Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering death threats against his former spouse.

At trial, the complainant denied sending a Facebook message that indicated the sexual activity was consensual, and the trial judge barred further cross-examination on the message.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence, including forensic analysis proving the complainant sent the message, which she subsequently admitted.

The Crown conceded the fresh evidence met the prerequisites for admissibility.

The Court of Appeal admitted the evidence, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial, which was stayed at the joint request of counsel.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving over the legal limit, arguing that his statements to police at the accident scene were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and violated his section 7 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the smell of alcohol alone justified the approved screening device demand and the police had established the driver's identity without relying on the appellant's statements.

The proposed appeal did not raise a question of law of significance to the administration of justice beyond the case.

The appellant employer and respondent employee settled two actions for $1,500,000.

The minutes of settlement required a $250,000 payment to the respondent's solicitors in trust 'with no deductions'.

The appellant, on accounting advice, withheld and remitted taxes to the CRA on the full settlement amount, applying the withholding for the trust payment against another payment made directly to the respondent.

The application judge found the appellant breached the minutes.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the minutes ambiguous and concluding the appellant acted reasonably.

Furthermore, the respondent suffered no loss as the remitted funds stood to his credit with the CRA.

The appellant appealed his convictions for production of marijuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable and based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence against the appellant was very strong, including the presence of nearly 3,000 plants on his farm and his truck equipped to water them.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The appellant mother requested an adjournment of her appeal regarding the Crown wardship of her son due to illness, missing transcripts, and a desire to obtain legal representation.

The respondent Society did not object.

The Court of Appeal granted a short adjournment on peremptory terms, directing the Society to expedite the transcripts and provide an update on the child's well-being.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash the responding parties' appeal of an order requiring interim payments pending a phase two trial.

The moving parties argued the order was interlocutory, or alternatively, made under the Ontario Business Corporations Act, meaning jurisdiction lay with the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the order was final as it determined minimum payment amounts and rejected certain deductions.

The Court also held the underlying relief was rooted in common law and equity, not the OBCA, giving the Court of Appeal jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that dismissed their action in negligence and breach of contract against the respondent regarding a slip and fall on restaurant stairs.

The motion judge had dismissed the claim regarding hazards on the stairs but allowed the appellants to amend their claim to plead a breach of the Consumer Protection Act for failing to advise of a main floor washroom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly dismissed the first branch of the claim due to a lack of evidence of stair hazards, and properly preserved the second branch regarding the failure to advise.

The appellant pled guilty to conspiracy to commit fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document, and was sentenced to nine months in jail.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for the disparity between his sentence and the 90-day intermittent sentence imposed on his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit and the sentencing judge properly considered the parity principle, noting material differences between the offenders such as the co-accused making full restitution.

The appellant moved for a stay of a motion judge's order regarding reintegration reconciliation counselling and the adjournment of her summary judgment motion.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to quash the appeal, arguing the underlying order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the respondent, finding that the issue of access remained to be determined at a future summary judgment motion.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal from a judgment implementing a consent to judgment.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, noting that under section 133(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, an appeal from a consent order requires leave.

The appellants had improperly sought leave within their Notice of Appeal rather than bringing a motion in writing as required by Rule 61.03.1.

The appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellants bringing a proper motion for leave to appeal.

Following a successful appeal regarding the apportionment of damages, the court determined the costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

The third parties were ordered to pay partial indemnity costs of $50,000 to the appellants and $75,000 to the respondents.

The appellants were ordered to pay $30,000 in partial indemnity costs to the respondents, as the respondents were required to address all issues initially raised by the appellants.

The appellant sought an adjournment of the appeal to allow appellate counsel sufficient time to prepare for argument.

The respondent opposed the adjournment.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment, noting it was the first request, but ordered the appellant to pay $8,000 in costs thrown away to the respondent within 15 days.

The appellant, a physiotherapy assistant, was convicted of sexually assaulting a patient.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by considering the complainant's demure dress in court and her apparent religious beliefs as factors bolstering her credibility.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in law by treating the complainant's manner of dress and religious beliefs as relevant to her credibility, these factors were given minimal weight and did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Minister of Revenue appealed an order dismissing its motion to dismiss the respondent's tax appeal and granting a production order.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the scope of the appeal under the Retail Sales Tax Act.

As the order was interlocutory, jurisdiction to hear the appeal lay with the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed an order striking his fresh as amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The motion judge had found the claim, which alleged conspiracy, deceit, negligence, and professional misconduct, did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and was an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the pleading was irreparably deficient for failing to plead material facts in support of the serious allegations advanced.

The appellant, an undocumented immigrant living in Ontario, was struck by an unidentified motorist and sought compensation from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Superintendent denied the claim under s. 25(1) of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, arguing the appellant was not ordinarily resident in Ontario.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the Superintendent, finding the appellant's presence was illegal and deceptive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Superintendent only needed to prove the appellant was not ordinarily resident in Ontario, not his specific foreign jurisdiction of residence.

The appellant was convicted of assault and sexual assault against his former wife.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred by admitting irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence of extrinsic misconduct, specifically allegations of child abuse, and by failing to provide a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the use of that evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the evidence was improperly admitted and that the trial judge's instructions failed to shield the jury from impermissible propensity reasoning.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was directed.

The parties agreed on the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent costs fixed at $30,000 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault following a drive-by shooting that occurred after they were robbed at a flea market.

They appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, including the jury selection process, the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence and provocation with the jury, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the periods of parole ineligibility and the sentences for attempted murder and aggravated assault, as the trial judge had erred in principle by exceeding the Crown's sentencing position without notice and failing to give adequate weight to the appellants' youth and rehabilitative prospects.

The appellant, the sole director of a Canadian company that contracted to supply armoured vehicles to the United States government, appealed his committal for extradition to the US on fraud charges and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence that a civil relator action based on the same allegations had been dismissed in the US, arguing this created an issue estoppel and rendered the extradition an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, holding that the fresh evidence was irrelevant to the extradition hearing judge's limited statutory role and that the Minister reasonably concluded that issue estoppel was a defence to be raised at trial in the requesting state.