COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
CITATION: Haddock v. Haddock, 2026 ONCA 600
DATE: 20260824
DOCKET: COA-25-CV-1574
Monahan, Wilson and Madsen JJ.A.
BETWEEN
William Haddock and Susan O'Shea
Applicants (Respondents)
and
Thomas Haddock
Respondent (Appellant)
Ronald P. Bohm and David Scott Lee, for the appellant
Stuart Clark, for the respondents
Heard: August 19, 2026
On appeal from the judgment of Justice Jasmine T. Akbarali of the Superior Court of Justice, dated November 12, 2025, with reasons reported at 2025 ONSC 6287.
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] This appellant appeals the application judge’s interpretation of a clause in the Will of the late Audrey Lillian Haddock (the “Deceased”) dealing with the disposition of a cottage (the “Cottage Clause”).
[2] At the conclusion of the appellant’s submissions we did not find it necessary to call on the respondents and indicated that the appeal was dismissed with reasons to follow. These are our reasons.
[3] The Will divided the residue of the Deceased’s estate equally amongst her three children, the appellant Thomas Haddock (“Thomas”) and the respondents William Haddock and Susan O’Shea. The Cottage Clause provided as follows:
If I still own the cottage located at 96 Gilmour Point Road, Apsley, Ontario K0L 1A0 at the date of my death, title to the property shall be transferred to my son, THOMAS STEPHEN HADDOCK; Provided that the value of said cottage property as determined by a qualified appraiser and the cost of said appraisal shall be deducted from my said son’s share of my Estate.
[4] The value of the cottage property was appraised to be $1,375,000, while the value of the estate residue was $796,688.64. Because the value of the cottage exceeded Thomas’s one-third share of the residue, the issue in dispute was whether Thomas was required to pay the shortfall in order to receive title to the cottage or whether he would only be required to pay up to a maximum of his share of the residue.
[5] The application judge found that the Cottage Clause did not contemplate that the cottage would rise in value to such an extent that it would exceed Thomas’s share of the residue. She also found that the Deceased did not intend for the respondents’ share of the residue to be reduced by one half (each) of any shortfall between the value of Thomas’s share and the value of the cottage. Instead, the Deceased’s overriding intention was to treat her three children equally. Therefore, Thomas was entitled to the cottage only if he paid the full appraised value, with any shortfall constituting an amount owing to the estate. This was a finding of mixed fact and law that is entitled to deference: Trezzi v. Trezzi, 2019 ONCA 978, 150 O.R. (3d) 663, at para. 15.
[6] The appellant argues that the application judge erred by ignoring the Deceased’s intention, as expressed in the Cottage Clause, that Thomas “shall” receive the cottage so that it would remain in the family. The appellant argues that the application judge rewrote the Clause by inserting a condition that he could not satisfy, with the result that the cottage would have to be sold.
[7] We do not agree. The application judge found that the bequest of the cottage to Thomas was conditional on its value being deducted from his share of the estate’s residue. Because the value of the cottage exceeded Thomas’s share of the residue, this condition could not be satisfied. Therefore, the only basis upon which Thomas could receive the cottage was if he made up any shortfall between the value of his share and the value of the cottage.
[8] The application judge applied the correct legal principles, and her interpretation of the Cottage Clause was open to her on the record. The appellant has failed to identify any palpable or overriding error in her analysis and, instead, seeks to have this court substitute a different interpretation of the Cottage Clause from that reasonably reached by the application judge. That is not our role, and the appeal is therefore dismissed.
[9] The appellant also seeks leave to appeal the application judge’s order that the respondents’ costs be paid out the estate while the appellant should bear his own costs. Leave to appeal costs should only be granted where there was an error in principle or the costs order was plainly wrong, neither of which occurred in this case. The application to appeal costs is denied.
[10] With respect to costs of the appeal, the respondents point out that if their costs are paid out of the estate, they would in effect be funding two-thirds of their own costs (because this is their share of the estate residue). The respondents therefore seek an order that the appellant be required to pay their costs directly on a partial indemnity basis. The appellant, on the other hand, argues that both parties’ costs should be funded by the estate.
[11] As the application judge noted, this court in Neuberger Estate v. York, 2016 ONCA 303, 131 O.R. (3d) 143, at paras. 24-25, leave to appeal refused [2016] S.C.C.A. No. 207, explained that the historical approach to costs in estates litigation has been displaced in favour of one in which the normal costs rules in civil litigation apply unless the court finds that public policy considerations dictate otherwise. This modern approach “seeks to ensure estates are not depleted through the costs of unnecessary litigation and the assets of an estate are not treated ‘as a kind of ATM bank machine from which withdrawals automatically flow to fund their litigation’”: Muscat v Muscat Estate, 2025 ONCA 518, at para. 19, citing Salter v. Salter Estate (2009), 2009 CanLII 28403 (ON SC), 50 E.T.R. (3d) 227 (Ont. S.C.), at para. 6.
[12] The grounds of appeal advanced in this case, while arguable, were relatively weak. The appellant was essentially advancing the same arguments on appeal as had been carefully considered and rejected by the application judge. In these circumstances, it is appropriate that the normal costs rules apply. We therefore order the appellant to pay the respondents’ costs on a partial indemnity basis in the all-inclusive amount of $25,000.
“P.J. Monahan J.A.”
“D.A. Wilson J.A.”
“L. Madsen J.A.”