Holly Ann Akin

During a criminal jury trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, the defence objected to the Crown calling a police officer as an expert witness on drug trafficking practices.

Following a voir dire, the court considered the admissibility of the proposed opinion evidence under the framework from Mohan.

The court held the officer was qualified through experience in drug investigations and that his proposed testimony regarding common trafficking indicators—such as multiple cell phones, separation of drugs and cash, and possession of large amounts of currency—was relevant and necessary to assist the jury in assessing the accused’s knowledge of the drugs.

The court limited the scope of the expert evidence, ruling the officer could not opine on whether the accused possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking or had knowledge of the cocaine.

The evidence was admitted subject to those restrictions.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay between the laying of charges and the scheduled trial date.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and assessed the total delay of approximately 36.5 months, subtracting periods attributable to defence waiver, inherent time requirements, and defence delay.

After these deductions, the net delay was calculated at approximately 18 months and one week.

The court found limited prejudice to the accused and emphasized the seriousness of the charges involving large-scale marijuana production.

Balancing the factors, the court concluded the delay did not warrant a stay of proceedings.

The accused sought Charter remedies including exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) and a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) based on alleged police failure to preserve text messages.

The defence filed its materials late and failed to comply with multiple requirements of the Criminal Proceedings Rules for the Superior Court of Justice, including notice, timing, and proper content of application materials.

The court found that the late and deficient filings prevented the Crown from adequately preparing to respond to the Charter applications before the scheduled trial.

Emphasizing the importance of procedural rules to ensure fairness and prevent trial ambush, the court vacated the scheduled trial date.

The resulting delay was attributed to the defence.

The accused applied to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(f) of the Criminal Code on the basis of potential lack of language competency in the language of trial.

The defence argued that the right to challenge jurors on language grounds exists independently of an order under s. 530 governing the language of trial and forms part of constitutional language rights.

The court held that juror language competency is primarily a component of the right to a fair trial and that s. 638(1)(f) operates in conjunction with a prior order under s. 530.

In the absence of such an order and without evidentiary foundation demonstrating an air of reality for the concern, the court found that the standard jury vetting process sufficiently ensures linguistic competency.

The application to challenge jurors for cause was therefore denied.

The appellant appealed his drug-related conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge failed to warn the jury not to engage in propensity reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that since identity was the sole issue and all evidence was admissible on all counts, the requested warning would have confused the jury and would not have benefited the appellant.