Darla A. Wilson

Following a consent order restoring a commercial tenant to leased premises after a landlord lockout, the court determined the appropriate costs of the application.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the respondents engaged in aggressive and intimidating conduct, including unsupported allegations about the tenant’s business and delaying litigation steps.

The court held that the respondents’ conduct unnecessarily prolonged the proceeding and warranted sanction.

Applying the principles of reasonableness and proportionality under Rule 57.01 and the guidance in Boucher, the court fixed costs on a substantial indemnity basis but reduced the requested amount.

Costs of $50,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes were awarded to the applicant.

Following a resolved motion for an interlocutory injunction relating to the booking of exhibition space for a bridal show, the court was asked to determine costs.

Although the substantive injunction motion was not adjudicated, the moving party obtained alternative exhibition dates after commencing the motion.

The court held that the motion effectively prompted the resolution and therefore the moving party was successful for the purposes of costs.

Substantial indemnity costs were declined because the responding party’s conduct did not reach the level of reprehensible behaviour.

Partial indemnity costs of $50,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements and GST were awarded to the moving party.

The applicant sought enforcement of an alleged settlement agreement arising from a commercial dispute between advertising companies.

The respondent argued that no binding settlement existed because minutes of settlement were never executed and it had only agreed to certain terms of the proposal.

The court held that a binding settlement arises where parties agree on essential terms and demonstrate mutual intention to create legal relations, even if final documentation has not been signed.

The exchange of communications between counsel constituted a clear offer and acceptance of settlement terms.

The application was granted and the respondent was ordered to execute the agreed Minutes of Settlement and Release.

The respondent in an estate litigation matter brought a motion to remove the applicant's solicitors of record, alleging a conflict of interest because the firm had previously acted for her on a mortgage transaction concerning the disputed property.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that no relevant confidential information had been imparted during the prior retainer and noting the respondent's unexplained 14-month delay in raising the conflict issue.

The defendant law society brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a statement of claim without leave to amend on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff sought declarations challenging the law society’s regulatory authority over paralegals, alleging anti‑competitive conduct contrary to the Competition Act, bad faith regulation, and a violation of a constitutional right to access affordable justice.

The court held that the Competition Act does not apply to the actions of a provincial regulatory body acting within its statutory mandate and that compliance with validly enacted provincial legislation is presumed to be in the public interest.

The court further relied on Supreme Court of Canada authority confirming there is no broad constitutional right to access legal services.

The statement of claim was struck in its entirety without leave to amend.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to enforce a settlement allegedly reached through correspondence between counsel.

The self‑represented plaintiff denied that a binding settlement existed and sought to restore the action to the trial list.

The court held that a solicitor has authority to bind a client in settlement negotiations unless the opposing party is aware of limitations on that authority.

Correspondence between counsel demonstrated a clear offer and acceptance of settlement terms permitting the plaintiff to complete courses and obtain a diploma.

The court found a binding settlement had been reached and ordered judgment in accordance with the settlement.

The defendants brought a statutory “threshold motion” under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act during a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The issue was whether the plaintiff had sustained a permanent serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function sufficient to overcome the statutory bar to non‑pecuniary damages under Ontario’s auto insurance regime (Regulation 381/03, Bill 198).

The court assessed conflicting medical evidence regarding alleged chronic pain, spinal injury, and psychological impairment.

The court found the plaintiff lacked credibility, failed to comply with treatment recommendations, and that surveillance evidence undermined his reported limitations.

Preferring the defence orthopedic expert’s opinion that no objective pathology explained the complaints, the court held the plaintiff failed to meet the statutory threshold.

The applicant wife sought spousal support and an equalization of net family property, arguing that a 1998 estate freeze by the respondent husband's father was a fraudulent conveyance designed to defeat her equalization claim.

The court dismissed the fraudulent conveyance claim, finding no unlawful intention and noting the applicant was not a creditor at the time.

The court imputed an income of $30,000 to the applicant and ordered the respondent to pay $4,500 per month in spousal support for a maximum of 10 years.

The court also determined the value of the respondent's shares in the family business, applying a 30% discount for lack of control and deducting contingent taxes, and dismissed the applicant's request for an unequal division of net family property.

Biological parents appealed a child protection order making the child a Crown ward with no access for the purpose of adoption.

The appeal alleged errors in findings of medical neglect, improper assessment of best interests under the Child and Family Services Act, and reasonable apprehension of judicial bias.

The court applied the appellate standards of review from Housen v. Nikolaisen and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s factual findings or best‑interests analysis.

Most proposed fresh evidence was rejected except updated caseworker notes relating to the child’s circumstances.

The court held the trial judge properly considered the statutory factors and the ongoing protection concerns, including medical neglect, criminal conduct, and the parents’ abduction of the child.

The appeal was dismissed and the Crown wardship order with no access was upheld.

