Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellants appealed the summary dismissal of their medical malpractice action.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, finding the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability under s. 5(2).

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge failed to consider receipts for medical records that suggested a later discovery date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that pleadings are not evidence and the receipts alone, without an explanation linking the records to the discovery of the claim, were insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption.

The appellants, students in a post-graduate program, brought a class action against the respondent college for a misleading statement in its course calendar regarding the opportunity to complete industry designations.

At the damages trial, the judge awarded aggregate damages under the Consumer Protection Act but excluded the third cohort of students from the class.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, reinstating the third cohort into the class, finding that reliance is not required for a Consumer Protection Act claim.

The Court dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's award of aggregate damages.

The parties separated after a 27-year marriage.

At trial, the judge ordered the wife to pay an equalization payment, ordered the husband to pay indefinite spousal support based on imputed incomes, and awarded full indemnity costs to the husband.

The wife appealed the spousal support, equalization, and costs orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge failed to explain the basis for imputing $484,356 in annual income to the wife, precluding meaningful appellate review.

The court also set aside the costs award, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the husband's settlement offer and his degree of success at trial.

The spousal support and costs issues were remitted to the trial judge, while the equalization payment was upheld.

The appellant's home was damaged during exterior restoration work when the contractor failed to properly seal areas against water.

The appellant's insurer denied coverage based on a 'faulty workmanship' exclusion.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding the exclusion precluded claims for both direct and resulting damage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 'faulty workmanship' exclusion must be interpreted narrowly to exclude only direct damage, preserving coverage for resulting damage under the all-risks policy.

The appellant was successful in an oppression action against the respondents.

The respondents had served an offer to settle nine calendar days before trial, which technically amounted to fewer than seven days under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial judge treated the offer as a valid Rule 49 offer and awarded costs accordingly.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the 'no near miss' policy applies to the timing requirement under rule 49.03, meaning the offer was not a valid Rule 49 offer.

However, the Court upheld the costs award, finding that the trial judge was entitled to take the offer into account under his residual discretion pursuant to rule 49.13.

The appellant and respondent, who are sisters, were involved in a long-running dispute over their deceased mother's estate.

The appellant sought to replace the respondent as Estate Trustee to pursue a claim against the respondent for breach of fiduciary duty.

A previous motion to replace the trustee with the appellant or a named friend had been dismissed.

The appellant brought a new application to appoint an unnamed independent trustee.

The motion judge dismissed the application under Rule 21, finding it was barred by issue estoppel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the appellant was not entitled to a second attempt to litigate substantially the same issue and that discretionary relief from issue estoppel was not warranted.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict finding them liable for internet defamation, awarding $42,000 in damages, and a trial judge's orders granting a permanent injunction and substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding defamatory meanings or malice.

The Court upheld the permanent injunction, noting the appellants' continued publication of the defamatory statements and refusal to remove them.

The jury's awards for aggravated and punitive damages were also upheld as reasonable.

The appellant appealed a final family law order regarding the sale of the matrimonial home, child and spousal support, and section 7 expenses.

She argued the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment, exhibiting bias, and making unconscionable substantive findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary refusal of an adjournment or in her substantive findings, and rejecting the allegations of bias.

A minor transposition error regarding the proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses was corrected.

The respondent acted as an agent to assist a client in collecting insurance proceeds, agreeing to a percentage fee.

To resolve issues with clearing cheques, the appellant solicitor agreed to have the insurance cheques made payable to his firm in trust and provided an undertaking to protect the respondent's fee.

The appellants argued the undertaking applied only to a single payment and was given on behalf of the client, not personally.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the undertaking extended to future payments and was a personal promise of the solicitor, dismissing the appeal.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing their claim against the respondent bank and granting judgment to the bank on its counterclaim.

The appellants argued their procedural rights were denied because the motions judge did not follow a prior endorsement by another judge regarding a mini-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the parties had agreed to proceed before the motions judge and the prior order was not binding.

The court upheld the finding that there was no genuine issue for trial, as the appellants had defaulted on their line of credit and mortgage loan.

The appellant, a member of a not-for-profit housing co-operative, appealed the dismissal of his application for the appointment of an inspector and a compliance order under the Co-operative Corporations Act.

He alleged a pattern of mismanagement by successive boards of directors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence of mismanagement or malfeasance to warrant intervention.

A motion to adduce fresh evidence was also dismissed as it related to issues not raised in the initial application.

The appellant landlord appealed a trial judgment finding it had wrongfully terminated a commercial lease.

The trial judge found the parties had agreed on the quantum of rent arrears and the landlord had waived any additional amounts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions on waiver, credibility, tax credits, or compensation for the tenant's equipment left on the premises.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision granting the respondent College declaratory and injunctive relief for unauthorized practice and unauthorized use of protected titles.

The appellants argued that the language proficiency requirement in the Registration Regulation was discriminatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the appellants were barred from advancing the constitutional argument due to issue estoppel and abuse of process, as the same issue had been previously decided against them by the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed an order of a Superior Court judge resolving a priority issue between two mortgages registered under the Land Titles Act.

The Court of Appeal held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals, as section 27 of the Land Titles Act provides that appeals from orders made under the Act lie to the Divisional Court.

The appeals were transferred to the Divisional Court pursuant to section 110 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order regarding child support, spousal support, and custody arrangements.

The father had declared bankruptcy after failing to pay an equalization payment and costs to the respondent mother.

The motion judge had ordered the father to pay lump sum spousal support equal to the unpaid equalization payment and imposed a charging order on his assets.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the lump sum spousal support and charging order because the motion judge failed to properly consider the implications of the father's bankruptcy and the principles governing lump sum support.

The Court also ordered the mother to pay prospective child support for the daughter residing with the father.

The parties reached a settlement in principle regarding the bankruptcy proposal of Enroute Imports Inc. but required time to finalize specific terms.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal on consent, to be restored to the list if the settlement was not finalized by December 23, 2015.

The appellant estate appealed a decision finding that the joint tenancy of a matrimonial home had not been severed before the deceased's death.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that, despite the deteriorating relationship between the parties, there was no mutual intention to treat their interests as a tenancy in common.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed, as it did not materially change the evidence regarding mutual intention.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The appellants purchased a home and acquired a title insurance policy from the respondent.

Years later, they discovered a previous owner had removed load-bearing walls without a building permit, resulting in a municipal order to remedy an unsafe building.

The respondent denied coverage under the title policy.

The motion judge dismissed the appellants' summary judgment motion, finding the title remained marketable and that municipal work orders must be registered on title to trigger coverage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for standard form insurance contracts is correctness.

The Court found the motion judge erred in his interpretation of the policy and the nature of off-title defects, concluding that the unpermitted construction rendered the title unmarketable and was covered under the policy.

The appellant mother appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her appeal from a trial judgment that made her child a Crown ward without access.

She argued the Children's Aid Society breached its statutory duty to provide services and that the trial judge erred by not extending the period of CAS wardship.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the CAS made numerous attempts to assist the mother, which were frustrated by her own conduct, and that an extension of wardship was not justified given the child's best interests.

The appellants, a software developer and his company, appealed the dismissal of their counterclaim for wrongful dismissal and unpaid compensation against the respondent trading company.

The trial judge had found the developer was terminated for just cause due to sabotage and competition, and rejected claims for commissions, salary, and bonuses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the commissions claim and the finding of just cause, but allowed the appeal regarding unpaid salary and declared bonuses, finding the respondent had no right to withhold them.

The Court also reduced the trial costs award, noting a defendant is not entitled to substantial indemnity costs merely for beating its own offer to settle.