Mary J.L. Gleason

The prosecution appealed an order staying six fraud and fraud-related charges against the respondent due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The 18-month presumptive ceiling under Jordan was exceeded after the trial was adjourned to accommodate the respondent's Charter challenge, but the Military Judge attributed the ultimate delay to the unavailability of prosecution counsel on earlier dates.

The Court Martial Appeal Court found no reviewable error in the Military Judge's conclusion that the delay was attributable to the prosecution and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding an earlier stay application was dismissed for mootness.

The respondent pleaded guilty before a court martial to dangerous driving under the Criminal Code, charged as a military offence.

At sentencing, the prosecution and defence jointly recommended a driving prohibition under the Criminal Code.

The military judge held he lacked jurisdiction to impose a driving prohibition.

The prosecution appealed.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the National Defence Act establishes a distinct sentencing regime for military offences, and courts martial do not possess jurisdiction to impose discretionary penalties like driving prohibitions that are set out only in the Criminal Code.

The appellant brought a motion for an extension of time to file a late notice of appeal to resurrect an appeal he had abandoned in 2019.

In 2019, the appellant was found guilty of sexual assault by a court martial and ordered to be registered on the sex offender registry.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Ndhlovu finding mandatory registration unconstitutional, and the subsequent CMAC decision in R. v. O'Dell applying Ndhlovu to the National Defence Act, the appellant sought to challenge his inclusion.

The Court Martial Appeal Court granted the motion, finding the change in the law was a fundamental event striking at the root of the decision to abandon the appeal, the appeal had a reasonable prospect of success, and there was no prejudice to the respondent.

The appellant, a civilian dependant of a Canadian Armed Forces member stationed in Belgium, was convicted by a Standing Court Martial of operating a conveyance while impaired.

He appealed, arguing that trying him in the military justice system rather than the civilian system was arbitrary and infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory provisions explicitly apply Canadian law to his conduct abroad.

The Court further held that the decision to prosecute falls squarely within prosecutorial discretion, which can only be interfered with in cases of abuse of process, none of which was established here.

The appellant, Master Corporal Claude Houde, appealed two findings of guilt for sexual assault made by a General Court Martial panel.

The appeal centred on errors in the trial judge's instructions to the panel regarding the complainant's credibility and the assessment of photographic evidence.

The Court Martial Appeal Court found that the judge's instructions improperly focused on the complainant's credibility as the determinative issue, effectively circumventing the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as set out in R. v. W(D).

Furthermore, the judge erred by instructing the panel to decide whether to believe the photographic evidence before considering it as part of the whole evidence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the two charges.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to file a reply memorandum, which the respondent opposed.

Under Rule 10(2) of the Court Martial Appeal Court Rules, leave is required because there was no cross-appeal.

The Chief Justice granted the motion, noting that the appellant could not have reasonably anticipated some of the respondent's positions, the respondent would suffer no prejudice (and would gain advance notice of arguments), and the reply would assist the Court.

The appellant, Sergeant Meeks, was convicted of assault causing bodily harm and sentenced to 30 days' detention.

Following his sentencing, he was administratively released from the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

On appeal, he sought to admit fresh evidence of his release and argued that his sentence should be suspended or declared inoperative based on prior jurisprudence (Tupper).

The Court admitted the fresh evidence but held that Tupper should be read narrowly, concluding that a sentence of detention remains legally valid despite administrative release.

However, given the change in circumstances and the Crown's consent, the Court allowed the sentence appeal and suspended the remaining period of detention, subject to statutory conditions and a no-contact order.

The appellant, a Corporal in the Canadian Armed Forces, was convicted by a General Court Martial of sexual assault and sentenced to 42 days detention, with a mandatory 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order imposed.

The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing his prior consistent statement was improperly excluded, and appealed the SOIRA order, seeking a personal remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter based on R. v. Ndhlovu.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the conviction appeal, holding the military judge correctly excluded the self-serving hearsay statement.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal and set aside the SOIRA order, finding the military judge erred in law by focusing exclusively on the risk of reoffending and failing to consider whether the order's impact, particularly travel restrictions affecting his military career, was grossly disproportionate.