COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
DATE: 20251203
DOCKET: COA-24-CV-0994 & COA-24-CV-1005
Huscroft, Trotter and Favreau JJ.A.
DOCKET: COA-24-CV-0994
BETWEEN
1401380 Ontario Limited o/a Wilderness North Air
Plaintiff (Respondent)
and
Hydro One Remote Communities Inc.
Defendant (Appellant)
DOCKET: COA-24-CV-1005
AND BETWEEN
1401380 Ontario Limited o/a Wilderness North Air
Plaintiff (Respondent)
and
Wasaya Airways LP
Defendant (Appellant)
Reeva M. Finkel and Brendan Jones, for the appellant Hydro One Remote Communities Inc.
Matthew R. Smiley and Morris J. Holdervich, for the appellant Wasaya Airways LP
Roderick W. Johansen, for the respondent
Heard: June 2, 2025
On appeal from the judgment of Justice Tracey Nieckarz of the Superior Court of Justice, dated August 23, 2024, with reasons reported at 2024 ONSC 4701.
Grant Huscroft J.A.:
OVERVIEW
[1] Hydro One Remote Communities Inc. (“Remote”) contracted with 1401380 Ontario Limited o/a Wilderness North Air (“Wilderness”) to deliver fuel to remote First Nations communities. Following complaints by one of the unsuccessful bidders for the contract, Wasaya Airways LP (“Wasaya”), Remote removed Wilderness as vendor for several of the communities. Wilderness sued Remote for breach of contract and Wasaya for inducing the breach.
[2] The trial judge granted judgment against Remote and Wasaya. Remote was ordered to pay damages of $2,718,988, and Wasaya was found jointly and severally liable for $856,458 of that amount. Both appeal, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding a breach of contract, erred in failing to apply a limitation of liability clause in the contract, erred in finding that Wasaya had unjustifiably procured the breach of contract, and erred in failing to appropriately account for mitigation in her assessment of damages.
[3] I would allow Remote’s appeal in part and dismiss Wasaya’s appeal. The trial judge did not err in concluding that Remote breached its contract with Wilderness and that Wasaya induced that breach. Nor did she err in her mitigation analysis. However, I conclude that the trial judge erred in failing to apply the limitation of liability clause to Remote’s liability. The result is that the award of damages against Remote must be reduced to $50,000.
BACKGROUND
[4] Remote, as a subsidiary of Hydro One Inc., has an obligation under s. 48.1(1) of the Electricity Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 15, Sched. A, to supply electricity to remote First Nations communities not connected to the electrical grid. It does so by providing diesel fuel to operate generators in these communities. Fuel is delivered to the communities on an “as and when required” basis.
[5] On November 25, 2014, Remote issued a Request for Proposals (“RFP”) for fuel delivery, primarily by air, to twelve remote communities. Bids were to be evaluated based on the following weighted criteria: quality (50%), price (40%), First Nations participation (5%), and reference checks (5%). The RFP package included a copy of Remote’s standard contractual terms. Three carriers submitted bids: Wilderness; Wasaya; and Private Air Inc., c.o.b. as Cargo North (“Cargo North”).
[6] Two of these carriers, Wasaya and Cargo North, are owned by First Nations. Five of the twelve communities covered by the RFP had a financial interest in Wasaya (the “Wasaya Communities” [1]). Another five had a financial interest in Cargo North (the “Cargo North Communities” [2]). Thus, the Wasaya Communities and Cargo North Communities stood to benefit if their affiliated air carrier was awarded any portion of the fuel delivery contract.
[7] After issuing the RFP, but before it awarded any contract, Remote received Band Council Resolutions (“BCRs”) from the Wasaya Communities expressing their support for Wasaya’s bid and directing Remote to award it the contract.
[8] Remote did not do so. Instead, in June 2015, it awarded Wilderness a three-year contract, making it the “Primary Vendor for Air Delivery” for five communities (the “Primary Communities” [3]). Wilderness was also awarded a three-year contract to be the “Secondary Vendor for Air Delivery” (i.e., back-up) for seven other communities (the “Secondary Communities” [4]). The contract provided that the secondary vendor would be used “if and only if the awarded Primary Vendor” could not fulfill its delivery obligations. Cargo North was awarded a contract to be the primary vendor for the Secondary Communities, and the secondary vendor for the Primary Communities. Wasaya was not selected as a vendor for air delivery.
