Kirryn G. Hashmi

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike portions of the defendant's defence and the entirety of the counterclaim.

The parties resolved the motion by consent, leaving only the issue of costs.

The defendant argued that a consent order should not attract costs and that the motion was unnecessary.

The court disagreed, finding that the plaintiff incurred costs to analyze the poorly constructed pleadings and identify what should be struck, work that the defendant's counsel should have done.

However, the court found the plaintiff's claimed costs of nearly $9,000 to be excessive.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01, the court fixed costs at $5,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

Following the release of reasons for decision in a civil proceeding, counsel alerted the court to misstatements contained in several paragraphs of the judgment.

The court reviewed the concerns raised in correspondence and agreed that errors existed in the previously released reasons.

The judge confirmed that the misstatements had not been identified despite multiple proofreadings prior to release.

The court ordered that the errors be corrected and that a corrected version of the reasons be circulated to counsel.

The plaintiff commenced an action for negligence after a fire on the defendant's railway lands damaged its business.

The action was struck from the trial list due to outstanding undertakings and later administratively dismissed for delay after a motion judge refused to restore it.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in principle by focusing on allocating blame for the delay rather than whether the plaintiff's explanation was reasonable, and by presuming prejudice from the passage of time.

The Court reweighed the evidence, found the plaintiff's explanation acceptable and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant, and ordered the action restored to the trial list.

The appellant was seriously injured in a motor scooter accident and suffered brain injuries.

At trial, 16 years later, she provided a different account of the accident than in her statement of claim.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding she had not proven the respondent caused or contributed to the accident, relying in part on defence expert evidence regarding retrograde amnesia.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the expert evidence, assessing reliability, and applying the standard of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reliance on the expert evidence, assessment of reliability, or application of the balance of probabilities standard.

The defendants brought a motion to lift a stay imposed in 2001 pending determination of a right-to-sue application before the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal and sought dismissal of the action for delay.

The self-represented plaintiff requested that the stay continue while she pursued reconsideration or judicial review of the tribunal decision.

The court held that the stay should be lifted because the tribunal decision constituted a final determination and further proceedings should not delay the civil action.

However, despite the long history of delay, the court declined to dismiss the action, finding that the existing documentary record would permit a fair trial and that the defendants had consented to the stay and delayed bringing the motion.

The action was restored to the trial list with expedited pre-trial and trial dates.

The plaintiff moved to restore an action to the trial list after it had been struck due to outstanding undertakings and incomplete trial readiness requirements.

The court applied the test requiring a reasonable explanation for delay and absence of non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

Although some delay involved difficulties obtaining documents and funding an expert report, the court found the delay largely attributable to the plaintiff and not reasonably explained.

The court also accepted that the long passage of time since the underlying events raised concerns about fading witness recollection.

The motion to restore the action to the trial list was dismissed and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The applicant, a Muslim salesperson, alleged that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of creed by preventing him from attending Friday prayers, forcing him to work on Eid, and ultimately terminating his employment.

The Tribunal found that the respondent accommodated the religious practices of its Muslim employees and that the applicant's termination was based on poor sales performance, not his creed.

As the timely allegations regarding termination and post-termination commissions were dismissed on their merits, the remaining allegations were found to be out of time under section 34(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff insurer made payments to its insured for property damage and to a third party for bodily injuries following a motorcycle collision.

The insurer then sued its insured to recover both payments, alleging a breach of the insurance policy.

The insured brought a motion to strike the claim regarding the third-party payment.

The court granted the motion, finding that under the Insurance Act, an insurer cannot sue its insured for reimbursement of a third-party settlement without a prior judgment against the insured, an express reimbursement agreement, or an assignment of the third party's cause of action.