Zohar R. Levy

The applicant sought a stay of enforcement of an arbitral award and a stay of the ongoing arbitration proceedings pending its application for leave to appeal or set aside the award.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The court also declined to stay the ongoing arbitration proceedings, citing the kompetenz-kompetenz principle, noting that such a request should be directed to the arbitrator.

The motion was dismissed.

Prism Resources Inc. brought a summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that it holds a valid and enforceable royalty interest in mining claims and leases owned by Detour Gold Corporation.

Detour denied the existence of such a property interest, asserting Prism's rights were merely contractual against a previous owner.

The court applied the Dynex test for royalty interests as interests in land, finding that the language of the agreements, particularly the "carried interest in the project" phrase, combined with surrounding commercial circumstances and the previous owner's (Conquest) consistent acknowledgment of Prism's property rights in subsequent agreements with Detour, demonstrated an intention to create an interest in land.

The motion for summary judgment was granted in favour of Prism, declaring its 7.5% net profit royalty as a property interest running with the land.

The applicants sought a declaration that the respondents were vexatious litigants and an order requiring them to seek leave before instituting further legal proceedings.

The court reviewed the respondents' extensive litigation history, including repetitive claims, collateral attacks on previous orders, and persistent failure to pay costs.

The court found the respondents to be vexatious litigants under section 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and granted the applications, imposing a standard leave requirement and a "Chavali Order" to prevent serial applications for leave.

This is a supplementary decision to the Court of Appeal's judgment allowing the appeal in part.

Following the release of the main decision, the respondent requested that funds paid into court by the appellants as security for costs be paid out to the respondent.

The appellants did not oppose this request.

The court ordered that the funds held by the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice be paid out to the respondent.

On appeal from a trial judgment dismissing the appellants' action for breach of contract and repudiation.

The appellants, who operated methadone treatment clinics, hired the respondent physician under a contract requiring her to remit 45% of OHIP billings and containing a non-competition clause.

Following the dissolution of the appellants' joint venture with another clinic operator, the respondent continued working at the jointly-operated clinics.

The trial judge found the contract frustrated by intervening events and that the non-competition provision was not breached.

The appellants appealed, arguing errors in the frustration analysis and interpretation of the non-competition clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on frustration and contractual interpretation but allowed the appeal in part, awarding the appellants $8,194.59 for underpayment during the period prior to the alleged repudiation.

This decision addresses several procedural and evidentiary motions within a proposed class action.

M.M. sought to discontinue her action against Ms. Denham.

The Society sought to convert its crossclaim against Ms. Denham into a third-party claim, convert Ms. Denham's crossclaim into a counterclaim, have the third-party action case managed in Toronto with the class action, and obtain a sealing order.

Ms. Denham opposed the Toronto case management and requested a transfer to Perth/East Region.

The court granted the sealing order, M.M.'s discontinuance, the conversion of claims, and the joint case management/trial.

Crucially, the court conditionally transferred the class action and third-party proceedings to the East Region, finding no advantage to Toronto management beyond counsel convenience and significant inconvenience to Ms. Denham.

The moving parties (respondents in the main application) brought a motion to vary a prior order that required them to indemnify the responding party for the costs of a court-appointed Monitor.

The Monitor's final report vindicated the moving parties from allegations of ongoing defalcation, which had been the primary basis for expanding the Monitor's powers and imposing the indemnity.

The court applied Rule 59.06(2)(a) to vary the order based on these newly discovered facts, finding it unfair for the moving parties to bear the entire cost of the enhanced monitoring.

The court also declined to enforce the underlying arbitral award pending the moving parties' appeal.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal decision.

The appellant achieved only partial success on appeal.

The court reduced the respondent's costs award from $180,000 to $135,000 (a 25% reduction), finding that while the respondent remained entitled to costs of the application, some reduction was appropriate given the appellant's partial success and the disputed issues on appeal.

The court also declined to award costs to the appellant for his motion for a stay of the application judge's decision, finding the claimed costs excessive and the motion inappropriate as it sought multiple forms of relief beyond the stay order.

Appeal from an application judge's decision regarding the division of property following the breakdown of a common law relationship.

The appellant sought sole beneficial ownership of a jointly-titled residential property (Brookdale Avenue) or, alternatively, a credit for his repayment of a joint line of credit used to finance its purchase.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the respondent held a 50 per cent legal and beneficial interest in the property, but allowed the appeal in part by granting the appellant a $500,000 credit on division of sale proceeds for his repayment of the respondent's share of the joint debt.

The plaintiff brought a motion to withdraw admissions made by her former counsel at a status hearing, which had limited her damages claim to avoid the action being dismissed for delay.