[9] One of the five Primary Communities for which Wilderness was primary vendor (Kasabonika) was a Wasaya Community, and three were Cargo North Communities. Four of the seven Secondary Communities were Wasaya Communities.
[10] On June 26, 2015, Wasaya sent a letter to Remote informing it that “[t]he Chiefs and Council of each [Wasaya Community] have vowed … to block any carrier from entering their community except WASAYA.” Wasaya concluded its message by stating: “if we do not receive word guaranteeing Wasaya Airways being used as the airline into [the Wasaya Communities] … our First Nations’ communities will use any and all means necessary to block entry into the First nations communities by any other carrier.” Wasaya also directed its owner communities to issue further BCRs prohibiting any carriers other than Wasaya from delivering fuel.
[11] Remote forwarded the letter to Wilderness and informed it of the BCRs. It expressed concern that Wilderness might not be able to deliver fuel to Kasabonika given the Wasaya Communities’ resistance and demanded that Wilderness seek rescission of the BCRs or else risk losing the contract. Wilderness responded by maintaining that it continued to deliver fuel without incident: the airports it used were not located on First Nations land and thus not subject to the BCRs, and in any event the BCRs were an issue for Remote to deal with, not Wilderness.
[12] Remote did not accept this response. After Wilderness failed to have the BCRs rescinded, Remote notified Wilderness that it was being removed as the primary vendor for Kasabonika. Wasaya was made the primary vendor in its stead.
[13] Cargo North was also removed as the primary vendor for four Wasaya communities. Wilderness was the secondary vendor for these communities, but instead of turning to Wilderness to perform, or conducting a second RFP, Remote awarded Wasaya an exclusive contract for air delivery to these communities.
[14] Remote’s removal of Cargo North had a domino effect on the rest of Wilderness’s contract. When Remote removed Cargo North as primary vendor and replaced it with Wasaya, the Cargo North Communities issued BCRs of their own. Essentially, the Cargo North Communities were prepared to accept the results of the RFP, but if Wasaya was receiving preferential treatment at Cargo North’s expense, they wanted the same benefit. Remote responded by removing Wilderness as the primary vendor for the three Cargo North Communities that it served and replaced it with Cargo North.
[15] Ultimately, Wasaya became the primary vendor for the Wasaya Communities and Cargo North became the primary vendor for the Cargo North Communities. Wilderness continued to deliver fuel to only one Primary Community.
[16] In 2017, Wilderness claimed against Remote for breach of contract and against Wasaya for inducing that breach.
THE TRIAL JUDGE’S DECISION
Remote breached its contract with Wilderness
[17] The trial judge found that Remote breached the contract by terminating Wilderness as the primary vendor for four of the five Primary Communities. Although the contract permitted Remote to cancel purchase orders and use other vendors from time to time, it did not allow Remote to terminate Wilderness’s services completely. To accept Remote’s argument that it could cancel all purchase orders would result in commercial absurdity in light of the rigorous RFP process that led to the contract. Further, the evidence did not support the conclusion that Wilderness was unable to deliver fuel because of the BCRs. Rather, the trial judge found that Wilderness was “ready, willing, and able” to fulfill its contractual obligations.
[18] The trial judge did not decide whether Remote also breached the contract by selecting Wasaya as the exclusive vendor for the Secondary Communities after Cargo North withdrew, even though Wilderness, as secondary vendor, was to be afforded the opportunity to deliver fuel where Cargo North was unwilling or unable to do so. The trial judge concluded that this issue did not need to be addressed because she would not have awarded damages for this breach in any event: If Remote had not breached the contract, Cargo North would have continued as primary vendor for the Secondary Communities and Wilderness would not have been called upon as secondary vendor. The trial judge reasoned that to award damages for this breach would have resulted in a windfall to Wilderness. This issue was not appealed.
Remote breached its contractual duty of good faith
[19] The trial judge found that Remote did not breach its duty of honest performance. However, by cancelling Wilderness’s purchase orders for the Primary Communities and giving the work to Wasaya and Cargo North, Remote breached its duty to exercise its contractual discretion in good faith.
