Michael F. Smith

The plaintiff killed his son while experiencing a psychotic episode allegedly caused by the antidepressant Paxil, manufactured by the defendant.

He was found not criminally responsible and was under the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board until receiving an absolute discharge in December 2009.

He commenced an action against the defendant in October 2011.

The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff lacked the psychological capacity to sue until his absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge materially misapprehended the evidence.

Exercising its fact-finding powers, the Court concluded the plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of capacity under s. 7(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, as he had demonstrated the ability to instruct counsel, manage affairs, and understand the litigation process well before his discharge.

The action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's product liability action as statute-barred.

The plaintiff had killed his son while experiencing a psychotic episode, which he alleged was caused by the defendant's antidepressant medication.

The court found that while the plaintiff had cognitive awareness of his potential claim earlier, he lacked the psychological capacity to commence the action until his absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order staying an action for breach of contract.

The motion judge found that the contract required disputes to be resolved by arbitration in South Carolina.

The central issue was whether the contractual rights assigned to the appellant were limited to those in a Joint Venture Marketing Agreement (JVMA) or included terms from an International Sales Agency Agreement (ISAA) containing an arbitration clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that both agreements were assigned to the appellant and that the parties conducted themselves in accordance with the ISAA, including its arbitration clause.

The defendants, having successfully obtained a stay of action based on an arbitration clause, sought partial and substantial indemnity costs totaling $68,449.55.

The plaintiff conceded entitlement to costs but argued the amount was excessive.

The court applied the principle that costs should be fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party, not merely the actual costs incurred.

While acknowledging the importance of the matter to the defendants and the plaintiff's conduct contributing to increased costs, the court found the claimed hours excessive for a two-hour motion.

Considering an offer to settle, the court awarded costs at the higher end of a reasonable range, fixing them at $40,000.00.

Following a judgment declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant, the applicant sought costs of the application.

The court found that the respondent's history of vexatious litigation warranted a substantial indemnity costs award to sanction his behaviour and indemnify the applicant.

The court fixed the applicant's substantial indemnity costs at $17,943.19.

The applicant brought an application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act seeking to have her former spouse declared a vexatious litigant and to obtain a restraining order.

The evidence demonstrated nearly two decades of repetitive and unsuccessful litigation, including attempts to relitigate issues already decided, interfere with corporate affairs, and pursue proceedings without reasonable grounds.

The court reviewed the governing principles for declaring a litigant vexatious and concluded that the respondent’s persistent litigation, failure to comply with court orders, and improper use of proceedings constituted abuse of process.

The court declared the respondent a vexatious litigant and prohibited him from commencing or continuing proceedings without leave, and also granted a restraining order prohibiting contact with the applicant.

The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Canadian citizenship oath under s. 24 of the Citizenship Act, alleging it infringed rights under ss. 2 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by compelling allegiance to the monarch.

After certification of the proposed class proceeding was denied and appeals were dismissed, the plaintiffs sought an order under s. 7 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to continue the matter as an individual proceeding.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The court held that although the litigation had progressed slowly, the delay was not intentional, contumelious, or such as to create a substantial risk that a fair trial would no longer be possible.

The motion to dismiss for delay was denied and the plaintiffs were permitted to continue the action individually seeking declaratory relief.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering an equalization payment, dismissing a constructive trust claim, and imposing restraining and vexatious litigant orders.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence of a hearing impairment, which the Court of Appeal rejected.

The Court upheld the trial judge's finding that certain shares had no value, but adjusted the equalization payment to account for uncollectable receivables.

The Court also struck the restraining and vexatious litigant orders as they were not raised as issues for trial.

The appellant garnishee appealed an order from a garnishment hearing, arguing the motion judge reversed the burden of proof, improperly admitted transcript evidence from the judgment debtor's trial, and failed to give weight to a former solicitor's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's approach to the burden of proof, the admission of the transcript, the adverse inference drawn from failing to call the judgment debtor, or the weighing of evidence.

The complainant, who was discharged for failing to return to work on time after an extended vacation, alleged that his union breached its duty of fair representation under section 60 of the Labour Relations Act by refusing to take his discharge grievance to arbitration.

The union's grievance committee and executive board had reviewed the case and concluded it lacked merit due to credibility issues and the strict language of the collective agreement.

The Board dismissed the complaint, finding that the union had carefully considered the grievance and that its decision was not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.

An alleged innocent misrepresentation by a shop steward that caused the complainant to miss a union meeting did not constitute a breach of the Act.

The complainant sought compensation following an arbitration award that reinstated him without compensation, alleging a conflict of interest by the union's counsel.

At the hearing before the Ontario Labour Relations Board, the complainant's counsel requested an adjournment because the complainant was allegedly out of the jurisdiction.

The respondent and intervener opposed the adjournment, noting the complainant had been in Toronto just days prior.

The Board denied the adjournment request due to lack of direct knowledge by counsel and short notice.

As no evidence or representations were made regarding the compensation claim, the request for relief was dismissed.