The defendants brought cross-motions to hold the plaintiff to those admissions and strike portions of the statement of claim exceeding them.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendants' cross-motions, holding that a client is bound by the representations and admissions made by their counsel in court under the doctrine of ostensible authority.

The appellant physician appealed a partial summary judgment order in a medical malpractice action arising from the delayed diagnosis of a brain tumour.

The appellant had admitted breach of the standard of care and causation, leaving only contributory negligence and the specific list of injuries to be determined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness, no error in the burden of proof regarding contributory negligence, and no error in the motions judge's listing of specific injuries based on uncontradicted expert reports.

At a status hearing under Rule 48.14, the defendants sought dismissal of a personal injury action for delay following prolonged inactivity and incomplete document production.

The court reviewed the transition from the former Rule 48.14 to the revised rule effective January 1, 2015 and considered whether the plaintiff had shown cause why the action should not be dismissed.

Although the plaintiff’s delay in delivering an affidavit of documents was inexcusable, the court found no demonstrated prejudice to the defendants and noted that procedural remedies such as motions for further and better disclosure had been available.

Considering the relatively modest delay and the policy reflected in the amended rule extending the time to set an action down for trial, the court permitted the action to proceed.

The court ordered sworn affidavits of documents and additional productions within 45 days and directed that a pre‑trial conference be scheduled.

Following a successful partial summary judgment motion in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiffs sought costs of $169,022 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity, finding no bad faith by the defendant physician.

However, noting the defendant's refusal to concede uncontroverted medical evidence, the court found a higher than normal partial indemnity award was justified.

Costs were fixed at $60,000 all-inclusive.

In a medical malpractice action arising from a three-year delay in diagnosing and treating an acoustic neuroma, the moving parties sought partial summary judgment identifying the specific injuries caused by the admitted negligence and dismissing the defence of contributory negligence.

The court held that the expert evidence on causation and the listed injuries was largely uncontroverted and that the injuries could be summarily established without a trial.

Applying the reasonable patient standard, the court also found no evidentiary basis for the allegation that the patient unreasonably missed appointments or delayed follow-up in a manner contributing to her injuries.

Partial summary judgment was granted listing the injuries and dismissing contributory negligence.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination by the respondent doctor's office.

Prior to filing a response, the respondent sought confirmation that it could rely on the applicant's personal health information under the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) without consent.

The Tribunal directed the applicant to either provide written consent or file submissions opposing the respondent's use and disclosure of her personal health information.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an action as statute barred under the notice provisions of the Municipal Act.

The court held there was no dispute that written notice had not been given within 10 days as required by s. 44(10), and the appellant therefore bore the onus under s. 44(12) to establish a reasonable excuse and absence of prejudice to the municipality.

The motion judge's reasons were found to be careful and considered, and the appellate court found no error in the analysis or in the application of the governing principles.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The plaintiff was injured in a single-car rollover accident after hitting a pothole on a municipal road.

She did not provide written notice of her claim to the municipality until almost two years later.

The municipality moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred under s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act.

The court granted the motion, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay under s. 44(12), and the municipality was prejudiced because the road had been resurfaced and it lost the opportunity to conduct a timely investigation.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a personal injury action arising from a single-vehicle accident on a county road.

The municipality argued the claim was barred under s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act because the plaintiffs failed to provide written notice of the claim within ten days of the accident and that the delay prejudiced its ability to investigate the roadway conditions.

The plaintiffs argued there was a reasonable excuse for the failure to give timely notice due to the driver’s severe injuries and hospitalization, and that discoverability delayed awareness of the material facts underlying the claim.

The court held that the plaintiff’s medical condition constituted a reasonable excuse and that issues relating to discoverability, alleged roadway design deficiencies, and potential prejudice to the municipality raised genuine issues requiring trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) confirming a decision to take no further action on his complaint against a psychiatrist.

The applicant argued that HPARB should have held an oral hearing rather than a written review, alleging a failure to accommodate his hearing impairment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that HPARB reasonably exercised its discretion to proceed in writing after attempts to accommodate the applicant's hearing impairment at an oral hearing were unsuccessful, and the applicant failed to show good reason why a written hearing was inappropriate.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant municipality following a motor vehicle accident.

After the action was set down for trial, the defendant sought leave under Rule 48.04 to bring a motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiffs' failure to provide notice within 10 days as required by the Municipal Act.

The court found no substantial and unexpected change in circumstances, but granted leave on the basis that the summary judgment motion had merit and proceeding with it would not cause non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiffs.