Maurice J. Mattis

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after returning from Jamaica.

During a customs inspection, a positive ion scan led to further questioning and a personal search.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit the accused's statements as voluntary, while the defence sought to exclude the statements and drugs due to alleged breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the statements were voluntary and not the result of oppression.

However, the court held that the accused was detained when the CBSA officer began focused questioning after a second positive ion scan without providing Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the accused's statements regarding a side trip to Panama made during this period of detention, but admitted subsequent statements made after rights were provided.

The offender was found guilty of sexual interference involving his 13-year-old niece.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term of four to five years, while the defence argued for 15 to 24 months.

The court noted the aggravating factors of breach of trust and the intrusive nature of the offence, balanced against the offender's lack of a prior record and stable employment.

The court sentenced the offender to two years' imprisonment, along with weapons prohibitions, a DNA order, and a 20-year SOIRA order.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial subject to a publication ban, the court convicted the accused of sexual interference involving his 13-year-old niece.

The court accepted the complainant's video-recorded and trial evidence describing digital penetration and intercourse in a crowded family residence, and rejected defence theories of fabrication based on bedroom displacement and an alleged relationship with another witness.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and general credibility principles, the court found the accused's denial unpersuasive and found aspects of surrounding evidence, including contemporaneous demeanour and disclosure evidence, to be confirmatory.

The Crown proved the offence under s. 151 of the Criminal Code beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a trial for drug importation, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to police following his arrest.

The accused made an initial statement in a police cruiser and a subsequent video-recorded statement at the police station.

The court found the cruiser statement involuntary due to an incomplete record and inducements offered by the officer.

Applying the derived confessions rule, the court also excluded the subsequent video statement, finding it was causally, temporally, and contextually connected to the first tainted statement.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

At trial, a civilian witness testified to seeing the appellant assault the driver of a vehicle.

The appellant claimed he was the victim and that the driver's injuries, including blood, resulted from her breaking her fingernails while punching him.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence, erroneously finding that the police officer never mentioned broken nails, when the officer had actually testified to seeing cracked nails with blood under them.

The Superior Court of Justice held that this misapprehension of evidence played an essential role in the trial judge's reasoning process for rejecting the appellant's defence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The accused were tried before a judge alone on charges arising from a large-scale cocaine importation scheme involving approximately 112 kilograms of cocaine shipped from Guyana to Canada in a sea container.

The Crown alleged conspiracy to import cocaine, importing cocaine, and possession for the purpose of trafficking, relying on surveillance, intercepted communications, controlled delivery evidence, and admissions.

The court found that two of the accused knowingly participated in a conspiracy to import cocaine and later exercised possession of the drugs for trafficking purposes, based largely on circumstantial evidence and intercepted communications demonstrating knowledge, control, and shared financial interest in the shipment.

However, the court found insufficient evidence that any accused actually committed the offence of importing under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act because their involvement occurred after the drugs entered Canada.

Two accused were acquitted entirely due to reasonable doubt regarding knowledge and participation.

The offender, a 33-year-old first-time offender and single mother of four, was convicted of acting as the getaway driver in two armed robberies at bus stops.

The principal offender used an imitation firearm.

The Crown sought 2-3 years imprisonment, while the defence sought time served to avoid potential deportation consequences under the IRPA.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the serious impact on the victims, but acknowledged the offender's lesser role compared to the principal.

The court imposed a sentence of 18 months incarceration, reduced to 4 months after crediting pre-sentence custody and time spent on bail with a curfew, followed by 2 years of probation.

The offender, a 33-year-old first-time offender and mother of four, acted as the getaway driver for her boyfriend in two armed robberies at bus stops.

The principal offender used an imitation firearm and received a five-year sentence.

The court considered the offender's lesser role, her lack of a criminal record, and the potential immigration consequences of her sentence.

The court imposed a sentence of 18 months' incarceration, reduced to 4 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions, followed by two years of probation.

The accused was charged with procuring a complainant to become a prostitute and with exercising control, direction, or influence over her movements for the purpose of gain contrary to s. 212(1)(d) and s. 212(1)(h) of the Criminal Code.

The evidence showed the complainant worked as a stripper performing lap dances and later engaged in additional sexual services for payment while regularly consulting with the accused, who assisted her in obtaining work, set prices for sexual services, transported her, remained in frequent contact, and received large portions of her earnings.

