesser offence.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding this meeting and held that the discussion violated the accused's right to be present during his trial under s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the trial judge's actions compromised trial fairness and the presumption of innocence, rendering the curative proviso inapplicable.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed her fraud conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The appellant, a bookkeeper, admitted to cashing company cheques and making electronic transfers to herself, but claimed she did so at the complainant's behest and gave him the cash.

A credible defence witness testified to seeing the appellant hand cash to the complainant after cashing a cheque.

The trial judge failed to address this critical exculpatory evidence in his reasons.

The Court of Appeal held this failure constituted a misapprehension of evidence amounting to an error in law, rendering the verdict unsafe.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter, unlawful confinement, robbery, and use of an imitation firearm after a victim died from suffocation when her face was covered in duct tape during a robbery.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing his Corbett application to exclude his prior robbery convictions.

He also appealed his 18-year sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by finding he knew his actions put the victim at risk of death, and that the sentence was outside the typical range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion on the Corbett application and that the sentence, while outside the normal range, was fit given the extreme gravity of the offence and the offender's high moral culpability.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from conduct during a G20 street demonstration, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately address evidence bearing on his knowledge that a marked police cruiser was occupied by an officer.

The court held the reasons were sufficient, particularly in a credibility-driven case, and found the video evidence strongly supported the finding that the appellant knew the officer was inside the cruiser.

The court also upheld the conviction for intimidating a justice system participant under s. 423.1 of the Criminal Code, rejecting arguments based on legislative history and the alleged transitory nature of the officer's fear.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal in part because the sentence for assaulting a peace officer exceeded the lawful maximum for a summary conviction offence, and reduced that sentence to six months concurrent.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the constitutionality of section 717 of the Criminal Code and the Attorney General's discretion.

However, the underlying charge against the appellant had been withdrawn a year prior.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal to be moot and declined to hear it, noting that the constitutional issues could be addressed in a future live controversy.

The Crown's motion to quash was allowed and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assaulting a peace officer and intimidating a justice system participant.

He raised a preliminary jurisdictional challenge, arguing that the Crown had elected to proceed summarily on all charges, meaning the appeal should be heard by a summary conviction appeal court rather than the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the record and concluded that the Crown's ambiguous statement that it was proceeding 'summarily' applied only to the hybrid offences, while the indictable offence proceeded by indictment.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal retained jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the preliminary challenge was dismissed.

The appellant challenged rulings arising from a firearms prosecution, arguing the motion judge erred in accepting the affiant officer's evidence, in assessing the confidential informant information, and in refusing a judicial summary.

The court held the informant was not an anonymous tipster, the firsthand information and police confirmation of outstanding drug charges provided support for the warrant process, and drafting problems in the information to obtain did not undermine the result.

The court also found no error in refusing a judicial summary where the informant's identity could readily be discerned.

Deference was owed to the motion judge's findings, and the appeal was dismissed.

Appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge or, alternatively, a conditional discharge, and also challenged the Board’s decision to proceed with a three-member panel after one scheduled member became ill.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board reasonably found the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety in light of active symptoms, refusal to engage in assessment or treatment, and medication non-compliance.

The court further held that the panel satisfied the statutory quorum under s. 672.41(1) and properly exercised its discretion to proceed.

The appeal was dismissed.