Molly Clare Flanagan

The appellant, Jordan Brown, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault by wounding and discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on "wounding" and intent to endanger life.

The court also granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, affirming the dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence despite a conceded error by the trial judge regarding the consideration of treatment prospects at the designation stage, finding no reasonable possibility that the outcome would have differed.

The Crown applied under s. 679(6) of the Criminal Code to revoke the respondent's bail release order, which had extended his release pending appeal.

The respondent opposed and brought a cross-application for release pending appeal.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the respondent had committed new indictable offences while on bail, including possession of break-in instruments, stolen mail, ammunition, and potential bomb-making materials.

The court concluded that the enforcement interest outweighed the reviewability interest, particularly given the nature of the new charges and the reduced concern for appeal delay.

Consequently, the respondent's bail release was revoked, and his application for release pending appeal was denied.

The appellant, Garrett Gauthier, appealed his convictions for accessing, possessing, making available, and making child pornography.

The appeal raised issues regarding the admissibility and scope of expert evidence on Skype technology, the trial judge's application of the legal test for third-party suspects (allegedly reversing the burden of proof), and misapprehension of evidence concerning Skype syncing and opportunity.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in failing to limit the scope of the expert's testimony regarding Skype, misapplied the third-party suspect framework, and misapprehended evidence, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, a new trial was ordered for the accessing, making available, and making child pornography counts, and an acquittal was entered for the possession count due to insufficient admissible evidence of knowledge.

The appellant, M.J.H., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the complainant's credibility, that the verdicts (guilty of sexual assault, not guilty of choking to overcome resistance) were inconsistent, and that the sexual assault verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury was adequately instructed on credibility, the verdicts were not inconsistent given the different elements of the offences, and the sexual assault conviction was supported by a reasonable view of the evidence.

The moving party, who was convicted of sexual assault and administering a noxious substance, applied to vary his release order to extend his surrender date pending appeal.

The Crown opposed the extension, arguing that following a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, the moving party could no longer show that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The motion judge found that while the proposed grounds of appeal did not appear strong, they surpassed the 'not frivolous' criterion.

Given the moving party's uneventful bail history and the short period required before the appeal could be heard, the motion judge concluded that the public interest in reviewability outweighed the enforceability interest.

The application to extend bail was granted.

The appellant renewed his application for release pending appeal based on a material change in circumstances.

He raised a new ground of appeal arguing the trial judge erred in applying s. 276 of the Criminal Code to prevent cross-examination of the complainant regarding her prior experience as a sex worker in a human trafficking prosecution.

The motion judge found this new ground had a realistic prospect of success, elevating the importance of reviewability.

The appellant was granted release on conditions including house arrest and electronic surveillance.

The applicant, having been convicted of human trafficking and obstruction of justice, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal.

The Crown conceded the primary and secondary grounds but contested the tertiary ground.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate that his release would not harm public confidence in the administration of justice, given the seriousness of the offences, the weakness of the proposed grounds of appeal, his prior breach of bail conditions, and an inadequate release plan.

The application for bail pending appeal was denied.

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years, less credit for pre-sentence custody, received after convictions for impaired driving, dangerous driving, failing to stop while pursued by police, and driving while disqualified.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to fully apply Gladue principles when considering his criminal record, suggesting previous sentences established an artificially high baseline.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence, noting the trial judge carefully reviewed the Gladue report, considered systemic factors, and that the "step up" principle was not applied.

The paramount consideration was the protection of other road users.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of setting aside the victim surcharge; in all other respects, it was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of two counts of sexual assault, two counts of assault, and one count of criminal harassment, appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred by applying different standards of scrutiny to the Crown and defence evidence, specifically regarding the complainant's recantations and post-offence messages, and the appellant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or her application of legal principles concerning victim behaviour and recantations.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the stabbing death of a landlord.

The victim was stabbed 29 times and, while dying, made pointing gestures toward the appellant Nurse before expiring.

The appellants appealed on two grounds: (1) the admissibility of the victim's gestures as hearsay evidence, and (2) the lawfulness of a second forensic analysis of deleted BlackBerry Messenger chats conducted with updated software one year after the initial analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the gestures admissible under the dying declaration and spontaneous utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule, and that the second analysis of previously extracted data did not constitute a fresh search requiring new authorization.

The appellant appealed his conviction under s. 172.2(2) of the Criminal Code for agreeing by telecommunication to commit sexual interference with a child.

