Peter Walter Samuel Copeland

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in law by presiding over the trial after having conducted the pre-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that while judges who conduct pre-trials should generally avoid conducting the trial, it is not a per se reversible error.

Absent clear objection from counsel and any prejudice, the trial judge's decision to seize herself with the trial was not an error in law.

The court also upheld the trial judge's factual findings that the appellant followed the complainant, made threatening gestures, and rammed her vehicle.

Following a successful appeal by the City of Toronto on a single issue, the Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement.

Because several issues from the original application remained undetermined and were remitted to the Superior Court, the Court of Appeal set aside the application judge's costs order and reserved the costs of both the original application and the appeal to the judge determining the remitted issues.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision quashing a by-law that prohibited commercial parking lots and private parking enforcement agencies from issuing private parking tickets.

The application judge had found the by-law ultra vires, reasoning that trespassers are not 'consumers' under the consumer protection licensing power in s. 150(2) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge applied an overly restrictive interpretation of 'consumer protection'.

Applying a broad and purposive approach, the Court found that 'consumer' includes any person with whom a licensed business transacts, engages, or deals directly, including alleged trespassers from whom the business seeks to extract payment.

The respondents brought a motion for particulars regarding allegations of illegal trading and distributions under the Securities Act.

They argued that the Statement of Allegations and the voluminous disclosure provided by Staff were insufficient to allow them to know the case to meet.

The Commission held that while Staff is not required to meet the strict standard of a criminal proceeding, the duty of procedural fairness requires sufficient particularization of the material facts.

The Commission directed Staff to provide additional specific particulars regarding the alleged illegal distributions, solicitation meetings, and representations, but dismissed the motion to enforce an alleged undertaking by Staff.

On a criminal appeal from convictions for sexual assault, assault, and threatening death, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings in a consent case.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge improperly took judicial notice of a physiological proposition about how a healthy young man's penis would function during intercourse, despite the absence of expert evidence and without notice to the parties.

The court also found a material misapprehension of a witness's evidence concerning what she knew of the parties' prior relationship, which materially supported the rejection of the defence evidence.

Because both errors went to central factual issues, the convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission brought a motion to adjourn the respondents' Constitutional Motions until the hearing on the merits.

The respondents' motions challenged the constitutionality of section 11 of the Securities Act and the use of compelled evidence, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The Commission granted Staff's motion, holding that Charter challenges and requests for a stay of proceedings should generally not be decided in a factual vacuum.

The Commission found that a complete factual record, which could only be developed at the hearing on the merits, was necessary to properly assess whether the respondents' Charter rights were violated and what remedies might be appropriate.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission brought a motion to defer the hearing of Constitutional Motions brought by the respondents until the hearing on the merits.

The respondents sought to challenge the constitutionality of the investigation provisions of the Securities Act and the manner in which Staff obtained and used an investigation order.

The Commission granted Staff's motion, finding that Charter challenges should generally be decided on a complete factual record rather than in a factual vacuum.

The Commission concluded that the constitutional issues could not be fairly or completely resolved without regard to the contested facts and anticipated evidence that would be presented at the hearing on the merits.

The respondents requested that the Commission's Confidential Reasons and Decision dated May 18, 2007 be redacted to remove their names and identifying information prior to public release, relying on the confidentiality provisions in section 16 of the Securities Act.

Staff argued that subsection 17(6) permitted disclosure in connection with a proceeding and opposed a broad sealing order, but did not object to anonymizing the parties.

The Commission held that while it had the authority to release the reasons unredacted, it would exercise its discretion to release a redacted version until the commencement of the hearing on the merits.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission brought a motion to adjourn the respondents' Constitutional Motions until the hearing on the merits.

The respondents had filed motions challenging the constitutionality of section 11 of the Securities Act and the manner in which an investigation order was obtained and used, alleging violations of their Charter rights.

The Commission held that the Constitutional Motions should be dealt with in the course of the hearing on the merits because a determination in advance would deprive the Commission of the complete factual basis necessary for a proper consideration of the alleged Charter violations.

Staff's motion was granted and the Constitutional Motions were deferred to the hearing panel.

The Crown appealed a nine-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual assault, sexual interference, assault with a weapon, and simple assault against his stepchildren.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is rarely appropriate for sexual touching of children by adults in a position of trust, absent exceptional circumstances.

