Peter Walter Samuel Copeland

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for wounding following a jury trial.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding consent, party liability under sections 21(1) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code, and the offence of assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding any error regarding consent was harmless as it was unavailable on the facts, and the party liability instructions were unobjectionable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence properly reflected the appellant's significant record for violence.

The United States sought the extradition of two Aboriginal Canadians to face drug trafficking charges.

The applicants faced significantly harsher sentences in the US than they would in Canada, and the US system does not consider Aboriginal status in sentencing.

The Minister of Justice ordered their surrender, concluding that the Gladue principles were not relevant to their s. 6(1) Charter mobility rights and that surrender would not shock the conscience under s. 7.

The Court of Appeal set aside the surrender orders, holding that the Minister erred in law by failing to properly apply the Gladue principles to the s. 7 analysis and by failing to conduct an independent Cotroni analysis under s. 6(1).

The Court found that surrendering the applicants to face crushing sentences without consideration of their Aboriginal background would violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder following a jury trial.

During deliberations, the jury reported an impasse three times.

On the third occasion, the trial judge delivered an exhortation that singled out one juror, stating she had an incorrect understanding of reasonable doubt and instructing the other jurors to disabuse her of this error.

The appellants appealed, arguing the exhortation was improper.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge misconceived the juror's understanding of the law and improperly pitted the majority against the minority.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with four counts of possessing explosive substances and one count of counselling mischief not committed, arising from his activities prior to the G20 Summit in Toronto.

Police found various chemicals and laboratory equipment in his home, which the Crown alleged were intended to make explosive substances.

The accused maintained the chemicals were for innocent purposes, including amateur rocketry, gardening, and testing the security system.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to create explosive substances, accepting that his interest in rocketry and other hobbies raised a reasonable doubt.

On the counselling charge, the court found the accused's tweets about design flaws in the G20 security fence merely described how mischief could be committed but did not actively induce or advocate the commission of the offence.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused brought a global application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude all evidence obtained during the investigation, including chemicals and equipment seized from his home pursuant to valid search warrants.

The court found multiple Charter breaches throughout the investigation, including arbitrary detention, right to counsel violations, and search and seizure violations.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the police conduct was not in bad faith or part of a systemic disregard for Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, arrested in relation to the G20 summit, was interviewed by intelligence officers before being permitted to speak to counsel, resulting in a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

He subsequently gave two videotaped statements to an investigating detective.

The court held that the first videotaped statement was not tainted by the earlier Charter breach and was voluntary, despite a breach of s. 503(1)(a) of the Criminal Code for failing to bring him before a justice within 24 hours.

However, the court found that a portion of the second videotaped statement was involuntary and inadmissible because the detective offered a quid pro quo regarding bail for the accused's wife and created oppressive circumstances by suggesting the accused was being investigated by national security forces.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence found on computers seized from his residence, arguing his s. 8 rights were infringed.

The search warrants authorized a search of computers for records relating to the production of explosives but did not expressly authorize the seizure of the computers.

The police seized the computers and searched the entire hard drives off-site.

The court found that the seizure of the computers violated s. 8, as the police could not rely on the plain view doctrine or s. 489 of the Criminal Code.

However, the court held that the cursory search of the entire hard drives was reasonable and not overbroad.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the Charter breaches were not serious, had little impact on the accused's protected interests, and the evidence was reliable and important to the Crown's case.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused challenged the facial validity of two search warrants executed at his residence following a Garofoli ruling that some offences listed in the warrants were unsupported by the Information to Obtain.

The accused argued that the entire warrants must be quashed because the unsupported offences rendered the warrants invalid and could not be cured by severance.

The Crown submitted that the unsupported portions could be severed, leaving valid authorizations.

The court reviewed the doctrine of severability in the context of search warrants and held that where the invalid portions are clearly separable and not vital to the authorization, they may be excised without invalidating the remainder.

The court concluded that the unsupported offences and related items could be severed and that the remaining portions of the warrants constituted valid authorizations.

The accused brought a Charter s. 8 application following a Garofoli review seeking to exclude evidence obtained through search warrants executed at his residence.

The court addressed two reserved issues: whether the Information to Obtain properly supported a charge of intimidation of a justice system participant by “watching” police officers, and whether computers were properly included as items to be searched in a second warrant.