[20] Remote had discretion under s. 27 of the contract to cancel purchase orders and to contract with other vendors under s. 8 of the RFP. However, the trial judge concluded that these provisions existed for the purpose of dealing with changing fuel requirements and to ensure a steady supply of fuel; they did not extend to removing Wilderness as primary vendor altogether and substituting Wasaya and Cargo North.
[21] The trial judge found that Remote’s exercise of discretion was improper for five reasons. First, Remote should not have insisted that Wilderness secure the rescission of the BCRs as a condition of continuing the contract. Second, the underlying problem arose out of Remote’s RFP process and it was Remote’s obligation to fix it. Third, Remote knew that the Wasaya Communities would not rescind their BCRs and relied on this as a pretext to terminate Wilderness’s purchase orders. Fourth, Remote could not claim that it terminated Wilderness’s purchase orders out of regard for First Nations’ sovereignty; much of its other conduct disregarded the clear directions of these communities. Finally, Remote could not hide behind its statutory obligations under the Electricity Act as those obligations did not displace its contractual obligations to Wilderness.
Remote’s liability is not limited by the terms of the contract
[22] Applying the test in Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and Highways), 2010 SCC 4, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 69, the trial judge found that Remote’s liability for breach of contract was not confined by s. 18 of the contract. That clause purported to limit Remote’s liability to $50,000. However, the trial judge found the clause was ambiguous and made little commercial sense. On her interpretation, the clause served only to exclude liability arising out of “contingencies” – the need to cancel individual purchase orders from time to time in response to fluctuating fuel needs. It was not intended to limit liability for the complete removal of Wilderness as primary vendor.
[23] The trial judge added that, because parties cannot exclude liability for a breach of the duty of good faith, the clause would apply only if her finding that Remote breached its duty of good faith was incorrect.
Wasaya is liable to Wilderness for inducing the breach
[24] The trial judge found that Wasaya intentionally procured the breach of Remote’s contract with Wilderness. Wasaya directly threatened Remote in its June 26, 2015 letter and actively coordinated and advanced the Wasaya Communities’ efforts to compel Remote to change the contract award by issuing BCRs.
[25] The trial judge rejected Wasaya’s argument that it was justified in its actions due to legitimate concerns about the safety and economic well-being of the Wasaya Communities and their interest in self-governance. The defence of justification was not available to Wasaya for three reasons. First, Wasaya agreed to the terms of the RFP when it submitted its bid and had a fair and equal opportunity to obtain the contract through that process. Second, while the Wasaya Communities have legitimate interests in self-governance and economic development, Wasaya itself – as the unsuccessful bidder – should not have been involved in advocating for those interests. Third, there was no evidence that Wilderness posed legitimate safety concerns or could not deliver the required fuel.
[26] Finally, the trial judge rejected Wasaya’s alternative argument that there was no breach of contract because Remote and Wilderness were operating under a common mistake as to Wilderness’s ability to perform. There was no basis to find the parties made any mistake at the time they entered into the contract.
Damages
[27] The trial judge preferred Wilderness’s expert’s calculations to those of Remote’s expert. She rejected the argument that Wilderness had mitigated its loss by entering into a fuel delivery contract with a third party (the “Indonesia contract”), finding that this contract represented an opportunity to expand business that pre-existed the contract with Remote.
[28] Even though concurrent performance of the Remote contract and the Indonesia contract would have required four planes – two per contract – and Wilderness only had three, the trial judge found that the delay in acquiring the fourth plane wouldn’t have prevented Wilderness from securing the Indonesia contract; it would have merely delayed when it received that income. Accordingly, the trial judge deducted, as mitigation, the fixed costs Wilderness would have spread across both contracts, but not its profits from the Indonesia contract.
[29] The trial judge held Wasaya jointly and severally liable for $856,458 of the total damages award of $2,718,988, with Remote solely liable for the remainder. The joint and several amount represented Wilderness’s loss from being removed as primary vendor for Kasabonika – the only Primary Community which Wasaya had taken over as primary vendor.
Issues on Appeal
[30] Remote argues that the trial judge erred in finding that it breached its contract with Wilderness, erred in finding that it breached its duty to exercise its contractual discretion in good faith, erred in failing to apply the limitation of liability clause in the contract, and erred in calculating damages by failing to find that Wilderness mitigated the breach by entering into the Indonesia contract.