A twelve-month custodial sentence was substituted, with nine months' credit for the conditional sentence served.

The court also ordered a new hearing on the Crown's application for a Sex Offender Information Registration Act order, as the sentencing judge gave no reasons for finding it grossly disproportionate.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's charge to the jury on reasonable doubt was deficient because it failed to link the W.D. charge to the issue of credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the specific instruction on resolving conflicting evidence was not a model of clarity, the jury charge read as a whole left no misapprehension about the correct standard of proof.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on an arson charge and a costs order made against the Crown for late disclosure of an expert report.

During the trial, the Crown's primary fire investigator became seriously ill and could not complete his cross-examination.

The trial judge excluded his evidence in its entirety, as well as the evidence of a second expert whose report was disclosed late.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by prematurely excluding the evidence before the end of the trial and failing to consider affording the incomplete evidence less weight.

The Court also vacated the costs order, finding the Crown's late disclosure was not flagrant or unjustified.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants were convicted of attempted murder and robbery following a home invasion where a 72-year-old victim was severely beaten and left bound.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting, and by omitting the D.W. instruction from written materials provided to the jury.

One appellant also appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the jury instructions were adequate in context, the verdicts were reasonable, and the 13-year sentence was fit given the viciousness of the crime and the intent to kill.

The appellant appealed his criminal conviction, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons and improperly assessed witness credibility.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's reasons were conclusory, failed to properly scrutinize the unconfirmed evidence of the main Crown witness, misapprehended evidence regarding an exchange, and improperly drew an adverse inference from a neutral fact.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant operated a website containing audiovisual material and written stories depicting violence against women.

He was convicted of making, possessing, and distributing obscene material.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that adult nudity alone could amount to explicit sex for the purposes of obscenity.

The court ordered a new trial for the audiovisual counts but upheld the conviction for the written stories, which clearly depicted explicit sex and violence.

The sentence was varied to a $2,000 fine.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and attempted murder.

The appeal raised numerous issues, including the validity of his warrantless arrest, the legality of a gunshot residue test and the seizure of his clothing, and the admissibility of similar fact evidence and hearsay.

The Court of Appeal found that the police had reasonable grounds for the arrest and that the gunshot residue test was a valid search incident to arrest.

However, the trial judge erred in admitting highly prejudicial similar fact evidence of a subsequent shooting, as it lacked the requisite degree of similarity to prove identity.

The trial judge also failed to properly resolve factual issues regarding an alleged violation of the appellant's right to counsel.

Due to the erroneous admission of the similar fact evidence, the appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death and failing to stop after striking a pedestrian and fleeing the scene.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the jury instructions were flawed.

The Crown appealed the 30-month sentence, arguing it was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the verdict was supported by the evidence, the jury instructions did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the sentence was entitled to deference.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence for the first respondent based on his degree of complicity and personal circumstances.

For the second respondent, the Court noted the sentence should have been custodial, but declined to interfere given the passage of time, completion of an extensive community service order, and personal circumstances.

The Court also declined to set out sentencing principles for the criminal organization charge due to the unique circumstances and joint submission of the parties.

The appeals were dismissed.

Following his criminal conviction for insider trading, the Ontario Securities Commission held a hearing to determine whether to impose public interest sanctions against the respondent under s. 127 of the Securities Act.

The respondent, while an officer and director of a reporting issuer, had sold shares with knowledge of undisclosed material negative assay results, avoiding significant losses.

The Commission found his conduct egregious and a breach of fiduciary duty.

To protect the capital markets, the Commission ordered a 15-year cease trade order and a 15-year ban on acting as a director or officer of any reporting issuer, with limited carve-outs for personal trading.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's decision to exclude evidence obtained from a wiretap authorization under s. 185 of the Criminal Code, which led to the respondents' acquittals on drug smuggling charges.

The Court of Appeal found that the unchallenged affidavit evidence met the requirements of s. 186(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code, providing reasonable grounds and demonstrating investigative necessity.

Furthermore, the Court held that even if a s. 8 Charter breach had occurred, the evidence should have been admitted under s. 24(2) because the police reasonably relied on a facially valid judicial authorization and the evidence was non-conscriptive.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.