Lorne Sossin

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury trial and sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 15 years and 9 months.

He appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, including challenges to the trial judge's Corbett application ruling regarding his criminal record, the adequacy of jury instructions on propensity reasoning and post-offence conduct, the sufficiency of corrective measures following inflammatory Crown closing arguments, and the application of Gladue principles in sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in principle by the trial judge and upholding both the conviction and sentence.

The moving party sought an extension of time to perfect a cross-appeal against a Divisional Court decision regarding the Law Society of Ontario's voiding of licensing exam results and registrations following a security breach.

The Court of Appeal had previously upheld the LSO's decision to void registrations as procedurally fair, finding the decision to be administrative rather than adjudicative in nature.

The moving party sought to challenge the fairness of the voiding of her barrister exam result and the LSO's failure to disclose a key statistical report (the Caveon Report).

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed cross-appeal lacked merit and that the justice of the case did not favour granting an extension of time.

On appeal from a Superior Court decision, the mother challenged the appeal judge's order upholding an extended society care order and varying her access status from access recipient to access holder.

The mother argued that the appeal judge should have ordered a new trial on all issues due to a finding of procedural unfairness regarding the access holder determination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a breach of procedural fairness on a discrete issue does not require a new trial on all matters when the appellate court can properly decide the issue based on the evidentiary record.

The court admitted fresh evidence but found it did not change the outcome, as the evidence supported the extended society care order.

The appellants sought a panel review of a motion judge's decision denying their extension of time to perfect materials for a panel review of a prior decision dismissing their appeal for delay.

The underlying dispute concerned unpaid storage costs and the respondents' rights to sell stored property under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The appellants requested an adjournment citing injuries from a motor vehicle accident but failed to provide adequate medical documentation.

The appellants also requested recusal of one judge based on alleged bias, which was denied.

The panel upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision to deny the extension of time, finding no reversible error in the application of the governing principles and noting that the appeal had become moot as the property had been auctioned.

The appellant brought an action against her former lawyers alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and negligence in connection with a wrongful dismissal settlement.

The appellant claimed the respondent lawyers conspired with her former employer, preferred the employer's interests, and induced her to enter into an improvident settlement.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding no genuine issue for trial and rejecting allegations of collusion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the motion judge properly assessed whether the respondents' advice was reasonable and whether the settlement was improvident given the litigation risks.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to add three non-LSO defendants as necessary parties to his action and to amend his pleadings to include a negligence claim against them.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision on three grounds: (1) the issue of whether the non-LSO defendants were necessary parties had been finally determined in prior proceedings and raising it again constituted an abuse of process; (2) the negligence claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the appellant had discovered the relevant facts by December 2020, well before the proposed amendment in June 2023; and (3) the negligence claim constituted an abuse of process as it could have been made in the original statement of claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a costs award of $300,000 made by the trial judge following a motor vehicle accident case.

The respondent was struck by a vehicle driven by the appellant while crossing a pedestrian crossing.

After a three-week jury trial, the jury awarded the respondent $24,166 in general damages and $26,000 in special damages for past income loss, with a net recovery of $16,160.50 after accounting for contributory negligence and statutory deductibles.

The trial judge awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, finding the respondent was more successful at trial.

The appellant argued the costs award was wholly disproportionate to the modest recovery and that the trial judge erred in finding the respondent was more successful.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the costs award.

Pine Glen Thorold Inc. appealed the dismissal of its action against Rolling Meadows Land Development Corporation and Glen Gordon.

The motion judge had struck the claim on the basis that it did not disclose reasonable causes of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, but on different grounds.

Rather than analyzing each individual cause of action, the court found that the claim as a whole constituted an abuse of process.

Pine Glen sought to relitigate issues that were already decided or could have been raised in prior applications between the parties, and its claim was primarily based on the respondents' conduct during the previous litigation.

The court held that absent exceptional circumstances (such as viable claims for malicious prosecution or abuse of process), parties should not be permitted to pursue civil actions based on the conduct of prior litigation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and extortion, raising two grounds: (1) whether the application judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application regarding trial delay following a mistrial, and (2) whether the Crown's improper question about child pornography rendered the retrial unfair.

