Molly Clare Flanagan

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years, less credit for pre-sentence custody, received after convictions for impaired driving, dangerous driving, failing to stop while pursued by police, and driving while disqualified.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to fully apply Gladue principles when considering his criminal record, suggesting previous sentences established an artificially high baseline.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence, noting the trial judge carefully reviewed the Gladue report, considered systemic factors, and that the "step up" principle was not applied.

The paramount consideration was the protection of other road users.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of setting aside the victim surcharge; in all other respects, it was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of two counts of sexual assault, two counts of assault, and one count of criminal harassment, appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred by applying different standards of scrutiny to the Crown and defence evidence, specifically regarding the complainant's recantations and post-offence messages, and the appellant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or her application of legal principles concerning victim behaviour and recantations.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the stabbing death of a landlord.

The victim was stabbed 29 times and, while dying, made pointing gestures toward the appellant Nurse before expiring.

The appellants appealed on two grounds: (1) the admissibility of the victim's gestures as hearsay evidence, and (2) the lawfulness of a second forensic analysis of deleted BlackBerry Messenger chats conducted with updated software one year after the initial analysis.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the gestures admissible under the dying declaration and spontaneous utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule, and that the second analysis of previously extracted data did not constitute a fresh search requiring new authorization.

The appellant appealed his conviction under s. 172.2(2) of the Criminal Code for agreeing by telecommunication to commit sexual interference with a child.

The Crown's case involved online conversations between the appellant and an undercover police officer posing as a mother of two daughters.

The trial judge convicted the appellant but failed to make an explicit or implicit finding that the appellant had agreed to commit the offence, which was an essential element of the actus reus.

The Court of Appeal found this to be a reversible error and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for luring, sexual exploitation, and making, possessing and accessing child pornography involving two complainants, as well as his 20-month custodial sentence.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the application judge erred in dismissing the appellant's Charter s. 11(b) application regarding unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the delay of approximately 43 months from charge to trial exceeded both the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 30 months and the Morin guideline of 14-18 months.

The court identified errors in the application judge's analysis, including: (1) incorrectly characterizing the adjournment of the exit judicial pre-trial as a discrete exceptional event; (2) inflating the neutral intake period for Crown disclosure to five months when only 2.5 months was appropriate; (3) treating institutional delay as neutral rather than attributable to the Crown; and (4) failing to consider inferred prejudice from the length of delay.

The court concluded that transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the delay, and the proceedings were stayed.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to one year in custody.

She appealed both conviction and sentence.

The appellant claimed that additional paycheques she received were payments for files she had brought to the lawyer's practice, allegedly pursuant to an agreement for 10% of earnings.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence as internally inconsistent, unsupported, and unreliable, while accepting the lawyer's evidence as credible and supported by bank records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the W. (D.) test, no misapprehension of evidence, and no basis for interfering with the sentence imposed.

The appellant was convicted of administering a noxious substance on April 17, 2014, and acquitted of administering a stupefying substance for the purpose of sexual assault and sexual assault.

He was sentenced to nine months in custody plus two years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both the conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no inconsistency between the conviction and acquittals, and rejected arguments based on circumstantial evidence principles.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's rejection of a conditional sentence and no basis to interfere with the nine-month custodial sentence imposed.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition detaining a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) accused in a secure forensic unit.

The appellant challenged the Board's finding that she posed a significant threat to the safety of the public.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board failed to properly apply the legal test for "significant threat" under section 672.5401 of the Criminal Code, which requires a serious risk of serious physical or psychological harm from criminal conduct.

The Board's reasons did not adequately analyze either the risk or gravity of psychological harm.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing was directed.

A police officer was charged with sexual assault following an incident during a traffic stop in the early morning hours of January 4, 2015.

The complainant, a 23-year-old foreign university student from China, was removed from her boyfriend's vehicle during a traffic stop on Woodbine Avenue in Markham, Ontario.

The complainant testified that the officer sexually assaulted her in the rear of his police SUV, including kissing her, touching her breast and vagina, and exposing his erect penis.

The officer denied the allegations.

The court found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the officer's evidence as largely incredible.

The court found the officer guilty of sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant, a police officer, was charged with sexual assault arising from an alleged incident in 1986 involving a woman he had investigated during a traffic stop.

The complainant alleged the defendant contacted her early the next morning, came to her home under the pretext of needing additional information, and forced her to perform fellatio.

The defendant testified the encounter was consensual and involved only kissing and touching.

The court found both witnesses had credibility concerns but ultimately determined that while the complainant's version was more probable, the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The charge was dismissed.

This is a preliminary inquiry into charges of criminal negligence causing death and dangerous driving causing death against two Ontario Provincial Police officers.

The officers were engaged in a high-speed pursuit of a stolen vehicle driven by a prohibited driver that resulted in a collision with an innocent third party, causing her death.

The Crown alleged the officers failed to terminate the pursuit when the risk to public safety outweighed the benefit of apprehension, and that their driving was objectively dangerous.

The defence argued the officers' conduct was within their training and policy, and that neither supervising sergeant terminated the pursuit.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both officers to trial on both counts.

Robert Hansen, a Detective Constable with the Hamilton Police Service, was convicted of perjury and two counts of attempt to obstruct justice for knowingly making false statements in an Information to Obtain a Search Warrant and encouraging an informant to plant a firearm.

The court considered aggravating factors, including breach of trust, planned and deliberate actions, and the intention to implicate an innocent person, and mitigating factors such as no prior record, loss of employment, and difficult protective custody.

The Crown sought a six-year sentence, while the defence sought sixteen months.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years' incarceration, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for police officers who breach public trust and undermine the administration of justice.

A London Police Service constable was charged with dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code after responding to a Code 1 armed robbery call.

While responding with lights and sirens activated, the officer approached an intersection controlled by a red light.

The officer slowed significantly but did not come to a complete stop, failed to reactivate her siren (which she had turned off per a sergeant's direction), and did not see an oncoming vehicle proceeding on a green light.

The collision resulted in injuries to two pedestrians and occupants of the other vehicle.

The trial judge acquitted the officer, finding that while the conduct constituted the actus reus of dangerous driving, the Crown failed to establish the required mens rea of a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the officer's circumstances.

A police constable was charged with assault with a weapon arising from his use of a police asp during the arrest of a protester at the G-20 demonstrations in Toronto on June 26, 2010.

The Crown alleged that the force used exceeded what was necessary.

The defendant testified that he used the asp to assist fellow officers in securing the arrestee's limbs.

The court found that the defendant's use of force was not proportionate, necessary, or reasonable, and that his explanation for the blows was an after-the-fact justification rather than the actual reason for them.

The defendant was found guilty.