Molly Clare Flanagan

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that acquitted a police officer of assault.

The trial judge had convicted the officer after finding that kicking a non-aggressive suspect twice constituted excessive force.

The appeal judge overturned the conviction, finding the trial judge improperly required aggressive action as a pre-condition for police use of force.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly considered the suspect's lack of aggression as a contextual factor, not a pre-condition, and that the appeal judge failed to consider proportionality.

The conviction was restored and a conditional discharge was imposed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of criminal negligence causing death and leaving the scene of an accident, but acquitted of dangerous driving causing death arising from the same conduct.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the verdicts for criminal negligence and dangerous driving to be necessarily inconsistent, as the jury found a marked and substantial departure but not a marked departure.

The conviction for criminal negligence was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The conviction for leaving the scene was also set aside due to a flawed jury instruction on 'evidence to the contrary', and a new trial was ordered on that count.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in calculating credit for pre-sentence custody.

Following the release of the Supreme Court's decision in Summers, the parties agreed the appellant was entitled to 45 months' credit rather than the amount initially granted.

The Court of Appeal varied the sentence to 15 months to reflect the correct pre-sentence custody credit against the agreed-upon five-year total sentence.

A London Police Service constable was charged with dangerous driving contrary to section 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code after responding to a Code 1 armed robbery call.

While responding with lights and sirens activated, the officer approached an intersection controlled by a red light.

The officer slowed significantly but did not come to a complete stop, failed to reactivate her siren (which she had turned off per a sergeant's direction), and did not see an oncoming vehicle proceeding on a green light.

The collision resulted in injuries to two pedestrians and occupants of the other vehicle.

The trial judge acquitted the officer, finding that while the conduct constituted the actus reus of dangerous driving, the Crown failed to establish the required mens rea of a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the officer's circumstances.

The accused was tried on a charge of conspiracy to traffic in weapons under s. 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, with the alleged unlawful object being weapons trafficking under s. 99.

The Crown relied on intercepted communications, police surveillance, and formal admissions to prove an agreement and the accused’s participation in a weapons trafficking scheme.

The court accepted that a weapons trafficking conspiracy existed between others and that the accused may have agreed to purchase weapons or ammunition, but held the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused shared a common design to re-sell or further distribute the weapons.

Because the circumstantial evidence supported a reasonable inference of personal use, the accused was acquitted.

In a judge-alone criminal trial for conspiracy to commit weapons trafficking, the court ruled mid-trial on the admissibility of intercepted communications.

The court held that the traditional co-conspirator exception had been supplemented by the principled hearsay approach and applied the necessity and reliability criteria from Khan.

Communications during the alleged conspiracy period, together with earlier communications that provided meaningful context and were capable of showing acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, were admitted.

More cryptic earlier communications with negligible probative value were excluded unless the Crown called a witness to explain them.

The appellant appealed his convictions for threatening death, unlawful confinement, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and assault with a weapon, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in the jury instructions regarding consent, failed to provide a limiting instruction on bad character evidence, and presented an unbalanced charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and no prejudice from the lack of a limiting instruction.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed in part to grant enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody at a ratio of 1.5:1, varying the sentence accordingly.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over .80, arguing that the intoxilyzer was not proven to be functioning properly because the technician used an external printer and did not check the internal printer.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the intoxilyzer was in proper working order.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown brought a pre‑trial application seeking admission of a photograph allegedly depicting a police officer assaulting a protester during the 2010 G20 Summit in Toronto.

The image had been anonymously uploaded to a website and lacked metadata, raising concerns about provenance and possible manipulation.

Competing expert evidence addressed whether the photograph had been altered, but neither expert could confirm its authenticity or trace its origin.

Applying the established criteria for authenticating photographic evidence, the court held the Crown failed to establish fairness and absence of manipulation.

As a result, the photograph was not authenticated and was ruled inadmissible at trial.

