Eleanore A. Cronk

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on drug trafficking charges, which followed the trial judge's exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a finding of arbitrary detention under s. 9.

The trial judge had concluded that police lacked objectively reasonable grounds to arrest the respondent based on confidential informant tips and surveillance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by considering the informant information and police observations in isolation.

When viewed in totality, the informant information was sufficiently compelling and corroborated by police surveillance of multiple brief meetings in vehicles outside the respondent's residence to establish reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for declaratory relief concerning her aunt's estate and the respondent's role under a power of attorney.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no evidence of fraud or lack of capacity, and awarded $8,000 in costs against the appellant due to unsubstantiated allegations and unnecessarily lengthening the hearing.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's findings or costs award and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following its decision on the main appeal.

In accordance with the parties' agreement, the court ordered that the costs of the appeal be paid out of the estate of the deceased.

The successful appellant was awarded $46,000, and the respondents were awarded $25,000.

The appellant, representing Ontario grain farmers, applied under Rule 14.05(3)(d) for a declaration interpreting a regulation that restricted the use of neonicotinoid-treated seeds.

The appellant argued the regulation was unworkable and sought an interpretation that would effectively delay its implementation.

The motion judge struck the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation was not ambiguous and the appellant was improperly seeking to rewrite the regulation rather than resolve a genuine interpretive dispute.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for minor assaults and detained at a minimum forensic unit.

Despite his ongoing marijuana use, he had no history of aggression while detained.

The Ontario Review Board ordered his transfer to a medium security unit to restrict his access to drugs and help him develop insight.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the transfer unreasonable because it was more restrictive of his liberty and there was no evidence linking his marijuana use to a risk to public safety while detained.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment declaring that a May 2014 agreement between the parties was a binding contract and ordering its rectification to remove a clause requiring a future formal agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the parties' conduct demonstrated an intention to be bound and that the formal agreement clause was included by mutual mistake.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The deceased, a non-swimmer, drowned in Lake Simcoe while visiting the respondents' cottage.

The appellants brought an action in negligence and negligent misrepresentation, alleging the respondents failed to warn the deceased of the lake's dangers and falsely represented that the lake was safe and shallow.

The motion judge dismissed the action on summary judgment, finding no special relationship or duty of care.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the respondents did not control the lake, did not create a risky situation, and owed no duty to warn the deceased of obvious dangers removed from their property.

The appellant was employed under a five-year fixed-term contract and was terminated without cause after 23 months.

The motion judge found the early termination clause unenforceable and awarded common law reasonable notice damages subject to mitigation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that where an employment contract is for a fixed term and lacks an enforceable early termination provision, the employee is entitled to the salary and benefits for the unexpired portion of the term.

Furthermore, the court held that there is no duty to mitigate damages arising from the early termination of a fixed-term contract.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel and a breach of his section 14 Charter right to an interpreter.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence regarding the ineffective assistance claim but found no miscarriage of justice, noting trial counsel's strategic decisions were reasonable.

The Court rejected the section 14 claim, finding the appellant understood the proceedings and did not require an interpreter.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision upholding a trust agreement that declared the appellant company's assets belonged to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's credibility findings regarding the agreement's execution.

However, the Court held that the motion judge erred by granting a certificate of pending litigation on his own initiative, as it was neither pleaded nor requested.

The appeal was allowed in part solely to delete the certificate of pending litigation, and dismissed in all other respects.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The tenant's business premises were destroyed by a fire caused by a contractor retained by the landlord.

The tenant's insurer paid the policy limits and brought a subrogated claim against the landlord for the remaining uninsured losses.

The commercial lease required the tenant to insure its property against fire and to name the landlord as an additional insured, but also contained a clause requiring the landlord to indemnify the tenant for damage caused by the landlord's negligence.

The Court of Appeal held that the tenant's covenant to insure constituted an assumption of the risk of fire damage, relieving the landlord of liability even for its own negligence.

The appeal was allowed and the tenant's action dismissed.

The appellant appealed from judgments regarding valid mortgages on which he had been in default for over a year and a half.

He argued there was enough equity in the property to satisfy the debts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the orders below and noting that the equity in the property was irrelevant to the respondent's right to payment and to assert its rights under the security.

The appellant failed to comply with a security for costs order.

The respondent requested that the appeal be dismissed for non-compliance, and the appellant did not oppose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on consent.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision striking her application for declaratory relief as an abuse of process.

The appellant alleged that State Farm wrongly transmitted her confidential medical information outside Ontario without consent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the application was duplicative of the appellant's pending action for statutory accident benefits and circumvented the comprehensive dispute resolution schemes under the Insurance Act and PIPEDA.

The appeal and a motion to adduce fresh evidence were dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his convictions for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and having a blood alcohol level over 80 mg.

He was found asleep in the driver's seat of an inoperable vehicle stopped in a driving lane.

The trial judge acquitted him, finding no realistic risk of danger, but the summary conviction appeal judge entered convictions.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by assuming an inoperable vehicle could not create a realistic risk of danger, entitling the appeal judge to intervene.

The deceased left a will that expressly disinherited his daughter, stating she had had no communication with him for several years.

The daughter challenged the will, adducing extrinsic evidence that her father's actual motive was racially discriminatory because she had a child with a white man.

The application judge admitted the evidence and set aside the will on public policy grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that third-party extrinsic evidence of a testator's motive is inadmissible when the will is clear and unambiguous.

Furthermore, the court held that the public policy doctrine cannot be used to void an unconditional, private testamentary bequest based on a testator's alleged discriminatory motive, affirming the principle of testamentary freedom.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought costs for both the motion and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $90,000 in costs for the motion on a partial indemnity basis, payable by the respondents.

However, the court declined to award costs for the appeal, as the appellant's counsel had explicitly stated during the hearing that he was not seeking appeal costs due to the novelty of the issue and access to justice concerns.

The appellant appealed a committal order made pursuant to section 49 of the Extradition Act.

As provided for in the bail order, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The applicant sought judicial review of a surrender order made by the Minister of Justice under the Extradition Act.

As provided for in the applicant's bail order, the Court of Appeal dismissed the application for judicial review as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his robbery convictions on the ground that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the frailties of eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that while it would have been better to give the cautionary instruction, no request was made at trial.

The Court applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, finding that the identification and circumstantial evidence against the appellant was overwhelming.