Amy Michelle Alyea

The appellant was convicted of robbery and unlawful confinement.

During the investigation, police officers subjected the appellant and his co-accused to deliberate, prolonged, and violent beatings to extract confessions.

The trial judge found egregious Charter breaches but refused to grant a stay of proceedings, opting instead to reduce the appellant's sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the systemic ramifications of the police misconduct and its impact on the integrity of the justice system.

The Court concluded that the state misconduct was so egregious that carrying the prosecution forward would be offensive to society, warranting a stay of proceedings under the residual category.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault involving a 15-year-old complainant.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that he did not receive a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge improperly curtailed defence counsel's cross-examination of the complainant regarding her previous lies about her age, admitted highly prejudicial hearsay evidence, and failed to adequately instruct the jury on the mistake of age defence under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The cumulative effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial for second degree murder.

The appellant was alleged to be a party to a murder during a home invasion robbery by facilitating entry, though he was not present during the robbery.

The Court of Appeal found there was no admissible evidence at the preliminary inquiry that the appellant had the subjective foresight that the principal offender would kill the deceased.

The appeal was allowed, the committal for second degree murder was quashed, and a committal for manslaughter was substituted.

The young person appealed his convictions for robbery and aggravated assault, as well as his sentence, which included a 'serious violent offence' designation under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The convictions arose from an incident where the young person robbed the victim of a cell phone and subsequently assaulted him, resulting in the victim's finger being severed on a chain-link fence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the risk of bodily harm was objectively foreseeable.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the preliminary threshold for a serious violent offence designation is automatically met when serious bodily harm is caused, with foreseeability remaining a factor at the discretionary stage.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing the trial verdict was unreasonable.

The conviction arose from a domestic dispute where the appellant held a knife in his wife's direction while demanding money, an event witnessed by their son.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no clear error or question of law of general significance, as there was direct evidence supporting the conviction.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault with a weapon after attacking his adoptive parents.

Following psychiatric assessments, the trial judge found the appellant not criminally responsible (NCR) due to a mental disorder, likely schizophrenia.

The appellant appealed the NCR verdict, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's strategy was professional and caused no prejudice, and that the NCR verdict was well-supported by the evidence of the appellant's mental decline, bizarre behaviour, and expert testimony.

The appellants appealed their fraud convictions, arguing that a production order for bank documents violated their s. 8 Charter rights due to the non-disclosure of statutory declarations.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that while a s. 8 violation occurred regarding personal documents, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because the officer's carelessness did not render the breach serious enough to warrant exclusion.

The court found the trial evidence overwhelming and dismissed the appeals.

In a criminal appeal concerning workplace computer privacy, the Court held that an employee may retain a reasonable, though diminished, expectation of privacy in personal information stored on an employer-issued laptop where personal use is permitted or reasonably expected.

The police breached section 8 by conducting warrantless searches of computer data received from a school board, because the employer's authority to search for workplace purposes did not transfer to police for criminal investigation.

The majority concluded exclusion under section 24(2) was not warranted after balancing police conduct, privacy impact, and trial truth-seeking interests.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial order remained in place.

A dissent would have excluded the evidence due to serious disregard of warrant requirements.

The appellant broke into the 76-year-old complainant's apartment, sexually assaulted her, and stabbed her multiple times.

He was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, attempted murder, and other offences, and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Crown had withdrawn its dangerous offender application after the appellant refused a psychiatric assessment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the life sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge made no error in principle and that the egregious circumstances of the offences and the need to protect the public justified the maximum sentence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder on the basis that she aided or abetted the principal offender in fatally stabbing the deceased.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made three errors in the jury charge: omitting the requirement of the principal's subjective foresight of death, failing to focus the jury on when the principal's intention was formed, and improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these errors amounted to errors of law that could have had a significant impact on the verdict.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in a medium secure unit.

The appellant argued that the disposition was unreasonable, that the Board failed to consider the statutory factors, that the reasons were inadequate, and that a treatment impasse had been reached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable given the significant escalation in the appellant's aggressive and threatening behaviour and the expert evidence supporting the need for a higher security level.

The appellant appealed his convictions for refusal to take a breathalyzer test and impaired driving.

He argued that his section 10(b) Charter rights were breached when he was denied a second phone call to his lawyer, and that the trial judge erred in finding impairment and drawing an inference under section 258(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was not asking to speak to counsel for further advice, and holding there was ample evidence of impairment.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

He argued he was denied a fair trial as a self-represented accused, alleged improper police motive, and sought a constitutional exemption from the mandatory minimum sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding the trial judge provided sufficient assistance, there was no evidence of improper motive, and no discretion existed to grant a constitutional exemption.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and gun storage offences.

The Court of Appeal found that evidence of the appellant's refusal to answer police questions about a gun cabinet key was improperly admitted and repeated in the jury charge.

Additionally, the Crown failed to disclose a property report relevant to the gun storage charges.

Given the potential adverse inference on the appellant's credibility, the court quashed all convictions and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, a high school teacher, was charged with possession of child pornography after a school computer technician found explicit images of a student on his work laptop.

The principal seized the laptop and copied the images, and the school board later copied temporary Internet files before handing everything to the police, who searched the laptop without a warrant.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal files on the work computer, though modified by the technician's right to maintain the network.

While the school officials did not breach the Charter, the warrantless police search of the laptop and temporary Internet files violated section 8.

Applying the Grant framework, the Court excluded the laptop and temporary Internet files under section 24(2), but admitted the disc containing the images of the student.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for the aggravated assault of a woman he had been dating.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in excluding the possibility that his risk to the public could be managed in the community under a long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant's risk could not be controlled in the community was amply supported by the record.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to inquire into his Aboriginal background and consider s. 718(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence in the form of a Gladue report detailing the appellant's systemic and personal challenges.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served, with additional probation conditions requiring the appellant to reside with his father, attend counselling, and participate in a Healing Lodge program.

The appellant appealed his sentence, having already served his term of imprisonment but expressing concerns about his ability to comply with the probation terms.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit given the seriousness of the offence and the appellant's record.

The court held that any future problems with probation terms should be addressed through an application under s. 732.2 of the Criminal Code.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference involving two of his step-granddaughters, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the young complainants' credibility and failed to adequately consider the possibility of collusion or tainting.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were detailed and properly addressed the evidence's frailties.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed, as the court rejected the argument that the sentencing judge improperly punished the appellant for a lack of remorse.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that allowed an appeal from a conviction for obstructing justice and ordered a new trial.

The summary conviction appeal judge found that a comment made by the trial judge early in the examination-in-chief, suggesting a key witness was committing perjury, raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing that the trial judge's comment, combined with the summary dismissal of a mistrial motion without hearing submissions, supported a reasonable apprehension of bias.