Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court decision that found a commercial lease for fitness club premises did not include the basement, despite the tenant's long-standing use of it.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that when the lease is interpreted in light of all surrounding circumstances—particularly email correspondence between the parties' lawyers—the parties clearly intended to lease the entire premises, including the basement, on a lump sum basis.

The court found the application judge erred in law by failing to consider all relevant circumstances, despite acknowledging the need to do so.

The appellants, holding foreign arbitral awards against the Kyrgyz Republic, sought declarations that the Republic owned shares in Centerra Gold Inc. registered to Kyrgyzaltyn JSC, a state-owned corporation.

The applications judge dismissed the applications, finding no evidence of a transfer of rights, express trust, or resulting trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the governing agreement unambiguously established Kyrgyzaltyn as the beneficial owner of the shares and that the presumption of resulting trust was rebutted by the evidence of intention.

The appellant homeowner appealed an order confirming a master's report that allowed the respondent contractor's action for unpaid renovation work and dismissed the appellant's counterclaim.

The appellant argued the master failed to address allegations of post-contractual misrepresentations and breach of the duty of honest performance, and that the motion judge erred in finding the entire agreement clause excluded these claims.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the entire agreement clause could not exclude the duty of honesty, but dismissed the appeal because the master's factual findings—that the parties had agreed to the charges for extra work—disposed of the factual underpinnings of the appellant's claims.

The appellants, the City of Ottawa and a city bus driver, appealed a trial judgment finding them 20% liable for a fatal intersection collision.

The bus driver, travelling on a green light, collided with a vehicle that entered the intersection on a red light.

The trial judge found the bus driver negligent for speeding and momentary inattention, concluding the accident could have been avoided had he driven at the speed limit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's articulation of the standard of care or her causation analysis.

The appeal regarding the trial judge's costs award was also dismissed.

The appellant, a small distillery, challenged the LCBO's 139.7% mark-up on spirits sold at its on-site retail store, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax under sections 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The application judge dismissed the challenge, finding the mark-up was a proprietary charge and not a tax, and that the appellant had voluntarily agreed to it by contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the LCBO, as the owner of the spirits under the contract, was exercising its private law rights to determine prices in a commercial context.

The appellants, the biological parents of a child, appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld a trial judge's order making the child a Crown ward with no access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness, bias, or palpable and overriding error in the lower courts' decisions.

The Court emphasized the child's need for permanency and stability after being in the care of the respondent for over five years, concluding that the child should be placed for adoption without further delay.

The bankrupt brought a motion to quash the trustee's appeal from the dismissal of a contempt motion, arguing the order was interlocutory and should be appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that under s. 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, an appeal from an order of a bankruptcy judge lies to the Court of Appeal regardless of whether it is final or interlocutory.

The Court also granted leave to appeal under s. 193(e) if required, given the serious allegations and issues of general importance to bankruptcy practice.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his personal injury action following a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge had found the appellant failed to prove his injuries or causation, making it unnecessary to determine the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal raised the issue of jurisdiction on its own motion and concluded that, because the judgment contained no declaratory relief regarding the threshold, the appeal and cross-appeal properly lay to the Divisional Court under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The proceedings were transferred accordingly.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion for an order to allow the late filing of his statement of claim regarding the sale of allegedly defective dairy cows.

The appellant failed to file the statement of claim within the 30-day deadline after issuing a notice of action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellant's explanation for the delay lacked necessary detail and that the respondent suffered prejudice due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims for a beneficial interest in the family home or equitable damages for services rendered to his mother, as well as the dismissal of his application to revoke his sister's power of attorney.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in allocating the burden of proof for unjust enrichment by requiring the appellant to prove a 'net benefit'.

Applying the correct framework from Kerr v. Baranow, the Court awarded the appellant $438,113 in equitable damages for domestic services.

The Court also admitted the trial judge's findings of undue influence as fresh evidence and revoked the sister's power of attorney.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant, brought a motion to vary an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The single judge had declined to direct the issuance of a notice of appeal, grant a declaration regarding a previous order, and consolidate appeals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to vary, finding that the moving party failed to identify any sustainable legal basis to interfere with the order and had brought the motion without leave, contrary to a previous order.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm after a severe rear-end collision on a highway.

At trial, he argued that his roadside admission to being the driver was statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act, violating his Charter right to silence, and that the subsequent breath demand was not made 'forthwith'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant volunteered the information freely and that the brief delay in making the breath demand was justified by public safety concerns at the chaotic accident scene.

The appellant sought to certify a global class action against an Ontario accounting firm for auditor's negligence regarding a clean audit report used in a US private placement.

The motion judge denied certification, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario for the foreign investors and concluding that joinder was preferable to a class proceeding.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by mischaracterizing the claim as being about the foreign financing rather than the Ontario-based audit, and by failing to properly conduct the comparative access to justice analysis required for the preferable procedure criterion.

The action was certified as a class proceeding.

The appellant emergency room physician appealed a trial judgment finding him liable in negligence for the death of a patient from bacterial meningitis.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by failing to consider meningitis, perform a lumbar puncture, or administer standard treatment when the patient presented with confusion, fever, and a history of decreased consciousness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the patient's mental status, her reliance on an infectious disease specialist's standard of care evidence, or her causation analysis applying the 'but for' test.

A Sanderson costs order against the appellant was also upheld.

In a multi-jurisdictional class action regarding credit card merchant fees, Class Counsel entered into a Fee Sharing Agreement with a competing law firm to resolve a carriage dispute.

The agreement provided the competing firm up to $800,000 from Class Counsel's fees in exchange for staying rival actions.

On a motion to approve a partial settlement and fees, the motion judge reduced Class Counsel's requested fees by 10%, declared the Fee Sharing Agreement unenforceable, and prohibited any payments to the competing firm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the fee reduction and the prohibition on paying the competing firm from the settlement or approved fees, finding the agreement was subject to court approval under the Class Proceedings Act.

However, the Court set aside the declaration that the agreement was entirely unenforceable from any source, as the competing firm was not given notice or an opportunity to make submissions on that specific issue.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault after stabbing a neighbour during a physical altercation on her driveway.

The fight was instigated by the neighbours over noise from a leaf blower.

The appellant claimed she acted in self-defence to protect her husband, who was involved in the melee.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding that the victim was not applying force or engaged with the husband at the moment of the stabbing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the law of self-defence and did not impermissibly weigh the appellant's response to a nicety.

The appellant wife appealed a summary judgment that retroactively reduced and prospectively terminated the respondent husband's spousal support obligations.

The husband cross-appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a 2005 consent order and a 1985 marriage contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the wife's appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in interpreting the wife's and her new partner's income tax returns to impute income.

The court substituted a new spousal support order with a step-down approach but no termination date.

The husband's cross-appeal was dismissed, as there was no basis to set aside the consent order and the marriage contract was unenforceable.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of trafficking one kilogram of cocaine and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to correct Crown misstatements and in correcting defence counsel's instructions on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by relying on unproven prior trafficking, failing to apply the principle of parity, and imposing a sentence at the upper end of the range for a first offender.

With the admission of fresh evidence in the form of a Gladue report, the sentence was reduced to five years.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had overturned the accused's conviction for having care or control of a vehicle while impaired.

The Court of Appeal found that the SCAC impermissibly substituted its own factual findings for those of the trial judge regarding whether the accused posed a realistic risk of danger.

The Court of Appeal also held that the SCAC erred by deciding the appeal on the unargued ground of insufficient reasons.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a historical sexual assault that occurred in 1991.

He argued that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge fairly assessed the credibility of the witnesses using the W.(D.) framework and that there was a clear evidentiary basis for the conviction.