Darla A. Wilson

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assault and sexual interference against a child complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred by characterizing the complainant's mother's evidence as 'corroborative' when it only confirmed peripheral details.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not use the term in its technical legal sense, but rather as confirmative of the complainant's general reliability, which was a permissible use of the evidence.

This five-judge appeal reconsidered the common law governing non-disclosure of partial settlement agreements in multi-party civil litigation.

The court held that the prior rule mandating an automatic finding of abuse of process and an automatic stay, without proof of prejudice or regard to proportionality, was wrongly decided and should be overruled.

The proper approach requires a contextual and discretionary abuse of process analysis focused on unfairness, prejudice, oppression, harm to the administration of justice, and a proportionate remedy, with r. 49.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reinforcing that framework.

Applying that approach, the court allowed two appeals and remitted those matters, while dismissing two others where the record was sufficient to determine the result.

The appellant pleaded guilty to firearms offences and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by granting inadequate credit for strict pre-sentence bail conditions and by misapplying the framework for considering systemic anti-Black racism.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no error in principle in quantifying the bail credit and correctly applied the requirement to find 'some connection' between the appellant's experiences of racism and the offences.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court order that denied him permission to proceed with an application for judicial review and a motion.

The applicant was previously declared a vexatious litigant and required leave to commence proceedings.

The Court of Appeal initiated a review under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the motion for leave to appeal to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The motion for leave was dismissed, and the applicant was prohibited from making further motions in the proceeding without leave.

The appellant appealed convictions for human trafficking, assault, and related offences following a jury trial.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting prior discreditable conduct evidence, creating procedural unfairness by prematurely sharing defence counsel's closing position summary, and improperly instructing the jury to disregard parts of the defence closing submissions due to a breach of the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, no severe procedural unfairness, and deference to the trial judge's remedial action for the Browne v. Dunn breach.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for careless storage of a firearm, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention at a mental health centre.

The appellant argued he no longer posed a significant risk to the public and sought an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by unchallenged psychiatric evidence that the appellant minimized his offence, refused to discuss concerning writings, and had an uncertain commitment to medication.

The appellant challenged a jury conviction for sexual interference on the basis that the trial judge wrongly admitted a young child's hearsay statement under the principled exception and permitted the jury to use it as similar fact evidence across counts.

The court held that the trial judge failed to identify and analyze key hearsay dangers, including the risk of maternal misinterpretation of non-verbal gestures and the risk that the statement was shaped by leading and suggestive questioning.

Applying the threshold reliability framework, the court concluded contemporaneous cross-examination could have materially assisted the truth-seeking process and that reliability was not sufficiently established.

Because the impugned statement may have influenced the conviction on the surviving count, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The moving parties brought motions to quash appeals from an order authorizing a court-appointed Sales Officer to enter into agreements to separate joint venture interests in real estate projects as part of a corporate wind-up.

The Court of Appeal granted the motions to quash, finding that the order was interlocutory because it was a step in implementing the wind-up and sale process, not a final determination of substantive rights.

Furthermore, the Court held that the order was made pursuant to the Business Corporations Act, meaning any appeal lies to the Divisional Court.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for attempted murder, appealed a detention order made by the Ontario Review Board.

She argued the Board failed to adequately consider her proposal for a conditional discharge that included a 'Young clause' and treatment compliance conditions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board must meaningfully consider whether the proposed conditions could practically and effectively address the risk to the public, and remitted the matter for a new hearing.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of two counts of sexual interference against his two granddaughters.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on reasonable doubt concerning child witnesses and in his handling of similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury was properly instructed on the standard of proof and propensity reasoning, and the trial judge's similar fact ruling was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 6 years' imprisonment and a 16-year driving prohibition following guilty pleas to dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm.

He argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit and the sentencing judge erred in weighing mitigating and aggravating factors, including a psychological report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the egregious conduct, excessive speed, and legislative increases to maximum penalties for dangerous driving.

The appellant pleaded guilty to 23 charges, including multiple frauds and breaches of court orders, and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge committed a material error of principle by including a withdrawn charge in the sentencing analysis.

The global sentence was reduced to three and a half years.

