Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellants were successful on appeal from a summary judgment decision.

The Court of Appeal addressed costs following the appeal.

Counsel for the respondent agreed that the appellants' claimed costs of $18,686.25, comprising $17,132.50 in fees on the partial indemnity scale and $1,553.75 in disbursements, were reasonable.

The court ordered that amount in costs, inclusive of HST, be paid by the respondent to the appellants.

The estate of a deceased lawyer appealed a trial judge's damages assessment in an undefended trial arising from breaches of fiduciary duty by former employees.

The defendants had wrongfully removed and transferred 120 client files to a competing law firm.

The trial judge awarded $344,513.87 in general damages plus $145,662.19 in prejudgment interest but declined to award punitive damages.

The appellate court found three errors: (1) improper double-counting of overhead expenses in calculating general damages; (2) failure to award punitive damages despite egregious misconduct; and (3) undercompensation of special damages for disbursements.

The appeal was allowed in part, increasing the total award to $627,678.09 plus prejudgment interest.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment granting rescission and damages with respect to one vacant property (Petting Zoo) and issuing a certificate of pending litigation with respect to another property (Lot 511).

The respondents had made payments totalling $168,727.74 between 2006 and 2013 towards the purchase of both properties, but the appellant retained title to both.

The appellant argued the respondents had defaulted on their payment obligations and forfeited their interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's own breach in failing to obtain severance of Lot 511 justified the respondents' cessation of payments and entitled them to the remedies granted.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated sexual assault in the death of a 29-year-old woman found naked in a wooded park in Guelph.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on DNA evidence linking the appellant to the deceased, forensic entomology evidence establishing time of death, and toxicology evidence showing cocaine in the deceased's blood.

The trial judge admitted evidence of a subsequent assault by the appellant on another sex worker (the "Barrie incident") to establish motive and rebut innocent association.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: admissibility of the Barrie incident evidence, unreasonableness of the verdict on causation and fault elements, and adequacy of jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Barrie incident evidence was wrongfully admitted and that the jury instructions on the fault element in murder were deficient.

This appeal concerns a class action by General Motors of Canada Limited (GMCL) dealers against the law firm Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP for breach of fiduciary and contractual duties.

During the 2009 financial crisis, Cassels represented three potentially conflicting clients: the Saturn Dealers, Industry Canada (regarding GMCL bailout financing), and GMCL dealers generally regarding a potential restructuring or insolvency.

The trial judge found that Cassels breached its duties by failing to disclose the conflict of interest with Industry Canada to the dealers and by failing to provide proper advice regarding Wind-Down Agreements (WDAs) offered by GMCL.

The dealers lost the opportunity to negotiate collectively for better compensation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability findings but reduced the damages award from $45 million to approximately $41 million (subject to further calculation regarding class composition).

This appeal arises from the 2009 General Motors of Canada bailout and the termination of franchise dealerships.

The franchisor offered Wind-Down Agreements to 240 dealers, providing payment in exchange for comprehensive releases of all claims, including those under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The dealers were required to obtain independent legal advice before signing.

A class action was subsequently brought by terminated franchisees claiming breaches of statutory rights.

The trial judge found the releases valid under the Tutor Time exception to section 11 of the Wishart Act, as they constituted settlements of known and existing claims entered into with legal advice.

The trial judge also held that covenants not to sue and indemnity provisions were void for public policy reasons but were severable from the release.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the validity of the releases and the severance of the covenant not to sue.

This appeal concerns a statutory interpretation dispute regarding the priority of a condominium corporation's lien under the Condominium Act, 1998.

The appellant condominium corporation obtained a compliance order and costs award against a unit owner in February 2011.

The owner defaulted on payment of the costs in March 2011.

The corporation added the costs to common expenses in August 2011 and registered a lien certificate in December 2011.

The respondent mortgagee held a first mortgage on the unit.

The central issue was whether the corporation's lien lost priority over the mortgage because it failed to register the lien certificate within three months of the default, as required by section 85(2) of the Act.

The court held that the default triggering the three-month perfection period occurred when the owner failed to pay the costs order in March 2011, not when the owner failed to pay the claimed common expenses in September 2011.

Accordingly, the corporation's failure to register within three months caused the lien to lose priority.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellants, The Regional Municipality of Sudbury and The City of Greater Sudbury, appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated November 17, 2015.

The appeal was unsuccessful.

The court awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $95,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

The appellant did not attend for argument of the appeal and advised the respondents' counsel that she would not be attending.

The appellant was self-represented, having filed a Notice of Intention to Act in person.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned, and the respondents were awarded costs in the amount of $9,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

Appellants purchased a franchise from the respondent and sought rescission under section 6(2) of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000 on the basis that no proper disclosure document was provided.

The motion judge found the disclosure deficient but held that the appellants received sufficient information to make an informed decision and that deficiencies were not significant or misleading.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that material deficiencies in the disclosure document—specifically the absence of two required director signatures and failure to provide current audited financial statements—rendered the purported disclosure document invalid under the Act and Regulation.