The Court of Appeal held that mistrials do not reset the Jordan clock but must be assessed within the Jordan framework as potential discrete exceptional circumstances.

The mistrial in this case was found to be a discrete exceptional circumstance arising from a shared misunderstanding of law regarding the materiality of dates in the indictment.

The Crown's improper question was adequately remedied by timely and forceful corrective instructions from the trial judge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Richard Pereira, was convicted of second degree murder in the death of Kathryn Horne.

At trial, the defence conceded that Pereira killed Horne, but argued he was not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder.

The Court of Appeal reviewed whether the trial judge erred in applying the NCR test, in analyzing post-offence conduct, and in considering expert evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court finding no error in the trial judge’s approach to the NCR defence, the use of post-offence conduct, or the treatment of expert evidence.

The appellant, Rasha Al-Enzi, appealed her 11-year sentence for kidnapping with a prohibited firearm and robbery with a restricted firearm, both arising from home invasions.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the aggravating and mitigating factors considered by the sentencing judge, including the seriousness of the offences, the presence of children, and the appellant’s personal circumstances.

The appellant argued for concurrent sentences and raised concerns about the treatment of her parenthood as an aggravating factor.

The Court found no error in the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion, held that consecutive sentences were appropriate, and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Padraig Teggart from a decision designating him as a "high risk accused" (HRA) under the Criminal Code following a finding of not criminally responsible for attempted murder.

The court found that the application judge applied the correct legal standard and properly considered the evidence, including expert opinions and statutory factors, in concluding that there was a substantial likelihood that Mr. Teggart would use violence endangering the life or safety of others.

The decision affirms the exceptional and sparing use of the HRA designation and the heightened risk threshold required.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal by Denver Davis from two orders: one staying a proposed class action against Amazon in favour of arbitration, and the other dismissing the motion for certification of the class action.

The class action alleged Amazon was liable for breach of employment contracts, breach of good faith, unjust enrichment, and negligence, and sought damages on behalf of approximately 73,000 delivery workers.

The court held that the motion judge did not err in finding that Amazon was not a common employer of the delivery associates (DAs) employed by third-party logistics companies, and that the requirements for certification were not met.

The appeal was dismissed and costs awarded to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an appeal by Peter Tak Ming Lee and Mun Chung Leung from a judgment granting York Region Standard Condominium Corporation No. 972 possession of their unit and leave to issue a writ of possession, unless the appellants discharged a lien.

The appeal raised issues of trial judge bias, disregard of evidence, and the validity and calculation of the lien.

The court rejected the bias and evidentiary grounds, but found a calculation error in the lien amount, requiring a reduction.

The appeal was allowed in part, with no order as to costs.

The appellants, Jordan Rudiger Zukowski and Rudi Heinz Edwin Zukowski, appealed an order granting summary judgment to the respondent, MarshallZehr Group Inc., regarding the enforceability of a personal guarantee for a project financing loan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge’s refusal to permit cross-examination of the respondent’s representative and no reviewable error in the finding that the respondent did not act in bad faith.

The court held that the issues raised were properly resolved on the record and that the personal guarantee was valid and enforceable.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal by the appellants, finding no palpable and overriding error or extricable legal error in the motion judge’s interpretation of minutes of settlement incorporated into a court order.

The court held that the motion judge correctly applied contractual interpretation principles, considered the relevant factual matrix, and properly refused to rely on subjective and contradictory evidence.

The appellants’ argument regarding severance of joint tenancy was rejected.

Costs of $8,000 were awarded to the estate.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Gavin Bertsch from the Superior Court’s dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action against Datastealth Inc. The court upheld the enforceability of the employment agreement’s termination provision, which limited Bertsch’s entitlements on termination to the minimum requirements under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA).

The court found the clause to be unambiguous and compliant with the ESA, precluding any claim for common law damages.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, Gregory Whalen, was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his stepdaughter, V.K., and appealed his conviction.

The central issue on appeal was the admissibility of surreptitious audio recordings made by V.K.’s mother during phone calls with the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision to admit the recordings, finding that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect and that the trial judge’s instructions to the jury were appropriate.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.