Additionally, two restitution orders were vacated because the victims had recovered their losses, and the remaining restitution orders were varied to allow 10 years to pay.

The appellant challenged an indeterminate sentence imposed after a dangerous offender designation, arguing that his risk could be managed in the community through a fixed custodial term followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The court held that the sentencing judge made no error in finding that the appellant’s violent risk was driven by multiple factors, including personality pathology not meaningfully amenable to medication.

The psychiatric evidence established high risk, chronic non-compliance with treatment and supervision, and an absence of insight or motivation to change.

The court concluded that the conditions necessary to control the risk could only be achieved in custody and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge's exchanges with defence counsel created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court applied the established bias test and emphasized the strong presumption of judicial impartiality and the heavy burden required to rebut it.

Although the trial judge's comments to defence counsel were found to be inappropriate and short-tempered, they arose in the context of counsel's repeated improper questioning, including myth-based reasoning and impermissible use of prior sexual history evidence.

Viewed realistically and practically, the exchanges did not demonstrate that the trial judge was predisposed to one side.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by dismissing his application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, taking the opportunity to clarify the legal framework for courtroom seating.

The Court held that an in-custody accused is presumed to sit in the prisoner's box, though trial judges retain discretion to permit alternative seating based on security, trial fairness, and the ability to make full answer and defence.

The Court found the trial judge's decision was reasonable and that standard jury instructions adequately mitigate any potential stigma associated with the prisoner's box.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a 2013 consent dismissal and settlement agreement, as well as the dismissal of a new 2023 action claiming the same relief.

The motion judge found the appellant's motion and the new action were transparent attempts to relitigate issues that had been settled over a decade prior.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, confirming that the doctrine of abuse of process prevents the relitigation of settled issues and that the interests of finality prevail absent contractual problems like fraud or duress.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged convictions for multiple historic child sexual offences against two complainants, arguing misapprehension of evidence, improper reliance on demeanour, and erroneous credibility considerations.

The court held that any imprecision in describing the appellant’s evidence was not consequential, that demeanour was not given undue weight, and that references to lack of embellishment were permissible; although the trial judge’s reliance on counselling evidence was unnecessary, it caused no miscarriage of justice.

On sentence, the court found the custodial term fit in light of the seriousness, grooming, breach of trust, and the governing sentencing guidance for child sexual abuse.

The court clarified that an arithmetic error meant the total sentence was 11 years, not 12, and varied the internet prohibition order under s. 161(1)(d) to add tailored exceptions.

The Crown appealed acquittals on written child pornography and child luring charges arising from an online undercover operation in which the respondent exchanged sexualized messages with a person repeatedly presenting as a 14-year-old girl.

The court held that the trial judge erred in law by isolating sexually explicit messages from their full context, by treating the absence of explicit age references within particular messages as dispositive, and by allowing the respondent’s claimed role-play motive to distort the objective inquiry under s. 163.1(1)(b) and (c) of the Criminal Code.

The court further held that the trial judge misapplied the mens rea for child luring, wrongly focused on whether the respondent intended to commit the secondary offences at the meeting, and failed to consider wilful blindness in the age analysis under s. 172.1 and Morrison.

The acquittals were set aside, findings of guilt were entered on all counts, and a new trial was ordered on all counts limited to entrapment and sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He had originally elected to be tried in the Ontario Court of Justice, but due to scheduling delays that would have exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling, the Deputy Attorney General preferred a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code, moving the trial to the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that his election to be tried in the provincial court vested his right to that mode of trial and that the direct indictment was an abuse of process aimed at avoiding a s. 11(b) Charter stay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 577 provides broad authority to prefer a direct indictment even after an election is made.

The Court further held that there was no abuse of process, as the direct indictment actually facilitated an earlier trial date, consistent with the right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered under s. 24(1) of the Charter for a violation of the accused's s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The application judge had found the net delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in her treatment of a discrete exceptional circumstance arising from the release of a Supreme Court of Canada decision that necessitated a rehearing of a change of venue motion.

The Court found the Crown had taken reasonable steps to mitigate the resulting delay and deducted an additional 93 days.

This brought the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was set aside.