Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and importing cocaine, but the jury could not reach a verdict on a trafficking charge.

During deliberations, the jury asked if a guilty verdict on importing required a guilty verdict on trafficking.

The trial judge answered 'no' without further explanation, contradicting his earlier instructions that the key issue for all charges was whether a specific transfer of cocaine occurred.

The Court of Appeal held that this incomplete and unhelpful response compromised trial fairness and left the jury adrift to assess conflicting bases of culpability.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a police search of a hotel bedroom was not a justified safety search and in excluding the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the officers had predetermined to conduct the search before arriving, which supported the trial judge's conclusion that there was no reasonable apprehension of imminent harm.

The Court found no basis to interfere with the exclusion of evidence, as the trial judge did not find the search was conducted in good faith.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for the death of his severely disabled brother, whom he had removed from a care facility to misappropriate his disability cheques.

The victim died from starvation and neglect after eight years of abuse.

The trial judge imposed a 20-year sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was beyond the established range and that the trial judge improperly treated a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the horrific aggravating circumstances justified a sentence outside the usual range.

However, the appeal was allowed solely to apply enhanced pre-sentence custody credit under Summers, reducing the net sentence to 14 years and 11 months.

The appellant was detained by police investigating trespass and liquor offences.

An altercation ensued, leading to his arrest and the discovery of a handgun in his backpack.

At trial, the appellant argued his detention was arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter, but the trial judge dismissed the application, finding the police had reasonable suspicion.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the s. 9 ruling.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, concluding that the totality of the circumstances supported a reasonable suspicion that the appellant was engaged in trespass or liquor-related offences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 12.5 years for manslaughter.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly consider his self-induced intoxication and that the sentence was clearly unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the trial judge properly considered the intoxication and the sentence fell within the acceptable range for aggravated manslaughter.

However, based on the intervening Supreme Court decision in Summers, the court allowed the appeal solely to grant enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre-sentence custody, reducing the net sentence to 10 years and 5 months.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for killing his mother.

He raised a defence of not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR), which the jury rejected.

On appeal, he argued the jury's verdict was unreasonable because it rejected uncontradicted expert psychiatric evidence, and he sought to introduce a new psychiatric report as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury had a rational basis to reject the expert opinion due to flaws in its factual foundation.

The court also denied the admission of fresh evidence, concluding it lacked cogency and could not reasonably be expected to have affected the verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

He had forced his way into the complainant's apartment, confined her, and eventually ordered her to watch him masturbate.

The appellant argued that because he did not touch the complainant or verbally threaten her, his actions did not amount to a threat of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in the context of the violent and sexualized atmosphere created by the appellant, his actions constituted a threat to apply force of a sexual nature.

An employee of the respondent perpetrated a large-scale fraud by requisitioning cheques payable to six entities and depositing them into accounts he controlled.

Two of the entities were invented, and four were customers not owed money.

The respondent sued the appellant banks for conversion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the banks' appeal, finding they had a valid defence under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

The court held that the two invented payees were non-existing, and all six payees were fictitious because the respondent's directing minds never formed an intention to pay them.

The appellant, a former gym teacher and basketball coach, appealed his conviction for historical sexual assault against a former student.

The trial judge's decision rested entirely on a credibility assessment of the complainant and the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge made material errors by misapprehending the appellant's evidence regarding his post-practice monitoring routine and by placing undue weight on the appellant's demeanour while testifying.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with pre-sentence custody credited on a 1:1 basis.

The sentencing judge denied enhanced credit on the mistaken belief that the appellant's bail had been revoked.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found this was a material factual misunderstanding.

Applying the principles from Summers, the Court held the appellant was entitled to enhanced credit of 1.5:1, as there was no evidence to rebut the inference that he had lost eligibility for early release.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced accordingly.

The appellant was convicted of fraud-related offences arising from a large-scale internet fraud scheme operated from his home involving stolen and altered corporate cheques.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions for similar cheque frauds as similar act evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the similarities between the prior conduct and the alleged offences were sufficient to overcome the objective improbability of coincidence, and noting the Crown's case was formidable even without the similar act evidence.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for arson, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her continued detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

She argued the Board erred in finding she continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence indicating a high risk of decompensation and violent behaviour if the appellant discontinued her medication.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing a personal guarantee for a small business loan and setting aside the transfer of a matrimonial home as a fraudulent conveyance.

The appellants argued the Bank's refusal to provide information about the primary debtor's account rendered the guarantee unconscionable or breached a duty of honest performance.

The Court of Appeal found the Bank breached a contractual disclosure obligation but held this did not discharge the guarantee because the guarantor failed to prove any resulting prejudice or damages.

The court also upheld the finding that the property transfer was a fraudulent conveyance.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged jury convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000.

The court rejected the submission that intercepted drug purchase calls were inadmissible hearsay, distinguishing the governing Supreme Court authority because there were multiple calls, confirmatory evidence, and practical necessity.

The court also held that the jury charge, read as a whole, adequately instructed on reasonable doubt and did not require a specific W.(D.) instruction concerning the defence witness.

The remaining complaints about credibility and demeanour instructions disclosed no material error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits until returning to work.

The insurer sent a letter discontinuing benefits and warning of a two-year limitation period to dispute the refusal.

The appellant later stopped working due to her injuries and sought reinstatement of benefits, which the insurer denied as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action, confirming that the limitation period began running upon the valid refusal of benefits, and was not delayed by the temporary return to work provision in the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

He had previously been granted a conditional discharge but subsequently missed appointments, was hospitalized multiple times, used drugs, and exhibited concerning behaviour.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk to public safety was reasonable and owed deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought an extension of time to seek a panel review of a 2008 order by a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which had denied his application for an extension of time to appeal his 2002 second-degree murder conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the seven-year delay in seeking the review and failed to demonstrate any basis to interfere with the single judge's discretionary decision.

The appellant was convicted of procuring a 14-year-old to become a prostitute and aiding her in engaging in prostitution for gain.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the closing address by his co-accused's counsel relied on matters not in evidence and prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that circumstantial evidence supported the co-accused's counsel's inferences and that the trial judge provided an adequate corrective instruction.

Leave to appeal the sentence was also denied.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 7 years' imprisonment for drug and property-related offences, including possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in finding he was at a high level of the drug business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the agreed facts amply supported the inference that he was a high-level trafficker and not merely a non-professional courier.

The sentence fell within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and assault in respect of the death of his infant son, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of civilian witnesses and a medical expert.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed to grant enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody at a ratio of 1.5:1, reducing the residual sentence to 5.25 years' imprisonment.