Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant sought leave to appeal his convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample, which had been upheld by a summary conviction appeal judge.

He argued the appeal judge erred in reviewing the trial judge's credibility findings and failed to address whether the breathalyzer machine was working properly.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding the trial judge's credibility analysis was adequate and that faking a breath sample constitutes a refusal regardless of whether the device is an approved instrument.

The appellant sued its former lawyer for negligence after he failed to appeal a bankruptcy trustee's disallowance of its secured claim.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the bankrupt had no rights in the disputed funds, meaning the appellant's security interest never attached and it suffered no damages.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred and raised a new 'loss of chance' argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on attachment and refusing to entertain the new loss of chance argument due to unfairness and lack of evidentiary foundation.

The tenant appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to set aside a default judgment obtained by the landlord respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision because the appellants failed to provide affidavit evidence explaining their delay in responding to the Statement of Claim or establishing a plausible defence.

The court noted the respondent's undertaking to credit the appellants for any re-rental amounts received and directed that the final judgment be adjusted accordingly.

The appellant appealed an order regarding funds held in court related to an estate.

The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the appeal, alleging the real litigant was a declared vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the underlying application had not been advanced for over 10 years, the beneficiaries were elderly, and the appellant's agent could not justify retaining the funds in court.

The appeal was found to be devoid of merit.

The self-represented appellant father appealed a summary judgment order granting sole custody of the two teenaged children to the respondent mother, with access at the children's discretion.

The father argued the motion judge erred in hearing the summary judgment motion after the matter was set for trial, in applying the evidentiary burden, and in assessing the children's best interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the summary judgment framework and properly considered the children's best interests, including their expressed wishes not to have court-ordered access with the father.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from the dismissal of a summary conviction appeal after a sexual assault conviction, relying on fresh expert evidence that he was in a parasomnic state and should be found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The court applied the fresh evidence framework under s. 683(1) of the Criminal Code and held that, although the proposed defence was raised only after trial and first appeal, the evidence was legally admissible, sufficiently cogent, and not barred by any tactical failure at trial.

Competing expert opinions created a live evidentiary issue that a reasonable trier of fact could resolve in favour of the appellant on a balance of probabilities.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The new trial was limited to determining whether the appellant was NCR-MD or guilty.

The parents appealed a summary judgment order granting Crown wardship of their four children and denying them access.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Crown wardship, finding it in the children's best interests.

The court also upheld the no-access order but outlined a therapeutic process that could lead to future access if the children desired it and professionals agreed.

An alternate plan of care proposing the children move to France was rejected.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a deaf man with a lengthy record of sexual offences, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in finding there was no reasonable possibility of eventually controlling his risk in the community.

The Court of Appeal upheld the indeterminate sentence, finding the sentencing judge reasonably concluded that the appellant's history of medication non-compliance and need for concurrent, specialized treatments meant his risk could not be managed outside a secure setting.

The appeal was dismissed.

The United States sought the extradition of the appellant for child luring based on internet communications traced to an IP address.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for extradition after inferring that the appellant was the user of the IP address at the relevant time because he was the subscriber.

The Court of Appeal held that this inference was unreasonable without further evidence linking the subscriber to the actual use of the device at the time of the offence, and quashed the committal order.

The Court also dismissed a constitutional challenge to the ex parte gathering and sending provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, finding they contained adequate safeguards to satisfy procedural fairness under the Charter.

The appellant appealed an order staying his action pending the payment of outstanding costs orders.

The respondents argued the order was interlocutory and the appeal route was to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the order did not determine any substantive matter in the action.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Crown applied for a review of a bail review judge's decision to release the accused pending trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The accused had initially been denied bail, but a bail review judge later granted release based on a material change in circumstances arising from evidence at the preliminary inquiry regarding the accused's intent and level of intoxication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's application, finding no error in the bail review judge's conclusion that the new evidence materially diminished the strength of the Crown's case and that the accused's continued detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice under the tertiary ground.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's refusal to set aside his guilty plea to aggravated assault, arguing the plea was not unequivocal and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge had found the plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, and that trial counsel was effective.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge and finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice arising from his trial counsel's conduct.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to make an explicit finding on the actus reus for the alleged assault, specifically whether the encounter with his father was non-consensual.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made no explicit finding that the fight was non-consensual, and the SCAC judge erred in concluding otherwise.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant creditor sought a declaration that the bankrupt's judgment debt survived his discharge from bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the bankrupt owed no fiduciary duty to the appellant, even though he had breached a fiduciary duty to a third party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that s. 178(1)(d) applies only if the bankrupt owed a fiduciary duty directly to the creditor seeking the declaration.

The appellant was convicted of a large-scale, complex fraud and sentenced to five years' imprisonment with a $100,000 restitution order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasoning, noting that denunciation and deterrence are dominant for such offences.

However, based on sealed material regarding post-sentence events, the parties consented to a sentence reduction.

The Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to three years.

Following a judgment allowing the appeal in part, the Court of Appeal received written submissions on costs.

The court awarded the appellants their costs of the appeal and related motions, fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed a decision granting the equitable remedy of rectification to correct mistaken share redemptions that triggered unintended tax consequences.

The application judge found that the respondents had a continuing intention to carry out loan arrangements on a tax-neutral basis and that the share redemptions were a mistake.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under the binding authority of Juliar, the critical requirement for rectification is proof of a continuing specific intention to undertake a transaction on a particular tax basis, which the respondents had established.

The appellant advanced funds to finance the cost of repairs by third parties to an aircraft owned by the respondent.

It brought a motion for a declaration that it had a non-possessory lien under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant was not a 'repairer' under the Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that advancing funds to finance repairs does not constitute making a repair or bestowing skill, labour, or money on the aircraft.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving.

A police officer, certified as a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE), evaluated the appellant and concluded his ability to drive was impaired by cannabis.

The trial judge excluded the DRE's opinion evidence after a Mohan voir dire, leading to an acquittal.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the acquittal, finding the evidence admissible under the Criminal Code without a voir dire.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code implicitly renders DRE opinion evidence admissible to prove drug-impaired driving without the necessity of a Mohan voir dire.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an appeal book endorsement directing that an order go as per the amended draft order filed by the parties.