Candice Suter

The appellant appealed her convictions and nine-year sentence for drug trafficking and forgery arising from a prescription fraud scheme.

The Crown conceded she should be acquitted of two trafficking counts, and the court stayed two forgery counts under the Kienapple principle.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the jointly submitted nine-year sentence manifestly unfit despite the seriousness of the offence, citing the appellant's youth, lack of record, cooperation with police, and the fact that a more culpable co-accused received the same sentence.

The sentence was reduced to six years.

The applicant sought an order under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code assigning counsel to represent him on appeal from convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats.

Although the court accepted that several proposed grounds of appeal were arguable, it found that the appeal was relatively straightforward, based on a short trial record with limited evidence and uncomplicated legal issues.

The court concluded that the applicant was capable of presenting the appeal himself and that the appellate court would be able to properly determine the matter without the assistance of assigned counsel.

The application was therefore dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a fatal barroom altercation.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding self-defence under sections 34(2) and 35 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to assess the lawfulness of the victim's assault from the accused's perspective rather than the victim's, and by failing to leave section 35 with the jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash their committal for trial on a charge of first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

They conceded that evidence supported committal for second degree murder but argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by finding evidence capable of supporting planning and deliberation.

The Superior Court held that certiorari is only available where a preliminary inquiry judge commits an accused without any evidence of an essential element or relies on irrational inferences.

The court concluded the hearing judge properly distinguished between speculation and rational inference and applied the correct circumstantial evidence test.

Viewing the evidence as a whole, a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer planning and deliberation.

The applications were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and making child pornography available.

The Crown's principal position at trial was that the appellant was wilfully blind to the child pornography his house guest had placed on his computer.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's original charge and re-charge to the jury on wilful blindness were too broad and confusing, failing to properly articulate the level of suspicion required to engage the doctrine.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the sentences imposed for two charges, one of which was an indictable offence.

The Crown conceded that the sentencing was improperly conducted in the absence of the accused without the required inquiry, and that the sentences were excessive.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, varying the sentences to two months consecutive on each charge to account for pre-trial custody, and declined to impose a probation term.

On a Crown appeal in a criminal matter, the Court addressed whether prior compelled civil discovery testimony could be used to cross-examine an accused at trial without violating s. 13 of the Charter.

A majority held that only prior testimony that is itself incriminating engages the constitutional protection, and that non-incriminating prior statements used solely for impeachment do not trigger s. 13.

The majority restored the conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and set aside the order for a new trial.

A dissenting minority would have barred the cross-examination, finding that compelled prior testimony assisting the prosecution in any way should remain protected.

The appellant, a 17-year-old youth, was involved in a gang shootout on a crowded street that resulted in the death of an innocent bystander.

He was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced as an adult.

On appeal, he argued the verdict was unreasonable regarding his identification as a shooter and causation of the victim's death, and challenged the Crown's decision to require a jury trial under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's verdict was reasonable based on the evidence, the mutual decision to engage in a gunfight established causation, and the Crown's decision to require a jury trial did not amount to an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained during an illegal search of his apartment.

The police had executed a search warrant without reasonable and probable grounds.

The trial judge excluded drug-related evidence but admitted the firearms evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the Grant framework.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the police did not act in bad faith and that there is a heightened public interest in the prosecution of firearms offences.

The appellant appealed his first degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting evidence of two loaded handguns seized from him that were unconnected to the murder, and by instructing the jury that this evidence could confirm the testimony of a Vetrovec witness (a jailhouse informant).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the firearms evidence was relevant to the appellant's knowledge of the murder weapons and properly admitted with a limiting instruction.

The Court also held the evidence was capable of confirming the informant's testimony, as it was independent and increased confidence in the witness's reliability.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder following a fatal stabbing.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give instructions on post-offence conduct, a Vetrovec warning, the defence of accident, the elements of manslaughter, causation, and the victim's reputation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and noting that the defence counsel at trial had not requested the omitted instructions or objected to the charge.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for various drug and property offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in her treatment of a witness's preliminary inquiry evidence and failed to properly apply the W. (D.) principles to the exculpatory defence evidence.

As a result, the convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking were substituted with simple possession.

The court also quashed convictions for simple possession of certain drugs where no such offence exists, quashed a property conviction as unreasonable, and quashed a money laundering conviction due to misdirection and lack of evidence.

Sentences on the remaining counts were reduced to time served.

The young person appealed their conviction and sentence.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the identification evidence of a teller and in admitting time and date stamps on school photographs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to the frailties of the identification evidence and that defence counsel had agreed to the admission of the photographs.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was reasonable and revealed no error in principle.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder for an execution-style shooting related to a drug debt.

On appeal, they argued that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding unsavoury witnesses (Vetrovec warning) and the defence of abandonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's continuum approach to the Vetrovec warnings, his instructions on confirmatory evidence, or his charge on abandonment.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt, arguing the trial judge erred in his section 11(b) Charter analysis regarding unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged errors in the trial judge's application of Youth Criminal Justice Act guidelines.

However, the Court upheld the decision, finding that the lack of actual prejudice and the gravity of the offence outweighed the inferred prejudice from the delay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge erred in imposing a consecutive sentence and that there was an unjustified disparity between his sentence and that of his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge gave cogent reasons for the consecutive sentence.

The Court also held that the disparity was warranted due to the appellant's longer criminal record, the co-accused's guilty plea, and the co-accused's assistance to the Crown.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter by the Court of Appeal, which substituted the conviction for second-degree murder following an appeal.

The appellant acted as a middleman in an insurance fraud scheme, recruiting arsonists to burn down a commercial building, which resulted in the death of one of the arsonists.

The Court of Appeal imposed a base sentence of 10 years' imprisonment, finding the appellant's role and the inherent danger of the arson warranted a substantial penitentiary term.

After applying credit for pre-sentence and post-conviction custody, the appellant was sentenced to 4 years and 11 months.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit arson and second degree murder after a co-conspirator died in an explosion while setting fire to a commercial building for insurance fraud.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in her treatment of Vetrovec witnesses, admitted improper discreditable conduct evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict on the murder charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the evidentiary grounds but found the murder conviction unreasonable, as the evidence did not establish the appellant had subjective foresight of the likelihood of death.

The court substituted a conviction for manslaughter and reduced the sentence for conspiracy to commit arson from ten years to six years to respect the parity principle.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm following a motorcycle accident.

In a related civil action, he was examined for discovery and testified he had no memory of the accident.

At his criminal trial, he gave a detailed account of the accident.

The trial judge allowed the Crown to cross-examine the appellant on his discovery evidence to impeach his credibility, finding that s. 13 of the Charter did not apply.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that under R. v. Henry, prior compelled evidence is inadmissible against an accused even for the purpose of challenging credibility.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for which a sentence of 12 months' probation was imposed three years prior.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, noting the question of law had no significance beyond the case, the argument on the reasonableness of the conviction was not strong, and the sentence did not engage significant liberty interests.