Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion for increased retroactive and prospective spousal support, arguing the motion judge provided insufficient reasons and failed to apply the correct legal principles regarding post-separation income increases and her medical inability to work full-time.

The respondent cross-appealed the motion judge's refusal to award him costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding that the motion judge's reasons, while brief, were sufficient for appellate review and that there was no error in principle or material misapprehension of evidence in denying the support increase or in the exercise of discretion regarding costs.

The appellants appealed an order declaring a family trust invalid and vesting its assets in the respondent Trustee in Bankruptcy.

The respondent moved to dismiss the appeals, and the alleged trustee of the trust brought a cross-motion.

The Court of Appeal found significant irregularities regarding the notice provided for the original hearing, noting that the hearing proceeded in the absence of the undischarged bankrupt and any representative of the trust.

The court set aside the original order and remitted the matter for a new hearing in the Superior Court of Justice to ensure procedural fairness.

The appellants, former employees whose employment was terminated following a corporate restructuring, appealed the dismissal of their application for supplementary retirement benefits under a supplementary executive retirement plan (SERP).

Following a partial wind-up of the registered pension plan, the appellants became entitled to statutory 'grow-in' benefits, allowing them to retire at age 55 with unreduced pensions.

The dispute centered on whether the SERP's formula required excluding these grow-in benefits when calculating their supplementary entitlement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's interpretation, which relied on expert actuarial evidence to conclude that the SERP's proviso mandated the exclusion of grow-in benefits from the base calculation but not from the deduction of earned registered benefits, resulting in a nil supplementary entitlement.

The moving party, a debtor company in receivership, sought leave to appeal an order approving the sale of its assets by a court-appointed receiver.

The moving party argued that the receiver acted unfairly, that the debtor's management retained the right to negotiate a restructuring, and that the receiver failed to consult with affected Aboriginal communities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the debtor's parallel negotiations contravened the receivership order, the receiver had exclusive authority to market the assets, and the Aboriginal consultation issue was raised too late and lacked an adequate evidentiary record.

The appellant tenants appealed a decision denying them a rent abatement after their apartment building's elevator was out of service for 96 days due to a latent defect.

The Landlord and Tenant Board found that the landlord had acted diligently and reasonably in maintaining the elevator and replacing it, and thus did not breach its duty to maintain the residential complex in a good state of repair under s. 20(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The Divisional Court affirmed the decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's contextual interpretation of s. 20(1), which considered the reasonableness of the landlord's actions, was reasonable and did not constitute an error of law.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Law Society Appeal Panel related to his uncivil in-court conduct during a lengthy securities fraud trial.

The appellant argued that trial judges, not the Law Society, should oversee in-court conduct and that the Appeal Panel's test for incivility failed to protect zealous advocacy.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasonableness standard of review applied to the Appeal Panel's decision.

The Court found that the Law Society has the statutory authority to discipline lawyers for in-court incivility, independent of a trial judge's actions.

The Court upheld the Appeal Panel's test for incivility and its finding that the appellant's repeated, unfounded allegations of prosecutorial misconduct constituted professional misconduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after having intercourse with a sleeping woman.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting the defence of consent, failing to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and admitting text messages into evidence.

He also appealed his 15-month sentence, introducing fresh evidence that he faced deportation as a permanent resident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence as the victim was asleep.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as a sentence of less than six months to avoid deportation would be manifestly unfit for the offence.

The appellant agreed to purchase a commercial property from the respondent for $9 million, subject to a vendor take-back mortgage.

The transaction failed to close after the parties could not agree on the terms of a secondary financing agreement.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondent, allowing it to retain $1.2 million in deposits.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in interpreting the agreement's secondary financing and escrow deed provisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's interpretation of the strict terms for secondary financing was commercially reasonable and supported by the record.

Following a successful appeal, the Court of Appeal determined the appellant's costs for the underlying action.

The court awarded the appellant costs of the underlying action, including summary judgment motions but excluding costs associated with a cross-claim, on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $65,231.79.

The court declined to make an order regarding additional costs sought by the appellant's shareholders' counsel.

The respondent was assaulted by the appellant and his brothers at the butcher shop where they worked.

At trial, the appellant admitted to the assault but argued the respondent provoked it.

The trial judge rejected the provocation defence, made favourable credibility findings for the respondent, and found the brothers were joint tortfeasors.

