Emmanuelle Léonard-Dufour

The appellant, a Master Corporal, appealed his sexual assault convictions and 42-month sentence imposed by a Standing Court Martial.

He raised several grounds: breach of language rights during a bilingual trial, unreasonable delay under Jordan following an adjournment caused by his inappropriate comment to the prosecutor, errors in finding lack of consent, and errors in applying the private records regime to exclude text messages he claimed showed a motive to fabricate.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's language rights were met through simultaneous interpretation, the trial delay was properly attributed to the defence, the judge correctly assessed consent, and the judge appropriately excluded text messages that relied on stereotypical reasoning to suggest a motive to fabricate.

The prosecution appealed an order staying six fraud and fraud-related charges against the respondent due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The 18-month presumptive ceiling under Jordan was exceeded after the trial was adjourned to accommodate the respondent's Charter challenge, but the Military Judge attributed the ultimate delay to the unavailability of prosecution counsel on earlier dates.

The Court Martial Appeal Court found no reviewable error in the Military Judge's conclusion that the delay was attributable to the prosecution and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding an earlier stay application was dismissed for mootness.

The respondent pleaded guilty before a court martial to dangerous driving under the Criminal Code, charged as a military offence.

At sentencing, the prosecution and defence jointly recommended a driving prohibition under the Criminal Code.

The military judge held he lacked jurisdiction to impose a driving prohibition.

The prosecution appealed.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the National Defence Act establishes a distinct sentencing regime for military offences, and courts martial do not possess jurisdiction to impose discretionary penalties like driving prohibitions that are set out only in the Criminal Code.

The appellant brought a motion for an extension of time to file a late notice of appeal to resurrect an appeal he had abandoned in 2019.

In 2019, the appellant was found guilty of sexual assault by a court martial and ordered to be registered on the sex offender registry.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Ndhlovu finding mandatory registration unconstitutional, and the subsequent CMAC decision in R. v. O'Dell applying Ndhlovu to the National Defence Act, the appellant sought to challenge his inclusion.

The Court Martial Appeal Court granted the motion, finding the change in the law was a fundamental event striking at the root of the decision to abandon the appeal, the appeal had a reasonable prospect of success, and there was no prejudice to the respondent.

The appellant, a civilian dependant of a Canadian Armed Forces member stationed in Belgium, was convicted by a Standing Court Martial of operating a conveyance while impaired.

He appealed, arguing that trying him in the military justice system rather than the civilian system was arbitrary and infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory provisions explicitly apply Canadian law to his conduct abroad.

The Court further held that the decision to prosecute falls squarely within prosecutorial discretion, which can only be interfered with in cases of abuse of process, none of which was established here.

The appellant, Master Corporal Claude Houde, appealed two findings of guilt for sexual assault made by a General Court Martial panel.

The appeal centred on errors in the trial judge's instructions to the panel regarding the complainant's credibility and the assessment of photographic evidence.

The Court Martial Appeal Court found that the judge's instructions improperly focused on the complainant's credibility as the determinative issue, effectively circumventing the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as set out in R. v. W(D).

Furthermore, the judge erred by instructing the panel to decide whether to believe the photographic evidence before considering it as part of the whole evidence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on the two charges.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to file a reply memorandum, which the respondent opposed.

Under Rule 10(2) of the Court Martial Appeal Court Rules, leave is required because there was no cross-appeal.

The Chief Justice granted the motion, noting that the appellant could not have reasonably anticipated some of the respondent's positions, the respondent would suffer no prejudice (and would gain advance notice of arguments), and the reply would assist the Court.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Standing Court Martial that dismissed his applications for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter in respect of a sexual assault charge.

The Court Martial Appeal Court found no palpable and overriding error in the military judge's calculation and characterization of the delays under the Jordan framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Appellant applied to file a Memorandum of Fact and Law exceeding the 30-page limit by 15 pages in an appeal before the Court Martial Appeal Court.

The Appellant cited the voluminous record, including 29 appeal books and 13 voir dires, as justification.

The Court dismissed the application, holding that the sheer volume of material is insufficient to justify an extension.

The Appellant failed to provide a draft factum or sufficient details about the grounds of appeal to demonstrate why the arguments could not be presented concisely within the standard limits.

The appellant, a Corporal in the Canadian Armed Forces, was convicted by a General Court Martial of sexual assault and sentenced to 42 days detention, with a mandatory 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order imposed.

The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing his prior consistent statement was improperly excluded, and appealed the SOIRA order, seeking a personal remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter based on R. v. Ndhlovu.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the conviction appeal, holding the military judge correctly excluded the self-serving hearsay statement.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal and set aside the SOIRA order, finding the military judge erred in law by focusing exclusively on the risk of reoffending and failing to consider whether the order's impact, particularly travel restrictions affecting his military career, was grossly disproportionate.