The appellants were entitled to rescission under section 6(2).

Motions for leave to appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing a motion to require Algoma to resume payments under a Cargo Handling Agreement in the context of CCAA proceedings.

The applicants sought to invoke section 11.01(a) of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to compel payment for post-filing services.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion three times on the same legal grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave motions, finding no prima facie merit due to issue estoppel and no significance to the practice, as the issues were specific to the unique agreements underlying the Port Transaction.

An appellant appealed a disposition decision of the Ontario Review Board dated June 7, 2016, which declined to modify the conditions of his detention order to provide broader community access privileges.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for second degree murder and was detained at a mental health facility.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the Board failed to consider readily available and relevant information from the original NCR hearing; and second, that the disposition was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable and that the NCR hearing information was not material to the narrow issue before the Board regarding whether the appellant's risk could be managed through modified detention terms.

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court decision upholding a trial judgment in a matrimonial case.

The trial judge had imposed a restraining order, prohibited the appellant from initiating further court proceedings without leave, awarded costs of $52,899.32 to the respondent, and the appellant alleged judicial bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions were appropriate and designed to clarify evidence and maintain trial control in a high-conflict case involving a self-represented litigant.

The restraining order was justified by findings of persistent abusive behaviour and threatening communications.

The prohibition on further proceedings was grounded in the litigation history and the appellant's admitted future litigious intentions.

The costs award was properly reasoned and not plainly wrong.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking offences and firearm-related offences, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the application judge's Charter ruling regarding the sufficiency of the information to obtain for a search warrant and the application of s. 24(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the application judge's analysis.

On the sentence appeal, the Court granted leave and allowed the appeal in part, reducing the sentence for the s. 86(1) firearm offence from two years to one year imprisonment concurrent, as the original sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for a first offender.

The Court upheld the trial judge's characterization of the appellant as a mid-level drug dealer based on the evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence for break and enter to commit theft and break and enter with intent.

He had pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence with two years' probation, with pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5:1 (198 days from 132 days).

The enhanced credit resulted in a custodial sentence exceeding 180 days, triggering mandatory deportation as a convention refugee and barring him from appealing the deportation order.

Fresh evidence on appeal demonstrated that trial counsel failed to appreciate the immigration consequences of the enhanced credit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on consent of the Crown and reduced the pre-sentence custody credit by 19 days to 179 days, thereby avoiding the immigration consequences.

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully importing cocaine into Canada contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed on two grounds: that the trial judge failed to address his defence meaningfully and failed to undertake proper analysis under the third step of the R. v. W.(D.) inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the defence theory that the appellant was an unwitting "blind mule" and properly applied the reasonable doubt standard.

The evidence established that cocaine was found in the appellant's luggage, and the only live issue was knowledge.

The trial judge rejected the defence assertion that unknown baggage handlers planted the drugs, finding it speculative and unsupported by evidence.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice referring his solicitor's account dated February 28, 2016 for assessment under the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the order was interlocutory rather than final in nature.

The order concerned a preliminary procedural matter directing referral for assessment, not the substantive determination of the account's quantum.

The appellant retained the right to defend the quantum of his account during the assessment process.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision interpreting a shareholders' agreement regarding the purchase rights of shares held jointly by a deceased shareholder and his spouse.

The appellant argued that shares held jointly with right of survivorship should not be subject to purchase options upon the shareholder's death, and that the respondent, as a non-founder, had no right to acquire founder's shares.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding that Article 2.7 of the agreement required jointly-held shares to be treated as owned by the deceased shareholder for all purposes of the agreement, including purchase options.

The court also found that when the respondent became the sole surviving shareholder, he was entitled to exercise his option to purchase all remaining shares.

A tragic motor vehicle accident occurred on November 22, 2000, when a 20-year-old driver lost control of her vehicle on a snow-covered regional road during a winter storm and collided with an oncoming school bus, sustaining catastrophic injuries.

The plaintiff and her family sued the municipality for negligence, alleging failure to maintain the road in a reasonable state of repair under the Municipal Act.

At trial, the municipality was found 100% liable for approximately $12 million in damages.

On appeal, the municipality challenged the trial judge's findings regarding statutory defences under sections 284(1.2) and 284(1.3) of the Municipal Act and the trial judge's rejection of a contributory negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding that the municipality had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk of road refreezing and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the hazardous conditions that caused the accident.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order staying an action for breach of contract.

The motion judge found that the contract required disputes to be resolved by arbitration in South Carolina.

The central issue was whether the contractual rights assigned to the appellant were limited to those in a Joint Venture Marketing Agreement (JVMA) or included terms from an International Sales Agency Agreement (ISAA) containing an arbitration clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that both agreements were assigned to the appellant and that the parties conducted themselves in accordance with the ISAA, including its arbitration clause.