The four applicants, who were convicted of various offences including participating in a criminal organization, applied for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for their appeals.

The Crown conceded the applicants lacked sufficient means but argued their proposed grounds of appeal lacked merit.

The court found that only one applicant, Ms. Neeranjan, had an arguable ground of appeal regarding her conviction for participating in a criminal organization.

Her application was allowed, while the applications of the other three were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of three burglaries based primarily on the testimony of his accomplice.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge improperly used similar fact reasoning to bolster the accomplice's credibility, despite dismissing the Crown's similar fact application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge appropriately considered circumstantial evidence, such as the appellant's possession of a screwdriver, and the totality of the evidence without engaging in propensity reasoning.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon, arguing that the evidence at trial did not support the conclusion that the offence occurred in 1999 as alleged in the information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the date of the offence is not an essential element unless it is critical and the accused is misled or prejudiced.

The court found the appellant knew the case he had to meet and the date played no part in his defence.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped prior inconsistent statement of a witness identifying the accused as responsible for several bank robberies.

The witness recanted or claimed memory loss during testimony, raising issues about the reliability and voluntariness of the prior statement.

Applying the framework from R. v. B.(K.G.) and R. v. Khelawon, the court examined whether the statement met the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that the witness’s evasive and contradictory testimony prevented meaningful cross‑examination and that the police had not adequately recorded critical interactions preceding the statement.

Despite some corroborating circumstances, the court held that the Crown failed to establish reliability on a balance of probabilities and refused to admit the statement for the truth of its contents.

A police constable was charged with assault with a weapon arising from his use of a police asp during the arrest of a protester at the G-20 demonstrations in Toronto on June 26, 2010.

The Crown alleged that the force used exceeded what was necessary.

The defendant testified that he used the asp to assist fellow officers in securing the arrestee's limbs.

The court found that the defendant's use of force was not proportionate, necessary, or reasonable, and that his explanation for the blows was an after-the-fact justification rather than the actual reason for them.

The defendant was found guilty.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the experienced trial judge fully appreciated the gravity of the offences and the applicable range, but correctly found compelling mitigating circumstances that took the case outside the usual range.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons regarding the complainant's alleged motive to fabricate, failed to assess witness reliability, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge implicitly rejected the motive to fabricate by accepting the complainant's evidence.

The Court also noted the trial was short, making express reliability analysis unnecessary, and found no uneven scrutiny, highlighting that the appellant's inculpatory statements supported the complainant's credibility.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in applying Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the trial judge took the initiative to order a Gladue report and properly considered the principles, despite the appellant only recently identifying as aboriginal.

The court commended the appellant's rehabilitation efforts but found no basis to interfere given the seriousness of the offences.

The Crown appealed a sentence on the sole issue whether enhanced credit under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code could be granted for pre-sentence custody based on loss of remission and parole eligibility.

The court held that the discretion to grant credit up to 1.5:1 is not confined to exceptional or unusual circumstances and may include parole and remission consequences where the record supports their relevance to the particular offender.

Applying modern statutory interpretation and the sentencing principles of proportionality and parity, the court concluded that a narrower reading would produce unjust disparities between similarly situated offenders.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible (NCR) eight years prior, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board detaining him at a maximum security facility.

He argued the Board erred by refusing to order his transfer to another psychiatric facility for an independent assessment, citing a change in his psychiatric diagnosis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably exercised its discretion in concluding that a transfer was not necessary for an appropriate disposition and that treatment and assessment could continue at his current facility.

The appellant, a former Chief of Police, appealed his custodial sentence for fraudulent actions committed in office over several years.

He argued for a conditional sentence, citing Gladue factors, medical needs requiring dialysis, and the parity principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a conditional sentence would not satisfy sentencing principles given the breach of trust by a public official.

The court noted the trial judge appropriately reduced the sentence length based on Gladue factors and confirmed that provincial institutions could accommodate the appellant's medical needs.