The court found significant credibility concerns in the complainant’s testimony and concluded there was a reasonable doubt that the accused had persuaded or induced her to become a prostitute.

However, the court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused exercised direction and influence that aided her prostitution for the purpose of financial gain.

The accused was acquitted of procuring but convicted of exercising control or influence for gain.

During a criminal trial for procuring a person to become a prostitute and exercising control or influence over a person engaged in prostitution, the accused brought an application for directed verdicts of acquittal at the close of the Crown’s case.

The court applied the test of whether there was any admissible evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could convict if the evidence were believed.

The evidence included testimony that the accused encouraged the complainant to work as a stripper, instructed her in lap dancing, advised her regarding sexual services for payment, transported her, controlled the proceeds of her earnings, and directed aspects of her work.

The court held that lap dancing involving sexual contact for payment could constitute prostitution and that the evidence could support findings of procuring and exercising direction or influence for the purpose of gain.

The application for directed verdicts was dismissed.

During a trial for three robberies, the Crown sought to admit a 911 call made by a victim who was unavailable to testify.

The court found that the 911 call was made almost immediately after the robbery while the victim was still in shock, leaving no opportunity for concoction or fabrication.

The court ruled the 911 call admissible under the traditional res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, and alternatively under the principled approach to hearsay, as it met the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability.

The accused was charged with three counts of robbery for allegedly acting as the getaway driver for her boyfriend, who robbed three victims at bus shelters over the course of one evening.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including cell tower data showing the accused's phone moving in tandem with the principal offender's phone, and a victim recording the licence plate of the accused's van.

The court found the principal offender committed all three robberies.

The court acquitted the accused on the first count, finding a reasonable doubt as to whether she knew a robbery was about to occur.

However, the court convicted the accused on the second and third counts, concluding she knew of the principal's intentions by that point and intended to aid him by acting as the getaway driver.

The accused was tried on a three-count indictment alleging that she aided a series of armed robberies committed by an accomplice at bus stops over the course of a single evening.

The Crown alleged that the accused acted as the getaway driver while the accomplice robbed victims of cellular phones using a firearm.

The court relied on circumstantial evidence including cell tower records, a licence plate identified by a victim, and property from one robbery found in the accused’s vehicle.

While the court had a reasonable doubt that the accused knew of the first robbery in advance, it concluded that by the time of the subsequent incidents she knew of and intended to assist the robberies.

The accused was acquitted on the first count but convicted as a party to the second and third robberies.

On a voir dire during a robbery trial, the court determined whether a police statement made by the accused was voluntary under the common law confessions rule.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to inducements, references to potential Children’s Aid Society involvement, and allegedly oppressive conditions including cold temperature and lack of medication for diabetes.

The court assessed the totality of the circumstances, including the accused’s demeanor, the recorded interview, and police testimony.

While acknowledging some inducements and pressure during the interview, the court found the accused retained an operating mind and was not subjected to oppressive conditions sufficient to overbear her will.

The Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and the statement was admitted at trial.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, trafficking, and possession for the purpose of trafficking after acting as a courier to transport half a kilogram of cocaine from Toronto to Ottawa.

The Crown relied on intercepted communications and circumstantial evidence to prove the accused's knowledge.

The court found that the accused was wilfully blind to the fact that he was transporting a controlled substance, given the suspicious circumstances, urgency, and use of guarded language.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with stabbing the complainant during an altercation at a public picnic in a park.

The Crown alleged the accused approached the complainant from behind during a brief verbal exchange and stabbed him with scissors, causing severe injuries requiring removal of the complainant’s spleen.

The accused testified that the complainant produced the scissors first and that the stabbing occurred accidentally during a struggle in self-defence.

Applying the credibility framework in R. v. (W.D.), the court rejected the accused’s evidence due to internal inconsistencies, post-offence conduct, and false statements to police.

The court accepted the complainant’s evidence, supported in part by other witnesses and surrounding circumstances, and concluded the Crown proved the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with robbery as an aider and abettor.

The Crown's case relied on video surveillance, an oral utterance made upon arrest, and a fingerprint found on a duct tape wrapper in the getaway car.

Following a voir dire, the court excluded the oral utterance under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that police breached the accused's s. 10(b) rights by showing him a surveillance photo to elicit a response before advising him of his right to counsel for the robbery charge.

On the trial merits, the court found that the remaining circumstantial evidence—a general resemblance in the video and the fingerprint—raised a strong suspicion but failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty.