Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellant appealed an order declaring a child to be a child of the marriage and requiring him to pay retroactive and ongoing child support, as well as spousal support.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on the child's status, his income, and the respondent's ability to contribute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or serious misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence regarding the appellant's income, noting it lacked cogency and that the trial order already provided a mechanism for adjusting support based on annual income tax returns.

The insurer appealed from a declaration that it owed a duty to defend and indemnify insured parents sued in negligence for allegedly failing to prevent their daughter's bullying of another student.

The Court of Appeal held that the negligence claim was properly pleaded and was not derivative of the intentional tort claim against the daughter.

However, the court found that the policy exclusion for failure to take steps to prevent physical, psychological or emotional abuse, molestation or harassment was unambiguous and squarely captured the pleaded failures to investigate, remedy, discipline, and prevent the harassment.

The insurer therefore had no duty to defend or indemnify in the underlying action.

This is a companion appeal to Unifund Assurance Company v. D.E. and L.E. The appellant insurance company appealed a declaration that it had a duty to defend and indemnify the respondent parents and their minor daughter in an underlying action relating to alleged bullying and harassment.

Applying the reasons from the companion appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in interpreting the exclusion clause.

The court also held that the minor daughter was excluded from coverage as the underlying claim was strictly for intentional torts of assault and battery.

The appeal was allowed, and the court declared the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify.

The appellants appealed an order discharging an $800,000 mortgage registered on a property.

In a prior proceeding, the court interpreted an agreement allowing the respondent to decline paying the mortgage, which gave the appellants an option to repurchase the property.

The respondent declined to pay, and the appellants did not repurchase.

The motion judge granted the discharge, finding it logically flowed from the prior decision.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the agreement provided the mortgage was deemed satisfied if the transaction failed to close without the respondent's fault.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision striking his statement of claim and dismissing his action regarding two properties.

For the Fergus property, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge proceeded on an incomplete understanding of the facts regarding waiver of conditions and extension of the closing date, and that a ten-year limitation period might apply.

For the Erin property, the Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the claims were barred by res judicata as they had been or should have been resolved in prior proceedings.

The appellant appealed a formal order containing only support orders made by the trial judge, including an order for retroactive support of $53,800.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the order fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The respondent, an undischarged bankrupt, brought an application for a declaration that his professional liability insurer was required to indemnify him for a class action.

The insurer brought a motion to strike the application, arguing the respondent lacked legal capacity.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the order was final and that the right to receive an indemnity under an insurance contract is a chose in action that vests in the trustee in bankruptcy.

The appeal was allowed and the application dismissed.

The mother appealed orders granting sole custody to the father, terminating his support obligations, and requiring her to pay child support.

The motion judge had made these orders after finding the mother in contempt for failing to return the children to Ontario from Alberta, and had prohibited the mother from participating in the hearing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by deciding custody without a full evidentiary record, failing to consider the children's best interests (including the father's history of domestic violence), improperly delegating access decisions to the father, and varying support without adequate evidence or consideration of statutory factors.

The orders were set aside and a new hearing was ordered.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action following the death of a 22-year-old man in hospital.

The deceased had been switched from morphine to Dilaudid by the respondent physician, and the appellants alleged the dosage was excessive and caused his death by opioid overdose.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's expert evidence that the dosage met the standard of care and that the cause of death was not an opioid overdose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to liability, standard of care, or causation.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to touch for a sexual purpose against his five-year-old great-niece, as well as possession of child pornography.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the complainant's prior consistent statements and the use of the child pornography evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding the prior statements but held the trial judge erred by failing to expressly instruct the jury that the child pornography evidence could not be used to determine guilt on the sexual abuse charges.

The convictions for the sexual offences were quashed and a new trial ordered.

The conviction for possession of child pornography was upheld, but the sentence was reduced to time served after applying the correct pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their legal malpractice action against the respondent lawyers.

The action alleged the respondents delayed applying for catastrophic impairment benefits and failed to advance Family Law Act claims for the injured party's brothers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellants failed to put their best foot forward by providing evidence of damages not compensated by the underlying $1.4 million settlement.

The appellant, an Ontario tax lawyer, appealed a judgment declaring that a Memorandum of Settlement was a binding contract between him and the respondents.

The appellant argued that the application judge ignored the test for contract formation regarding certainty of essential terms and failed to consider all evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the two-page Memorandum straightforward and clear, and that the application judge properly considered the evidence.

The Memorandum unambiguously resolved all outstanding disputes.

The appellant appealed the summary dismissal of his defamation action against the author and publisher of a book about a street gang.

The appellant claimed a passage comparing him to a movie character carried defamatory meanings, including that he was a murderer and a psychopath.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the words were not capable of bearing those defamatory meanings and that true innuendo had not been properly pleaded.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to reduce the motion judge's costs award from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, finding that Rule 49 did not automatically warrant substantial indemnity costs for a successful defendant.

The appellant commenced an action in 1998 relating to a property transaction in Venezuela.

By 2014, the action had not proceeded to trial.

The motion judge dismissed the action for delay, finding the 16-year delay to be inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial, particularly given that two principal defendants had died.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the delay met the test for dismissal and that the civil justice system will no longer tolerate such inordinate and inexplicable delay.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering her to pay damages and costs for fraudulent misrepresentations made to obtain a mortgage loan.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in evaluating the evidence, rejecting her claim that she was an innocent dupe in a mortgage fraud scheme, and failing to assist her as a self-represented litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by the evidence and that the appellant had participated fully at trial without any failure of assistance by the judge.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their action as an impermissible collateral attack on a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to address the appellants' request for an extension of time to appeal the Land Titles Decision.

The Court noted that one of the appellants had been acquitted of fraud in a related criminal trial, which contradicted the Deputy Director's findings, and that there were concerns about procedural fairness at the Land Titles hearing.

The action was reinstated to allow the appellants to bring a proper motion for an extension of time.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The parties had made a joint submission requesting a transfer to a secure unit and an early six-month review hearing.

The Board accepted the transfer but rejected the early review.

The appellant argued this breached procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board did not impose a more restrictive disposition than requested, the parties had a full opportunity to argue the merits of the early review, and the Board's decision was reasonable based on the evidence of the appellant's recent behaviour.

The appellant was seriously injured in a motor scooter accident and suffered brain injuries.

At trial, 16 years later, she provided a different account of the accident than in her statement of claim.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding she had not proven the respondent caused or contributed to the accident, relying in part on defence expert evidence regarding retrograde amnesia.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the expert evidence, assessing reliability, and applying the standard of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reliance on the expert evidence, assessment of reliability, or application of the balance of probabilities standard.

The appellants defaulted on a loan secured by both a promissory note and a mortgage.

The promissory note contained a provision escalating the interest rate from 0.75% to 10% upon default, while the mortgage contained late payment and default fees.

The motion judge granted summary judgment enforcing the 10% interest rate and the fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that because the promissory note and mortgage secured the same debt, section 8 of the Interest Act applied to both instruments.

The interest escalation provision and the late fees were found to violate section 8's prohibition against penalties on arrears secured by a mortgage and were set aside.

The appellant appealed a nine-month sentence for robbery-related offences on the basis of fresh evidence showing that a recent amendment to the immigration regime eliminated his right to appeal a removal order if he received a sentence of six months or more.

As a permanent resident, he faced near-certain deportation to Syria, where the evidence indicated extreme danger and likely compulsory military service.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance on collateral immigration consequences in sentencing, the court held that a sentence just under six months remained within the fit range for this youthful first offender and better served rehabilitation and individualization.

The appeal was allowed and the custodial sentence was reduced to six months less 15 days.