Patrick J. Monahan

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Leave to appeal sentence granted; sentence appeal dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to challenge a three-year sentence for breaching a long-term supervision order, arguing enhanced pre-sentence credit should have been granted.

Leave was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged dangerous-driving-causing-death conviction and a four-year sentence.

The court rejected alleged legal and evidentiary errors, dismissing both appeals except to correct wording of the driving prohibition to six years backdated.

The self-represented appellant sought to pursue a new action after prior proceedings and appeals concerning related allegations had concluded.

The court held the proposed appeal was a collateral attack and abuse of process and summarily dismissed it under r. 2.1.01.

The moving party sought panel review after a chambers judge refused to lift an automatic stay pending appeal.

Applying the deferential review framework for s. 7(5) CJA panel review, the court found no error in principle or unreasonable result and dismissed the review motion.

The appeal concerned whether post-closing transactions triggered accelerated earn-out payment obligations under a share purchase agreement.

The court deferred to the application judge’s contractual interpretation and factual findings, concluding no trigger event requiring immediate full earn-out payment had been established.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged dismissal of a motion for leave to issue a third-party claim, arguing limitation issues were wrongly decided.

The court held the motion judge made no error in finding the claim was statute-barred and rejected arguments premised on separate proceedings and later party discussions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The proposed intervener coalition sought leave to intervene in an employment-contract appeal concerning enforceability of termination provisions.

The court held the coalition would provide a distinct perspective on the effects of termination clauses on vulnerable and low-wage workers and granted leave on terms aligned with a prior intervener order.

The appellant challenged property and costs aspects of a family law judgment after an 11-day trial.

The court found only a minor arithmetic error in deducting valuation-date debt, increasing the equalization payment by $4,250.

All remaining grounds, including tracing, exclusions, RESP treatment, post-separation adjustments, and costs, were rejected.

The appellant, a former employee, appealed the dismissal of his anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act and sought leave to appeal a $50,000 costs award.

The appellant had made threats to communicate damaging information to the respondent's clients and the Ministry of Transportation if unpaid wage claims were not satisfied.

The motion judge found that the appellant's communications were fundamentally about his employment dispute rather than matters of public interest, and that the respondent would easily prove the statements were false and harmful.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis under s. 137.1(3) or s. 137.1(4)(b), and affirmed the costs award.

The respondent moved to quash an appeal of a stay order granted under section 9 of the International Commercial Arbitration Act, 2017, arguing that the stay order was temporary and therefore interlocutory, requiring leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that a stay order under section 9 of the ICAA is generally final in nature for purposes of determining the proper appeal route, as it effectively ends the action before the court.

The court rejected arguments that the stay was temporary merely because the arbitral tribunal might decline jurisdiction, and clarified that statements in cost submissions and the motion judge's characterization of the order do not alter its legal nature for appeal purposes.

The appellants, majority shareholders of Golden Ocean Investment Corporation, appealed the dismissal of their challenge to the validity and enforceability of two mortgages on property owned by the corporation.

The mortgages were authorized by the minority shareholder and sole director, Mr. Huang.

The appellants alleged the mortgages were fraudulent conveyances and that they had been defrauded.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the mortgagees were bona fide purchasers for value with no notice of fraud, that Mr. Huang had both ostensible and actual authority to enter into the mortgages, and that there was consideration for the third mortgage.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the second mortgagee respondents on a partial indemnity scale.

Appeal from a trial judgment resolving divorce issues between parties married in September 2021 and separated in July 2022, with one child born in April 2022.

The appellant sought permission to relocate with the child to Montréal, while the respondent opposed relocation and sought increased parenting time and decision-making authority.

The trial judge denied the relocation request and increased the respondent's parenting time.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to apply the statutory burden of proof under section 16.93(2) of the Divorce Act, instead evaluating relocation against the status quo.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge committed an error of law by failing to apply the presumption that relocation is in the child's best interests when the relocating parent is the predominant primary caregiver.

The relocation order was set aside and remitted for reconsideration.

All other relief sought by both parties was dismissed.

An appeal concerning the vicarious liability of co-owners of a motor vehicle under the Highway Traffic Act and the scope of insurance coverage under the Insurance Act.

The appellant insurance company argued that where two co-owners jointly own a vehicle, only the co-owner who consented to a third party's possession of the vehicle should be vicariously liable for negligent operation by that third party.

The court rejected this argument, holding that if either co-owner consents to possession by a non-owner, both co-owners are vicariously liable under section 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The court also clarified that section 239(1) of the Insurance Act does not create liability but merely requires coverage of liabilities imposed by law.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day imposed for theft over $5,000, forgery, and possession of stolen property over $5,000 for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant had stolen the famous "Roaring Lion" portrait photograph of Winston Churchill by Yousuf Karsh from the Château Laurier Hotel in Ottawa, replaced it with a forgery, and sold the original through an auction house in London.

The majority upheld the sentence, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The dissenting judge found errors in principle in the sentencing judge's approach to establishing the sentencing range, particularly in relying on foreign precedents and narrowing focus to art crimes, and would have substituted a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order striking his claim against Transport Canada and Francois Collins under Rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure without leave to amend.

The motion judge found that the claim, concerning alleged misrepresentations made by the employer to an insurer, related to the terms and conditions of employment and was therefore grievable under the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act, placing it outside the court's jurisdiction.

The appellant argued he was no longer an employee, the grievance procedure was unavailable, and procedural fairness was denied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's jurisdictional analysis or refusal to grant leave to amend.

The appellant sought to compel the respondent bank to reinstate a chequing account that had been closed.

The appellant argued that section 627.17(1) of the Bank Act required the bank to maintain the account once opened.

The application judge rejected this argument, holding that section 627.17 pertains only to the opening of accounts, not their closure.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding no reviewable error and agreeing that the word "open" means to start something, not to continue it indefinitely.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $15,000 payable to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order from Henderson J. dismissing a motion to set aside a summary judgment order granted by Donohue J. The Court of Appeal found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the order of Henderson J. was interlocutory rather than final, and any appeal from that order lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant was also out of time to appeal the original summary judgment order and had not sought an extension of time.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the respondents.

This is a costs decision following the respondent's successful appeal of orders certifying an action as a class proceeding and granting leave to proceed under the Securities Act.

The respondent sought $120,000 in total costs ($20,000 for the Divisional Court leave to appeal motion and $50,000 for each of two appeals to the Court of Appeal).

The court awarded $70,000 in total costs ($20,000 for the leave to appeal and $50,000 for the appeals), finding that while there were technically two separate appeals, the issues and arguments were inextricably bound together in substance.