[31] Wasaya argues that the trial judge erred in finding that it procured a breach of the contract, erred in rejecting its defence of justification, and erred in finding that there was no mistake in contract.
DISCUSSION
The trial judge did not err in finding that Remote breached the contract
[32] Remote repeats the argument that was rejected at trial: all that was contracted for was for Wilderness to be issued purchase orders from time to time, a right that Remote was entitled to terminate at any time in favour of any other vendor. Remote argues that the trial judge placed too much emphasis on the words “primary vendor” and too little emphasis on the fact that the contract did not make Wilderness the exclusive vendor.
[33] This argument must be rejected. The contract was the result of a rigorous RFP process that resulted in the identification of primary and secondary vendors for various communities at fixed prices. The trial judge’s interpretation gives effect to the words “primary vendor” and “secondary vendor” in the contract; Remote’s proposed interpretation does not. It was open to the trial judge to interpret the contract as imposing an obligation on Remote to use Wilderness as the vendor of first resort – albeit not necessarily the exclusive vendor – for the Primary Communities. It was also open to her to find that Remote breached this obligation when Remote removed Wilderness as the vendor for four of the five Primary Communities and replaced it with Wasaya and Cargo North.
[34] Remote does not argue that the trial judge erred in law, nor can it establish that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error of fact or mixed fact and law. The trial judge’s interpretation of the contract is entitled to deference: Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 633. There is no basis for this court to interfere with it.
The trial judge did not err in finding that Remote breached its duty to exercise its contractual discretion in good faith.
[35] Remote argues that in cancelling Wilderness’s purchase orders and contracting with Wasaya and Cargo North instead, it validly exercised its discretion under s. 27 of the contract and s. 8 of the RFP. It argues that the purpose of s. 27 of the contract and s. 8 of the RFP was to ensure reliable and safe delivery of fuel, consistent with its statutory duty to supply electricity to remote First Nations communities. Remote asserts that its exercise of discretion to remove Wilderness and replace it with Wasaya and Cargo North resulted from its concern that the BCRs would prevent Wilderness from delivering fuel, and so was not inconsistent with this purpose.
[36] This argument must be rejected. Remote did not have an unfettered right to cancel purchase orders. It had the discretion to reduce Wilderness’s orders and engage other carriers to provide the same service if it considered it necessary to do so – in other words, it had “operational flexibility to cancel purchase orders to deal with matters such as changing fuel requirements”, as the trial judge put it. The trial judge found that Wilderness was able to continue to deliver fuel despite the Wasaya Communities’ resistance and that Remote had used the BCRs as a mere pretext for removing Wilderness as vendor. In light of these findings, she made no error in concluding that it was inconsistent with the purpose of s. 27 for Remote to exercise its discretion to cut Wilderness out of the contract for four of the Primary Communities altogether.
The trial judge erred in finding that the limitation of liability clause is ambiguous and in failing to apply it to Remote’s breach of contract
[37] Remote argues that the trial judge erred in concluding that the limitation of liability clause was ambiguous and in failing to apply it to limit Wilderness’s damages.
[38] I set out the limitation of liability provision for convenience:
- Purchaser’s Limitation of Liability
Subject to all other exclusions and limitations in the Contract documents, the Purchaser’s maximum liability to the Company, or anyone claiming through the Company, shall not exceed the lesser of the Contract Price or fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), and in no event shall the Purchaser be responsible for any loss or damages that are indirect, consequential, punitive or for economic loss, loss of revenues, loss of profits, loss of business opportunity, or as a result of fines levied by governmental authorities or the courts thereof. This limitation of liability shall apply where the claims are based on contract, under any statute, or otherwise.
[39] Limitation of liability clauses are standard fare in contracts between sophisticated commercial parties as in this case. They know their interests and negotiate the terms of their contracts accordingly. Courts should be slow to conclude that they are ambiguous or make no commercial sense and decline to give effect to them on this account.
[40] Section 18 is clear on its face. The first part of the clause limits damages for breach of contract: “the Purchaser’s maximum liability to the Company […] shall not exceed […] fifty thousand dollars”. The second part excludes liability for certain types of damages entirely. Yet the trial judge found that the clause was confusing both as to “when it applies and what it applies to”.
