Holly Ann Akin

The applicant sought to exclude eyewitness identification evidence arising from a photo line‑up.

Evidence revealed that police had shown the witness several mug shots of suspects prior to conducting the formal photo line‑up and failed to keep notes or records of that interaction.

The court held that the undocumented pre‑line‑up exposure created a serious risk that the witness’s identification had been tainted and could not be meaningfully tested through cross‑examination.

Given the uncertainty surrounding the circumstances of the earlier photographs and the witness’s statements during the line‑up indicating influence from them, the probative value of the identification evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The identification evidence was therefore excluded.

The accused challenged the admissibility of evidence consisting of a name and phone number stored in a third party’s cell phone, arguing that it constituted hearsay.

The Crown sought to admit the evidence as circumstantial evidence of the state of mind of the person who recorded the contact information and its connection to events relevant to the prosecution.

The court held that the entry of a name and phone number in a cell phone constituted non-verbal conduct rather than hearsay and could be admitted for the limited purpose advanced by the Crown.

Alternatively, the evidence satisfied the principled exception to the hearsay rule due to circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and necessity where the phone’s owner had absconded.

The issue of the ultimate reliability and weight of the evidence was left to the jury.

During a criminal jury trial, the defence challenged testimony suggesting that the accused was known by a nickname, arguing the evidence was inadmissible hearsay.

The Crown contended the statement was admissible as an adoptive admission by silence because it was allegedly made in the accused’s presence.

The court reviewed the governing principles for adoptive admissions, including the requirement that the accused must have heard the statement and reasonably been expected to respond.

Because the evidentiary record did not establish that the accused was present or heard the statement, the foundational requirements were not met.

The jury was therefore prohibited from using the testimony as substantive evidence.

During a criminal jury trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, the defence objected to the Crown calling a police officer as an expert witness on drug trafficking practices.

Following a voir dire, the court considered the admissibility of the proposed opinion evidence under the framework from Mohan.

The court held the officer was qualified through experience in drug investigations and that his proposed testimony regarding common trafficking indicators—such as multiple cell phones, separation of drugs and cash, and possession of large amounts of currency—was relevant and necessary to assist the jury in assessing the accused’s knowledge of the drugs.

The court limited the scope of the expert evidence, ruling the officer could not opine on whether the accused possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking or had knowledge of the cocaine.

The evidence was admitted subject to those restrictions.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay between the laying of charges and the scheduled trial date.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and assessed the total delay of approximately 36.5 months, subtracting periods attributable to defence waiver, inherent time requirements, and defence delay.

After these deductions, the net delay was calculated at approximately 18 months and one week.

The court found limited prejudice to the accused and emphasized the seriousness of the charges involving large-scale marijuana production.

Balancing the factors, the court concluded the delay did not warrant a stay of proceedings.

The accused sought Charter remedies including exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) and a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) based on alleged police failure to preserve text messages.

The defence filed its materials late and failed to comply with multiple requirements of the Criminal Proceedings Rules for the Superior Court of Justice, including notice, timing, and proper content of application materials.

The court found that the late and deficient filings prevented the Crown from adequately preparing to respond to the Charter applications before the scheduled trial.

Emphasizing the importance of procedural rules to ensure fairness and prevent trial ambush, the court vacated the scheduled trial date.

The resulting delay was attributed to the defence.

The accused applied to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(f) of the Criminal Code on the basis of potential lack of language competency in the language of trial.

The defence argued that the right to challenge jurors on language grounds exists independently of an order under s. 530 governing the language of trial and forms part of constitutional language rights.

The court held that juror language competency is primarily a component of the right to a fair trial and that s. 638(1)(f) operates in conjunction with a prior order under s. 530.

In the absence of such an order and without evidentiary foundation demonstrating an air of reality for the concern, the court found that the standard jury vetting process sufficiently ensures linguistic competency.

The application to challenge jurors for cause was therefore denied.

The appellant appealed his drug-related conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge failed to warn the jury not to engage in propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that since identity was the sole issue and all evidence was admissible on all counts, the requested warning would have confused the jury and would not have benefited the appellant.