Christopher Diana

The applicant sought reconsideration of a Tribunal decision dismissing her application as abandoned after she failed to attend a teleconference summary hearing.

The applicant argued she was treated differently from the respondent, as the Tribunal had previously contacted the respondent's counsel when he failed to attend a hearing, but did not contact the applicant when she failed to attend.

The Tribunal acknowledged its errors and found that the need to ensure both parties are treated similarly outweighed the public interest in finality.

The request for reconsideration was granted and a new summary hearing was ordered.

The appellant police officer appealed a disciplinary conviction and penalty for unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority.

The officer had arrested a motorist for breach of the peace during a traffic stop after the motorist became agitated and argumentative.

The Hearing Officer found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest, as the motorist's behaviour did not pose an imminent risk of harm or breach of the peace.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission applied the reasonableness standard of review, upheld the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and credibility, and affirmed the penalty of forfeiture of 24 hours of work.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

A teleconference hearing was scheduled to determine whether the application should be dismissed for delay.

The applicant failed to attend the hearing despite receiving notice.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The applicant, a First Nations Constable and Chief of Police of the Tyendinaga Mohawk Police Service, made public comments to the press alleging that the OPP, RCMP, and SQ were racist organizations.

Following an investigation, the Commissioner of the OPP suspended and subsequently terminated the applicant's appointment as a First Nations Constable.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of race, ancestry, and ethnic origin, as well as reprisal.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the suspension and termination were based on the applicant's inappropriate public comments and not his race.

The Tribunal also found that the exclusion of First Nations Constables from the Police Services Act was not discriminatory, as it respected First Nations self-government.

The respondent requested that the human rights application be dismissed as an abuse of process.

The applicant repeatedly refused to accept the Tribunal's rulings regarding the scope of the hearing, insisting on litigating issues related to the Coroner's jurisdiction under the Coroners Act rather than discrimination under the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's persistent refusal to follow directions and attempts to relitigate issues outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction thwarted efforts to deal with the merits.

The application was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of age and disability regarding the respondent's refusal to hold an inquest into her mother's death.

The applicant brought a preliminary request to strike the respondent's Response, arguing that the Office of the Chief Coroner acted without jurisdiction under the Coroners Act.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that jurisdiction under the Coroners Act is a separate issue from whether the respondent breached the Human Rights Code, and lack of jurisdiction would not be a reason to disregard the Response.

The applicants, family members of individuals whose deaths were investigated by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), sought a declaration that police officers involved in SIU investigations are not entitled to legal assistance in preparing their notes.

The application judge dismissed the application on grounds of standing, justiciability, and mootness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the applicants had public interest standing and the issues were justiciable and not moot.

Exercising its jurisdiction to decide the substantive issues, the Court held that the Police Services Act and the SIU Regulation do not permit police officers to have a lawyer vet or assist in the preparation of their notes, though they may obtain basic legal advice regarding their rights and duties provided it does not delay note completion.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment, including that the exclusion of First Nations constables from the Police Services Act is discriminatory.

The respondents sought leave to amend their Response to argue that the provision of policing services to the Tyendinaga Mohawk Police Service constitutes a 'special program' under section 14(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal granted the request to amend, finding that the applicant would not be prejudiced as the hearing was ongoing and there was sufficient time to research and respond to the new defence.

The respondents moved to strike or quash portions of the appellants' Notice of Appeal, specifically a request for a declaration and a ground of appeal relating to justiciability and standing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, deferring the jurisdictional issue to the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellants' cross-motion to have the appeal case-managed was granted, with costs of the motion awarded to the appellants.

The applicant filed human rights applications against three police services, alleging discrimination and reprisal based on false statements made in 2003 about his mental stability.

The respondents requested that the applications be dismissed for delay.

The Tribunal found that the core incidents occurred between 2003 and 2005, well outside the one-year time limit under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal rejected the applicant's argument that the ongoing effects of the 2003 statements constituted a series of incidents.

Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the applicant's generalized fear of reprisal did not provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, and dismissed the applications.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and creed regarding the dietary accommodations provided while he was incarcerated.