On appeal, the appellant challenged these factual findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to disturb the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual conclusions regarding provocation and joint liability.

The appellants appealed a mini-trial judgment and costs order, arguing the trial judge erred by proceeding with the mini-trial before ruling on whether the action against one of the appellants was stayed under s. 69(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, finding the stay applied only to the bankrupt appellant and did not preclude the stand-alone claims against the others.

The court allowed the costs appeal in part, reducing the trial costs award by $7,500 to account for the appellants' success on a continuance motion.

The appellant trustee in bankruptcy appealed a trial judge's decision allowing the secured claims of a nominee company controlled by the respondent.

The appellant argued that the claims were barred by a full and final mutual release previously executed by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made an extricable error of law by failing to consider the release as a whole.

Properly interpreted, the release captured successor corporations under the respondent's control, including the nominee company, and barred the claims.

The Trustee in bankruptcy appealed the trial judge's refusal to set aside transactions arising from a settlement between an investor and a real estate developer.

The Trustee argued the payments and mortgages were transfers at undervalue, unjust preferences, fraudulent conveyances, oppressive, and an unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the settlement was supported by adequate consideration (forbearance from suit), the parties were at arm's length, and there was no intent to defraud creditors.

The investor's cross-appeal regarding a $471,000 payment found to be a fraudulent conveyance was also dismissed.

The appellant, acting as trustee in bankruptcy for two creditors, appealed the trial judge's partial disallowance of claims advanced in the bankruptcy of a development company.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, correcting the quantum of an unsecured claim from $420,000 to $457,600 and ordering interest to be calculated from the date of each individual advance rather than the final advance.

The court dismissed the appeal regarding the disallowance of certain third-party payments, finding the trial judge applied the correct standard of proof.

The court also upheld the application of the Courts of Justice Act for interest on an unjust enrichment claim, but varied the end date for interest accrual to the date of receivership.

A cross-appeal by another creditor was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of drugs and guns found in his girlfriend's apartment.

He challenged two pre-trial Charter rulings.

First, he argued that evidence from the apartment should have been excluded under s. 24(2) after the motion judge found a s. 8 breach due to the search warrant being executed at night without proper authorization.

Second, he argued his arrest was unlawful because the police lacked reasonable grounds, making the seizure of keys during the search incident to arrest unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the s. 8 breach was inadvertent and did not impact privacy interests, and that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was in joint possession of firearms.

The appellant, who suffered a traumatic brain injury, settled a tort claim for $800,000.

His former and current law firms claimed over $422,000 in fees and disbursements.

Facing severe financial pressure and acting without independent legal advice, the appellant entered into fee agreements and a consent order releasing the funds.

He later applied to have the accounts assessed under the Solicitors Act.

The application judge dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction due to the consent order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the consent order, and directed an assessment, finding that the application judge erred in law and that special circumstances demanded the fee agreements be reopened to protect the vulnerable client and maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant was convicted of drug and firearm offences.

He appealed the firearm convictions, arguing that Crown counsel impermissibly relied on a confidential informant's hearsay statement for the truth of its contents during the closing address, despite the statement not being in evidence.

The trial judge compounded the error by repeating the Crown's submission.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the uncorrected improper closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The appeal was allowed, the firearm convictions were vacated, and a new trial was ordered for those charges.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm, unlawful confinement, and other firearms offences arising from a home invasion.

He was sentenced to 8 years, less 1:1 credit for pre-disposition custody.

On appeal, the appellant sought enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre-disposition custody.

The Crown conceded that under the Supreme Court's decision in Summers, the appellant was entitled to the enhanced credit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to reflect the enhanced credit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and gross indecency involving an underage neighbour, arguing that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent because he was acquitted of four other sexual offences, including rape.

He contended that the jury must have reached an impermissible credibility compromise.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were not inconsistent.

The jury was entitled to accept some of the complainant's evidence while rejecting other parts, and it was open to them to distinguish between the offences involving intercourse and those that did not.

The accused was acquitted of sexual offences involving two underage girls after the trial judge found he had taken all reasonable steps to ascertain their ages under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his application of the mistake of age defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly identified and applied the legal principles, and that it was open to him to conclude that a reasonable person would not have made further inquiries given the compelling indicia of age presented by the complainants.