The court held that public online posts concerning dismantling G20 security fencing, combined with derogatory postings of police photographs, could reasonably support an inference that the accused intended to provoke fear in the general public.

The court further held that the discovery of chemical precursors, laboratory equipment, documents, and the accused’s extensive internet use provided reasonable grounds to search computers for records relating to the production of explosives.

The warrants were therefore properly supported.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding sexual interference, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate and untainted by references to other incidents.

The court allowed the appeal regarding breach of probation, entering an acquittal because the trial judge failed to make a discrete finding concerning the date of the offences.

On consent, the court entered a stay on the sexual assault conviction.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person charged with criminal negligence causing death while street racing.

The young person acted as the 'flag man' to start a street race that resulted in the death of one of the drivers.

The trial judge had granted a directed verdict of acquittal, finding the young person's participation insufficient to cause death.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to properly consider party liability under section 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court clarified that the mens rea for an aider to criminal negligence causing death requires intentional assistance of the negligent conduct with knowledge of the principal's intentions, and objective foresight that bodily harm would result.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge made several errors in his charge to the jury regarding the requisite intent for murder.

The appellant admitted to causing the victim's death but claimed he lacked the intent for murder due to intoxication and the minimal force used.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to link the 'common sense inference' of intent to the specific manner of death (venal asphyxiation) and by improperly applying the thin skull principle to the issue of intent rather than causation.

These errors compromised the defence, rendering the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter, criminal negligence causing death, and failing to provide the necessaries of life after her severely developmentally delayed sister starved to death while locked in her basement.

She was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons regarding expert evidence, failed to properly consider the mental elements of the offences, and imposed a sentence that offended the parity principle compared to her husband's conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the mental elements properly established, and the disparity in sentences justified by the appellant's role as primary caregiver and lack of remorse.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and trafficking in cocaine following a jury trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the evidence of a police informant and hearsay statements made by an alleged co-conspirator.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the application of the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule, particularly given it was a two-person conspiracy and the Crown sought to rely on statements made after the conspiracy alleged in the indictment.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the jury instructions failed to properly isolate the findings required before hearsay evidence could be used against the appellant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were charged with the attempted murder of a drug dealer.

After a jury trial, one appellant was convicted of attempted murder, while the other was convicted of the lesser included offence of aggravated assault.

The appellant convicted of attempted murder appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defence's position regarding the mens rea for attempted murder.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the key evidence supporting the appellant's position that he did not intend to kill the victim.

The conviction for attempted murder was set aside and substituted with a conviction for aggravated assault, with a reduced sentence.

The other appellant's appeal regarding the jury instructions on party liability was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant had engaged in sexual activity with the appellant, mistakenly believing him to be his identical twin brother, with whom she had an ongoing consensual sexual relationship.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the complainant's mistake as to identity meant she did not subjectively consent to the sexual activity.

The Court also upheld the finding that the appellant could not rely on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, as he failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent and was reckless or wilfully blind.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break, enter, and theft of coins, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding coin roll papers found in his motel room.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence in the record to support the alleged misapprehension.

Furthermore, the Court held that even if an error occurred, the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including eyewitness testimony and the appellant's unexplained possession of the stolen coins, rendered the verdict safe.

The Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario held a pre-hearing teleconference regarding a Notice of Proposed Order to refuse to renew and revoke the registration of the respondent.

The Vice-Chair issued a procedural order setting the hearing dates for January 25 and 26, 2010, and establishing deadlines for both parties to complete disclosure pursuant to Rule 10 of the AGCO Revised Rules of Practice.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his live-in girlfriend's two daughters.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in permitting the jury to use the testimony of each complainant as similar fact evidence and in failing to provide limiting instructions on its use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in admitting the evidence, as the similarities were highly probative and the issue of collusion was properly handled.

The Court also held that the requested limiting instructions were unnecessary and could have confused the jury or prejudiced the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a videotaped police station statement that was allegedly tainted by earlier inadmissible statements made in a police cruiser, and in instructing the jury on the defence of accident and intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the station statement was a 'fresh start' separated by time, location, and consultation with counsel, and that the jury was properly instructed on the requisite intent for murder.