The Crown's case involved online conversations between the appellant and an undercover police officer posing as a mother of two daughters.

The trial judge convicted the appellant but failed to make an explicit or implicit finding that the appellant had agreed to commit the offence, which was an essential element of the actus reus.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a reversible error and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for luring, sexual exploitation, and making, possessing and accessing child pornography involving two complainants, as well as his 20-month custodial sentence.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the application judge erred in dismissing the appellant's Charter s. 11(b) application regarding unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the delay of approximately 43 months from charge to trial exceeded both the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 30 months and the Morin guideline of 14-18 months.

The court identified errors in the application judge's analysis, including: (1) incorrectly characterizing the adjournment of the exit judicial pre-trial as a discrete exceptional event; (2) inflating the neutral intake period for Crown disclosure to five months when only 2.5 months was appropriate; (3) treating institutional delay as neutral rather than attributable to the Crown; and (4) failing to consider inferred prejudice from the length of delay.

The court concluded that transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the delay, and the proceedings were stayed.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to one year in custody.

She appealed both conviction and sentence.

The appellant claimed that additional paycheques she received were payments for files she had brought to the lawyer's practice, allegedly pursuant to an agreement for 10% of earnings.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence as internally inconsistent, unsupported, and unreliable, while accepting the lawyer's evidence as credible and supported by bank records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the W. (D.) test, no misapprehension of evidence, and no basis for interfering with the sentence imposed.

The appellant was convicted of administering a noxious substance on April 17, 2014, and acquitted of administering a stupefying substance for the purpose of sexual assault and sexual assault.

He was sentenced to nine months in custody plus two years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both the conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no inconsistency between the conviction and acquittals, and rejected arguments based on circumstantial evidence principles.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's rejection of a conditional sentence and no basis to interfere with the nine-month custodial sentence imposed.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition detaining a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) accused in a secure forensic unit.

The appellant challenged the Board's finding that she posed a significant threat to the safety of the public.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board failed to properly apply the legal test for "significant threat" under section 672.5401 of the Criminal Code, which requires a serious risk of serious physical or psychological harm from criminal conduct.

The Board's reasons did not adequately analyze either the risk or gravity of psychological harm.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing was directed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against two young children who attended his home daycare.

The trial judge had admitted the children's unsworn statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and rejected the appellant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by relying on defence counsel's trial tactics to impugn the appellant's credibility and by finding the necessity criterion for hearsay met without expert evidence of psychological trauma or a proper voir dire on the children's ability to recollect.

A police officer was charged with sexual assault following an incident during a traffic stop in the early morning hours of January 4, 2015.

The complainant, a 23-year-old foreign university student from China, was removed from her boyfriend's vehicle during a traffic stop on Woodbine Avenue in Markham, Ontario.

The complainant testified that the officer sexually assaulted her in the rear of his police SUV, including kissing her, touching her breast and vagina, and exposing his erect penis.

The officer denied the allegations.

The court found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the officer's evidence as largely incredible.

The court found the officer guilty of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his convictions and global sentence of nine years' imprisonment for offences involving multiple victims.

He argued the trial judge erred in using a prior statement, relying on similar fact evidence regarding cell phones, and engaging in inconsistent reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors.

The sentence appeal was allowed solely to correct a mathematical error in the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit, reducing the remaining sentence to 1744 days.

The defendant, a police officer, was charged with sexual assault arising from an alleged incident in 1986 involving a woman he had investigated during a traffic stop.

The complainant alleged the defendant contacted her early the next morning, came to her home under the pretext of needing additional information, and forced her to perform fellatio.

The defendant testified the encounter was consensual and involved only kissing and touching.

The court found both witnesses had credibility concerns but ultimately determined that while the complainant's version was more probable, the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The charge was dismissed.

This is a preliminary inquiry into charges of criminal negligence causing death and dangerous driving causing death against two Ontario Provincial Police officers.

The officers were engaged in a high-speed pursuit of a stolen vehicle driven by a prohibited driver that resulted in a collision with an innocent third party, causing her death.

The Crown alleged the officers failed to terminate the pursuit when the risk to public safety outweighed the benefit of apprehension, and that their driving was objectively dangerous.

The defence argued the officers' conduct was within their training and policy, and that neither supervising sergeant terminated the pursuit.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both officers to trial on both counts.