The plaintiffs were successful at a jury trial for damages arising from a motor vehicle accident, with the defendant Hann found fully liable and the defendant Albright found not liable.

In this post-trial endorsement, the court addressed several issues including costs, policy limits, and Family Law Act damages.

The court found the plaintiffs' motion regarding the insurer's policy limits premature.

The court granted a Sanderson order, requiring the unsuccessful defendant to pay the successful defendant's costs, finding it was reasonable for the plaintiffs to keep the successful defendant in the action.

The court fixed the plaintiffs' costs on a partial and substantial indemnity basis.

Finally, the court upheld the jury's award of Family Law Act damages to the plaintiff mother for 'on-demand guidance' provided to her brain-injured daughter, finding such support compensable as 'other services' under s. 61(1)(d) of the Family Law Act.

During a civil jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a child pedestrian, the court ruled on the permissible scope of testimony from an accident reconstruction expert.

The plaintiffs sought to elicit opinion evidence concerning alleged deficiencies in the defendant vehicle’s braking system and on driver perception and reaction times.

The court held that Rule 53 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires expert reports to clearly state the opinions being advanced and their factual bases, and an expert cannot introduce a new field of opinion not articulated in the report.

Because the expert’s reports did not opine that the brake condition contributed to the collision, such testimony would improperly expand the report.

The court also barred additional human factors opinion evidence as duplicative of testimony already provided by a qualified human factors expert.

The defendant moved to exclude examination for discovery transcripts on the basis that he did not have an interpreter during the first discovery and that some answers during the second discovery were given in broken English.

The moving party argued the transcripts were unreliable and unfair to use at trial.

The court held that the obligation to arrange for an interpreter rests with the party being examined and noted the defendant had an opportunity during the second discovery to correct earlier answers.

The court found that although the defendant would testify at trial through an interpreter, the discovery transcripts should not be struck.

Instead, the court directed that proposed read‑ins be reviewed to ensure fairness in light of the language issues.

During a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident involving a child pedestrian, the defendants moved for a mistrial following the plaintiffs’ opening address.

The court had previously ruled that a police mechanic could not provide expert opinion evidence regarding the condition or effect of the vehicle’s brakes.

In the opening address, plaintiffs’ counsel suggested that the defendant driver’s brakes were in an unsatisfactory condition and invited the jury to infer that this contributed to the accident, despite the absence of expert evidence supporting such a theory.

The court held that the opening address improperly contained argument, inaccurate statements about the police investigation, and suggestions that the jury act as enforcers of societal rules.

Because the comments invited the jury to draw conclusions unsupported by admissible evidence and could not be cured by a corrective instruction, a mistrial was declared.

During a civil jury trial arising from a pedestrian motor vehicle accident involving a child, the defendants moved for a mistrial after the plaintiffs’ counsel delivered an opening address containing alleged misstatements of law and improper argument.

The court found that counsel repeatedly misstated the reverse onus under the Highway Traffic Act by suggesting that all defendants bore the burden of disproving negligence, improperly argued factual conclusions regarding vehicle brake defects without supporting expert evidence, and displayed discovery transcript excerpts suggesting an admission of negligence by one defendant.

The court held that the discovery excerpt was misleading, potentially inadmissible, and taken out of context, particularly given language barriers during the examination for discovery.

Considering the cumulative prejudicial impact of the opening remarks, the court concluded that corrective instructions would not sufficiently remedy the prejudice to the jury.

A mistrial was therefore declared.

The plaintiffs in a motor vehicle personal injury action involving a child with an alleged brain injury sought leave under s. 12 of the Evidence Act to call more than three expert witnesses at trial.

The court considered factors governing leave to call additional experts, including necessity, duplication of evidence, fairness between parties, and proportionality.

While acknowledging the complexity of the medical issues and future care claims, the court emphasized the trial judge’s gatekeeping role and the need to avoid unnecessary or repetitive expert testimony.

Leave was granted for several experts with distinct specialties but denied for others whose proposed evidence lacked a compliant Rule 53 report or would duplicate testimony from other experts.

The court limited the number of occupational therapists who could testify and refused permission for certain proposed witnesses whose opinions were unnecessary or procedurally deficient.

Following a jury verdict in a medical negligence action, the court had issued written reasons on costs addressing the plaintiffs’ bill of costs and disbursements.

After the release of those reasons, counsel for the plaintiffs sent correspondence directly to the court seeking a further attendance and advancing additional arguments concerning expert disbursements that had been disallowed for lack of supporting information.

The court held that the correspondence constituted improper ex parte communication and an attempt to re‑argue the costs decision after final reasons had been issued.

The judge emphasized that the burden lies on the party claiming disbursements to demonstrate that they are reasonable and necessary and criticized counsel’s failure to provide sufficient supporting detail in the original materials.

The court refused to consider the contents of the letter and reaffirmed that the earlier costs decision was final.