Peter Walter Samuel Copeland

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and attempt to obstruct justice, as well as the lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order imposed as an ancillary order on sentence.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal but challenged the lifetime SOIRA order, arguing it should be 20 years.

Both the appellant and respondent agreed on this issue.

The court found that although there is no right of appeal from a SOIRA order imposed under s. 490.012(1) of the Criminal Code, the trial judge retains inherent jurisdiction to correct an erroneous SOIRA order.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, but the appellant was directed to return the matter to the trial judge for correction.

The appellant appealed his conviction on counts one and two, as well as the sentence imposed.

The trial judge committed two errors: first, using CPIC records to contradict the appellant's testimony about his name usage, which had no logical relevance; and second, using the appellant's rejected and fabricated evidence as circumstantial evidence of guilt.

The Court of Appeal found the second error to be fatal and quashed the convictions on counts one and two, ordering a new trial.

The conviction on count three (breach of probation) was upheld with a concurrent sentence of 120 days, and the firearm prohibition was set aside while the DNA order was maintained.

Two youths, aged 16 at the time of the offence, were convicted of first degree murder in the execution-style killing of another youth.

The Crown applied to have them sentenced as adults.

The youth court judge allowed the Crown's application and imposed life sentences with ten years' parole ineligibility.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the adult sentences, arguing that the youth court judge erred in concluding that the intensive rehabilitative custody supervision (IRCS) program would not adequately address their rehabilitation needs and that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness had not been properly considered.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the youth court judge had made reversible errors in his analysis of the IRCS program and that the Crown had failed to overcome the presumption of diminished moral culpability.

The court substituted youth sentences with IRCS orders.

Mandeep Punia was charged with second-degree murder and Skinder Punia with accessory after the fact to murder.

The jury found Mandeep guilty of manslaughter and Skinder guilty of accessory to manslaughter.

This decision provides the judge's reasons for several trial rulings: (a) the effect of a registrar's error during peremptory challenges in jury selection, which was deemed procedural and saved by s. 643(3) of the Criminal Code; (b) the refusal to issue a Vetrovec warning for a crucial Crown witness (Supinder Litt) due to her non-unsavoury character, though a strong caution was given; (c) the refusal to give a Bero instruction regarding incomplete police recordings, as no deliberate failure to preserve evidence was found, but the jury was instructed that reasonable doubt could arise from the absence of evidence; and (d) the decision to leave the defence of provocation with the jury for Mandeep, finding an "air of reality" to the subjective element based on the totality of evidence, despite the defence not actively advancing it.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The trial judge had excluded Intoxilyzer results under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a breach of s. 8 arising from the administering officer’s failure to consider the possibility of residual mouth alcohol when conducting an approved screening device test at a R.I.D.E. checkpoint.

The appeal court held the trial judge applied the wrong legal test for determining reasonable and probable grounds, failing to properly assess the subjective and objective components outlined in governing jurisprudence.

Given the accused had stated his last drink was 25 minutes earlier and no evidence suggested more recent consumption, a reasonable officer would regard the screening result as reliable.

The acquittal was therefore set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused challenged the facial validity of two search warrants executed at his residence following a Garofoli ruling that some offences listed in the warrants were unsupported by the Information to Obtain.

The accused argued that the entire warrants must be quashed because the unsupported offences rendered the warrants invalid and could not be cured by severance.

The Crown submitted that the unsupported portions could be severed, leaving valid authorizations.

The court reviewed the doctrine of severability in the context of search warrants and held that where the invalid portions are clearly separable and not vital to the authorization, they may be excised without invalidating the remainder.

The court concluded that the unsupported offences and related items could be severed and that the remaining portions of the warrants constituted valid authorizations.

The accused brought a Charter s. 8 application following a Garofoli review seeking to exclude evidence obtained through search warrants executed at his residence.

The court addressed two reserved issues: whether the Information to Obtain properly supported a charge of intimidation of a justice system participant by “watching” police officers, and whether computers were properly included as items to be searched in a second warrant.

The court held that public online posts concerning dismantling G20 security fencing, combined with derogatory postings of police photographs, could reasonably support an inference that the accused intended to provoke fear in the general public.

The court further held that the discovery of chemical precursors, laboratory equipment, documents, and the accused’s extensive internet use provided reasonable grounds to search computers for records relating to the production of explosives.

The warrants were therefore properly supported.