A hearing was scheduled, but neither the applicant nor his counsel attended, nor did they request an adjournment.

The respondent's counsel attended and informed the Tribunal that the applicant had been arrested earlier that week.

Because the applicant failed to attend or communicate with the Tribunal, the application was dismissed as abandoned.

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal scheduled a hearing and sent notice to the applicant.

The applicant failed to comply with disclosure rules and did not attend the hearing, despite confirming his awareness of the hearing date to respondents' counsel.

The Tribunal dismissed the application due to the applicant's failure to attend and provide evidence in support of his allegations.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and reprisal, along with a request to expedite proceedings under Rule 21.

The Tribunal denied the request to expedite, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate truly urgent circumstances requiring resolution in a particularly rapid manner compared to the regular process.

The appellant police officer was found guilty of neglect of duty for delaying a detainee's right to counsel for 90 minutes after the initial justification for the delay (officer safety) had passed.

The Hearing Officer imposed a reprimand, but the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services substituted a six-month reduction in rank.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the Commission's decision unreasonable, as it failed to consider mitigating factors and wrongly concluded that a reprimand was an unavailable penalty for a Charter breach.

The appeal was allowed and the reprimand restored.

The appellant hog producer appealed a decision of the Ontario Pork Producers’ Marketing Board denying his request for a payment adjustment on two loads of hogs shipped to Quebec instead of the U.S. The appellant argued he lost money because the Quebec processor no longer offered a heavy hog grid.

The Tribunal found that while the OPPMB was not responsible for the specific decision to ship the hogs to Quebec, it was partially responsible for failing to inform the transporter that the heavy grid was no longer available.

The Tribunal ordered the OPPMB to compensate the appellant for future losses resulting from the effect of the Quebec shipments on his rolling average index.

The appellant, a hog producer, appealed a decision of the Ontario Pork Producers' Marketing Board regarding the payment for two loads of hogs.

At the commencement of the hearing, the appellant requested an adjournment to obtain transcripts of telephone conversations between the marketing board and his transporter, which he argued were necessary to make his case.

The marketing board objected to the adjournment and the relevance of some transcripts.

The Tribunal granted the adjournment and ordered the marketing board to produce redacted transcripts of the relevant telephone conversations, finding that they may contain information relevant to the matter.

Following a successful appeal regarding entitlements under the Employment Standards Act, the appellant sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $31,000 for the entire action.

The respondent argued for no costs or partial indemnity costs of $5,000.

The Divisional Court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, noting the offers to settle did not strictly comply with Rule 49.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonable expectations, the court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs fixed at $4,500 for the motion and $6,000 for the appeal, plus disbursements.

The appellant employee appealed a decision dismissing his motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal damages and ESA entitlements.

The motion judge had held that ESA standards were only enforceable through administrative procedures and were alternatives to common law damages.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that ESA entitlements can be claimed in a civil action and are not subject to mitigation, as they are statutory minimums, not damages.

The Court granted summary judgment for the outstanding balance of the appellant's ESA entitlements.

The appellant, who was wrongfully convicted of sexual assault and later had his conviction quashed after fresh DNA evidence was admitted, sued his trial lawyer for negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding no 'egregious errors' and no evidence of causation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the proper standard of care for a lawyer conducting litigation is reasonableness, not 'egregious error'.

The Court also found that the 'but for' causation analysis raised a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the appellant would have been acquitted had the lawyer obtained the DNA evidence and properly conducted the trial.

The respondent's cross-appeal alleging abuse of process was dismissed.

The applicant appealed a decision of the Ontario Pork Producers' Marketing Board regarding the payment for two loads of hogs.

At the commencement of the hearing, the applicant requested an adjournment to obtain transcripts of telephone conversations between the Board and his transporter.

The Board objected, arguing the relevant transcripts were already provided and post-shipment calls were irrelevant.

The Tribunal granted the adjournment and ordered the Board to produce redacted transcripts of the requested telephone conversations, finding they may contain relevant information.