Amy Michelle Alyea

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to apply the Vetrovec principles to a witness's evidence and erred in presuming she had knowledge of materials from various civil suits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to the witness's evidence and was not required to expressly refer to Vetrovec.

Furthermore, any error regarding the civil suits caused no prejudice as they were a minor aspect of the case and the appellant had the opportunity to provide an explanation.

The appellants appealed their convictions.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in foreclosing the appellants from challenging the factual underpinnings of the counselling to commit murder charges for which the appellant Vanderheyden stood convicted.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the counselling convictions provided a significant boost to the credibility of two unsavoury witnesses.

The court found that the curative proviso could not be applied, as it could not be satisfied that Vanderheyden would not have testified had the trial judge ruled differently.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of armed robbery and possession of a loaded restricted firearm following an incident at a clothing store where a third accomplice, who was armed, died in a confrontation with the storeowner.

On appeal, they challenged the jury instructions regarding the storeowner's evidence, the elements of armed robbery, and party liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals against the armed robbery convictions and sentences, finding the jury instructions adequate.

However, the court allowed the appeals regarding the firearm possession convictions, setting them aside and ordering a new trial because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the specific elements of that offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer advised him to testify, resulting in a virtual confession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that trial counsel's advice was a reasonable exercise of judgment given the formidable Crown case, and was a strategic attempt to show the conduct fell short of the 'marked departure' standard.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the court found no basis to interfere.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Crown conceded that the appeal must be allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter by a judge and jury after shooting the victim during horseplay with a handgun.

He appealed his conviction, arguing errors in the jury charge regarding the standard of proof, the lack of a Vetrovec warning for a witness, and instructions on the defence of accident and criminal negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and noting that a Vetrovec warning was not mandatory.

The appellant appealed his conviction for child pornography.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on improper propensity reasoning related to the appellant's sexual orientation to infer knowledge.

The trial judge also erred in drawing inferences of consciousness of guilt from advice given to a witness and the location of a computer, without sufficient evidentiary basis linking them to the child pornography charge.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for a serious domestic assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misunderstood the Crown's position on sentence and imposed a sentence beyond the proposal without providing reasons.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to 15 months, factoring in a 22-month base sentence and 7 months of credit for pretrial custody.

Le demandeur, inculpé de fraude et d'entrave à la justice aux États-Unis pour avoir enlevé des cartons de documents, demande l'autorisation d'interjeter appel d'une ordonnance d'obtention rendue en vertu de la Loi sur l'entraide juridique en matière criminelle.

La Cour d'appel applique le critère de l'arrêt Ross et conclut que l'ordonnance d'obtention n'est qu'une étape préliminaire visant à préserver les documents avant l'audition de la requête en transmission.

La demande d'autorisation d'appel et la requête en suspension sont rejetées.

The appellant appealed her sentence of three months' jail and three years' probation for assault, break and enter, and other offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's mental health progress and the likelihood of drug use while on a conditional sentence.

Noting the uncontradicted evidence from her psychiatrist that a custodial sentence would be particularly difficult, and her continued progress while on bail, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the custodial sentence to time served.

The Crown appealed a sentence consisting of a $500 fine.

The Court of Appeal noted that given the gravity of the offences and the offender's substantial record, the fine was inadequate to address denunciation, general deterrence, and protection of the public.

However, because the offender had turned his life around and assumed substantial family responsibilities, the court concluded that incarcerating him would not be in the interest of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment for sending two unwanted letters to the complainant over an 18-month period.

He appealed, arguing that two communications do not meet the threshold of 'repeatedly' communicating under s. 264(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that 'repeatedly' means more than once, and that two communications can suffice depending on the context and history between the parties.

The court also denied leave to appeal the sentence of 18 months' imprisonment, finding it manifestly fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of sexually interfering with his niece and a family friend, both young children.

At trial, the judge admitted four out-of-court statements by the niece which contained details missing from her viva voce testimony.

On appeal, the appellant argued the statements should not have been admitted.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge did not err in finding the necessity and reliability criteria were met for the statements, he erred in admitting all four statements instead of just one.

The cumulative impact of the four statements was prejudicial, and the curative proviso could not be applied.

The conviction appeal regarding the niece was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The sentence appeal regarding the family friend was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against his stepdaughter, arguing the trial judge erred in defining reasonable doubt, misused prior inconsistent statements, and improperly assessed witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately instructed himself on the burden of proof, properly handled the prior inconsistent statements, and reasonably assessed the evidence and credibility of the witnesses.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months in custody and 15 months' probation for robbery.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by overemphasizing general deterrence for a youthful first offender, ignoring the principle of restraint for a first custodial sentence, and failing to consider the appellant's Aboriginal status.

Based on fresh evidence of educational and occupational opportunities, the sentence was reduced to time served plus 15 months' probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four counts of parental abduction and his sentence of 28 months' imprisonment (plus 20 months' pre-sentence custody).

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his O'Connor application for third-party records, improperly intervened during trial, admitted an untranslated videotape as demeanour evidence, and improperly instructed the jury on discreditable conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors and concluding the appellant's right to a fair trial was not compromised.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence fell within the appropriate range.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that acquitted the accused of driving over 80.

The accused had been stopped by police for failing to signal a turn and was followed into his underground parking garage, where he was arrested and provided breath samples.

The appeal judge had found Charter breaches regarding arbitrary detention, unlawful search, and right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the police were acting in the lawful execution of their duties, were entitled to follow the accused into the garage in continuous pursuit, and that the accused's right to counsel was not violated.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and his summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

He appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to properly apply the W. (D.) test for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's reasons suggested a credibility contest, misstated the standard of proof, and misapprehended key evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a severe sentence for an unprovoked and vicious assault that resulted in serious injuries.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error in the sentencing judge's reasons, noting that mitigating factors such as a guilty plea, a positive pre-sentence report, and the appellant's first-offender status were properly considered.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to uttering a death threat and received a sentence of one day in prison, two years' probation, and credit for pre-trial custody.

He appealed his conviction, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that his counsel coerced and misled him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant's claims incredible and concluding the plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the custodial portion was moot and the sentencing judge made no error in accepting the joint submission.