[41] The trial judge appears to have interpreted the term “economic loss” in the second part of the clause to mean “monetary loss”. Consequently, if the clause were to apply, the damages at issue would be excluded entirely. She struggled to understand how to apply the $50,000 limitation in light of this interpretation. The trial judge thus concluded that the clause could have only a limited application and could not apply to limit Remote’s liability to Wilderness for removing it as vendor.
[42] Sattva instructs that a trial judge’s interpretation of a contract is a question of mixed fact and law that is entitled to deference: at para. 50. Extricable questions of law are subject to review for correctness, but such questions are likely to be rare: at para. 55. The court identified a non-exhaustive list of these errors, which include the application of an incorrect principle, the failure to consider a required element of a legal test, or the failure to consider a relevant factor: at para. 53.
[43] With respect, the trial judge identified an ambiguity where none exists, a problem identified by this court in Amberber v. IBM Canada Ltd., 2018 ONCA 571, 424 D.L.R. (4th) 169, at paras. 63-65. There is no ambiguity when the provision is read as a whole.
[44] The first part of s. 18 limits liability for breach of contract. The second part excludes liability for damages not arising directly out of the breach – in other words, consequential economic loss. The exclusion of liability for consequential economic loss does not affect the limitation on liability for damages arising directly out of the breach of contract. If it did, it would deprive the $50,000 limitation of all effect.
[45] It follows that the trial judge’s award of damages cannot stand. Section 18 clearly limits damages for Remote’s breach of contract to $50,000. This is the parties’ agreement and it must be given effect.
The limitation of liability clause applies to the breach of Remote’s duty to exercise its discretion in good faith
[46] The trial judge’s interpretation of the limitation of liability clause led her to conclude that, if the clause were to apply, it would operate to exclude liability for breach of the duty of good faith altogether, something that she noted that Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 SCR 494 prohibited.
[47] Plainly, parties are not free to exclude the duty of good faith altogether; the duty is a general doctrine of contract law that applies to all contracts: Bhasin, at para. 75; C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger, 2020 SCC 45, [2020] 3 S.C.R. 908, at para. 84. But it does not follow from the inability of the parties to exclude the duty of good faith altogether that they may not limit the scope of liability for breach of the duty. They are free to do so, just as they may modify the scope of the duty of good faith: Bhasin, at para. 77.
[48] Breach of the duty of good faith sounds as a breach of contract: Wastech Services Ltd. v. Greater Vancouver Sewerage and Drainage District, 2021 SCC 7, [2021] 1 SCR 32, at para. 62; Spina v. Shoppers Drug Mart Inc., 2024 ONCA 642, at para. 171. There is, in principle, no reason why a breach of the duty is not amenable to a limitation of liability provision. Section 18 is not tantamount to a complete exclusion of liability, and hence a contracting out of the duty itself. Nor can it be said that, in this case, the parties’ decision to limit damages for breach of contract to $50,000 compromises the operation of the “minimum core” of the duty: Bhasin, at para. 77.
[49] Accordingly, Remote’s liability for breach of contract, including breach of the duty of good faith, is limited to $50,000. It goes without saying that the limitation of liability clause has no impact on Wasaya’s liability for procuring the breach of contract, given that Wasaya was not a party to the contract.
The trial judge did not err in finding no mistake in contract
[50] Wasaya argues that the trial judge essentially found that both Remote and Wilderness mistakenly believed that Wilderness had the ability to perform the work required under the contract. Wasaya describes this as a common mistake that warrants voiding the contract or declaring that it is unenforceable.
[51] There is no merit to this argument. The contract was performed in accordance with its terms until it was breached by Remote. The trial judge found that Remote misjudged the strength of will of the Wasaya Communities, but that does not give rise to a common mistake.
The trial judge did not err in finding that Wasaya induced a breach of contract
[52] Wasaya argues, relying on Drouillard v. Cogeco Cable Inc., 2007 ONCA 322, 86 O.R. (3d) 431, at para. 29, that the trial judge erred in concluding that its actions were the direct cause of the breach by Remote, rather than the actions of the Wasaya Communities. Wasaya argues, further, that the trial judge did not find that the Wasaya Communities acted as its agent, nor did she find that Wasaya had any authority to decide the content of any BCR. Wasaya asserts that it could not be found to have participated in any decision by the Wasaya Communities in the absence of a finding that it had the authority to do so.
