Brandon Anand Chung

The appellant, C.D., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault, and his sentence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned during oral submissions.

The conviction appeal raised three issues: the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct (the "shower incident"), the lack of a caution regarding the complainant's prior consistent statement, and the absence of an instruction against cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors by the trial judge.

The court held that the shower incident evidence was admissible for motive and to rebut defence theories, and that the lack of specific jury instructions was a legitimate tactical decision by defence counsel.

The appellant, N.D., appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his 18-month custodial sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reviewable errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment or application of legal principles regarding consent and mistaken belief.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court affirming the custodial sentence as fit given the nature of the offences and the aggravating factor of a prior relationship of trust.

The court declined to rule on the appellant's Charter application to vacate the SOIRA order, suggesting it be pursued in a lower court with a more developed evidentiary record.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard motions for leave to adduce evidence and for a confidentiality order in the context of a reference regarding the legality of an online provincial lottery scheme permitting international play.

The court granted leave to the Attorney General of British Columbia and the Canadian Lottery Coalition Members to file their proposed evidence, finding it potentially helpful for the reference panel.

The court dismissed the Canadian Gaming Association's motion for a confidentiality order, ruling that alleged reputational harm was a private interest insufficient to override court openness, especially as the information was largely public.

The Mohawk Council of Kahnawà:ke sought a declaration that Ontario's iGaming scheme, enabled by specific provincial legislative provisions, was inoperative.

The Council argued that these provisions impermissibly allowed private operators to "conduct and manage" lottery schemes, which, under the Criminal Code, is reserved for provincial governments, thus violating the division of powers and triggering the doctrine of paramountcy.

The respondents, iGaming Ontario and the Attorney General of Ontario, challenged the Council's standing and argued that Ontario, through iGO, properly conducts and manages the scheme.

The court granted the Council public interest standing but ultimately dismissed the application, finding that Ontario, through iGO, maintains sufficient control to be considered the "operating mind" of the iGaming scheme, thereby complying with the Criminal Code and avoiding paramountcy.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder based primarily on the testimony of a co-operating witness who was present during the shooting.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three cumulative errors that rendered the trial unfair: providing an inadequate answer to a jury question about the absence of corroborative evidence, failing to correct improper statements made by the Crown during closing submissions, and improperly excluding a hearsay statement made by the key witness to his lawyer.

The Court ordered new trials for two of the appellants.

For the third appellant, the Court found the verdict unreasonable due to deeply flawed stranger identification evidence and entered an acquittal.

The appellant, S.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the imposed sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The majority found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly consider the appellant's evidence regarding the complainant's capacity to consent, constituting a W.(D.) error.

MacPherson J.A. also found an error in the rejection of the honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent defence.

The applicant, a registered clinical psychologist, sought judicial review of a decision by the College of Psychologists of Ontario's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) ordering him to complete a specified continuing education or remedial program (SCERP) regarding professionalism in public statements.

The ICRC's order followed an investigation into the applicant's social media posts and public statements, which the committee found posed moderate risks of harm to the public and the profession.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the ICRC reasonably balanced the applicant's Charter right to freedom of expression with the College's statutory mandate to regulate the profession in the public interest, in accordance with the Doré framework.

The Court also held that the ICRC's decision met the Vavilov standard of justification, transparency, and intelligibility.

Nadeem Ahmed appealed his conviction for fraud and knowingly using a forged document, arguing his police statement was involuntary due to misleading advice regarding potential immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the statement was voluntary.

The court held that police are not required to explain every possible consequence of the criminal justice process, including immigration, and that the officer's statements were not misleading.

The decision emphasized the deference owed to a trial judge's voluntariness ruling unless a palpable and overriding error is demonstrated.

The appellant, Awale Hussein, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal the parole ineligibility component of his sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on alleged errors in dismissing a Corbett application (allowing cross-examination on his criminal record) and in the jury charge regarding police investigation inadequacies.

The sentence appeal argued errors in disregarding juror recommendations for parole ineligibility and treating absence of motive as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in principle or unreasonable exercises of discretion by the trial judge.

The appellant, L.T., appealed a sentence, specifically challenging the imposition of a s. 161 order under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the sentencing judge's discretionary decision.

The court emphasized that s. 161 orders are entitled to substantial deference on appeal and do not require the underlying offence to have been committed in prescribed circumstances.

The absence of an objection to the order at the time of sentencing was also noted as relevant to its fitness.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board confirming the revocation of his hospital privileges at Windsor Regional Hospital.

The hospital revoked his privileges due to his disruptive behaviour and refusal to comply with a new 'Model of Care' for renal patients.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's reasons were sufficient and that there was ample evidence of the appellant's disruptive conduct, which undermined the hospital's policies and staff, justifying the revocation of his privileges.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondent on two counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm, which arose from an incident where her dogs attacked a toddler and a babysitter.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's ruling to exclude evidence of three prior incidents involving the dogs.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by treating the absence of "discreditable conduct" as a basis for exclusion rather than as a factor in applying the similar fact evidence rule.

The court also found that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the timing and relevance of the prior incidents.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered, with the prior incident evidence deemed admissible.