Erica Tait

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion for increased retroactive and prospective spousal support, arguing the motion judge provided insufficient reasons and failed to apply the correct legal principles regarding post-separation income increases and her medical inability to work full-time.

The respondent cross-appealed the motion judge's refusal to award him costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding that the motion judge's reasons, while brief, were sufficient for appellate review and that there was no error in principle or material misapprehension of evidence in denying the support increase or in the exercise of discretion regarding costs.

Following a long motion regarding retroactive spousal support and child support, both parties sought costs.

The applicant claimed $29,700, while the respondent argued for costs based on bad faith or, alternatively, that each party should bear their own costs due to divided success.

The court reviewed the settlement offers, the divided success across the temporary and long motions, and the conduct of the parties.

Ultimately, the court ordered that no costs be awarded to either party.

The parties brought cross-motions to vary a 2007 consent support order addressing child support, spousal support, and the sharing of postsecondary expenses.

The court found the respondent intentionally underemployed and imputed full‑time income based on her previous salary.

Applying principles governing entitlement to share in post‑separation income increases, the court held that the respondent had not established compensatory entitlement to benefit from the applicant’s increased earnings.

The court rejected the respondent’s claim for retroactive and increased future spousal support.

The consent order was varied to adjust child support and allocate expenses proportionate to the parties’ incomes while leaving spousal support unchanged.

The unions sought leave to appeal an order granting super priority to a DIP lender over provincial pension legislation in a CCAA restructuring.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding the proposed appeals lacked sufficient merit.

The court upheld the motion judge's application of the doctrine of paramountcy, agreeing that without the DIP financing and super priority, the objectives of the CCAA would be frustrated and the company would be forced into bankruptcy.