[53] There is no merit to this argument. Wasaya intended to, and did, induce Remote to breach its contract with Wilderness. Wasaya sent the letter to Remote demanding that it replace Wilderness as the primary vendor for the Wasaya Communities. It informed Remote of the BCRs and threatened further escalation if its demands were not met. The threats were not limited to action by the Wasaya Communities: Wasaya itself threatened to “raise the issue in the public domain through news agencies” and create a public imbroglio if Remote did not cancel its contract with Wilderness. The trial judge found that Wasaya was actively involved, along with the Wasaya Communities, in formulating the BCR plan, assisted with the drafting of BCRs, and communicated with Remote on behalf of the Wasaya Communities. These findings are amply supported by the record. In light of these findings, it was open to the trial judge to conclude that Wasaya was directly involved in procuring the breach and she made no error in doing so. Involvement of the Wasaya Communities in procuring the breach does not absolve Wasaya of its responsibility.
The trial judge did not err in concluding that the defence of justification had not been established
[54] Wasaya argues that the trial judge erred in concluding that it failed to establish the defence of justification.
[55] There is no merit to this argument. The trial judge applied the relevant caselaw and made two key findings. First, she found that although the Wasaya Communities had legitimate economic and self-governance interests, Wasaya was simply an unsuccessful bidder in a fair RFP process and should not have been at the forefront of the communities’ advocacy initiatives. Second, the trial judge found there was no evidence of any legitimate safety concern occasioned by Wilderness’s performance of the contract. In short, Wasaya was motivated by economic self-interest, which is not an interest that can justify inducing a breach of contract. These findings are determinative of the justification argument and Wasaya has not established any basis for this court to overturn them.
The trial judge did not err in calculating damages by failing to consider Wilderness’s mitigation
[56] Remote argues that the profits Wilderness earned from the Indonesia contract should have been deducted as mitigation because concurrent performance of the Remote and Indonesia contracts was impossible. It argues that Wilderness made a windfall profit of approximately $1 million by utilizing the two planes in Indonesia that it would have had to use in performing the Remote contract. As a result, it completely mitigated its loss and incurred no damages.
[57] This argument must be rejected. The trial judge found that Wilderness had been exploring the Indonesia contract for years prior to the Remote contract and that it represented an expansion of Wilderness’s business. Having made these findings, the trial judge deducted fixed costs Wilderness would have incurred across both contracts, but not the profits it earned from the Indonesia contract. These findings were open to the trial judge and Remote has established no basis to interfere with them on appeal.
[58] The parties do not otherwise challenge the quantum of damages or the allocation of liability between Remote and Wasaya. The limitation of liability clause operates to limit Remote’s liability for breach of contract to $50,000 but, as noted above, it does not affect Wasaya’s liability for procuring the breach of contract. Consequently, Wasaya remains liable for $856,458 in damages.
CONCLUSION
[59] Accordingly, I would allow Remote’s appeal in part and order it to pay Wilderness $50,000 in damages for breach of contract.
[60] I would dismiss Wasaya’s appeal, leaving it liable for $856,458 for procuring Remote’s breach of contract.
[61] Remote has been largely successful on appeal and is entitled to costs fixed in the amount of $30,000, all inclusive. This outcome may affect the costs below. I expect the parties to resolve the trial costs, but if they cannot do so they may make brief submissions to this court, up to three pages in length, within two weeks of this decision.
[62] Wasaya shall pay Wilderness costs of the appeal in the agreed amount of $20,000, all inclusive.
Released: December 3, 2025 “G.H.”
“Grant Huscroft J.A.”
“I agree. Gary Trotter J.A.”
“I agree. L. Favreau J.A.”
[1] The five Wasaya Communities are Kasabonika, Big Trout Lake, Sandy Lake, Wapekeka, and Kingfisher Lake.
[2] The five Cargo North Communities are Lansdowne House (Neskantaga), Webequie, Weagamow (North Caribou), Sachigo Lake, and Deer Lake.
[3] The five Primary Communities are Kasabonika, Lansdowne House (Neskantaga), Webequie, Marten Falls, and Weagamow (North Caribou).
[4] The seven Secondary Communities are Bearskin Lake, Deer Lake, Sandy Lake, Kingfisher Lake, Big Trout Lake, Sachigo Lake, and Wapekeka.