Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for malicious prosecution against the respondent.

The trial judge had applied the correct legal test from Miazga v. Kvello Estate, which requires proof of four elements: initiation of prosecution by the defendant, termination in the plaintiff's favour, absence of reasonable and probable cause, and malice.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on the second, third, and fourth elements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and that the appellant failed to discharge his evidentiary burden on the balance of probabilities.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that found she was a partner in a law firm rather than an employee.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the control and dependency test established in McCormick v. Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, holding that McCormick does not establish control and dependency as an all-purpose test for determining partnership status.

Instead, courts must examine all surrounding circumstances, the substance of the relationship, the behaviour of the parties, and their intentions.

The trial judge's findings of fact, which supported a partnership relationship, were available on the evidence and no palpable and overriding error was demonstrated.

The National Gallery of Canada retained Lafleur de la Capitale Inc. for landscaping and maintenance services and required Lafleur to add it as a named insured under its comprehensive general liability policy with Intact Insurance Company.

The Gallery was added as an additional insured only insofar as its legal liability arose vicariously out of Lafleur's operations.

When a Lafleur employee died while performing maintenance work at the Gallery's premises, two actions were commenced against the Gallery by the employee's spouse and family members.

The Gallery applied for a declaration that Intact had a duty to defend.

The application judge granted the application in brief reasons that failed to address exclusion clauses or the nature of the allegations in the statements of claim.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge's reasons inadequate and did not permit meaningful appellate review, allowing the appeal and remitting the application for a new hearing.

The appellants appealed orders of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing their motion to set aside a reinstated default judgment and authorizing the sale of their property to satisfy the judgment.

The original action was commenced in 2001 and resulted in a default judgment of approximately $86,000.

The judgment was subsequently set aside, then reinstated by Brown J. in 2008 on an ex parte basis.

The appellants moved to set aside the reinstatement, but the motion judge dismissed their motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts when appearing before Brown J. without notice to the appellants, which was a sufficient basis to set aside the judgment.

The appellants, Robert Bortolon and his former lawyer Robyrt Regan, appealed findings of civil contempt and custodial sentences of 90 days imprisonment.

The contempt arose from their breach of a court order (the Le May Order) requiring production of documents to the respondent bank.

The appellants had made a deal whereby Regan would deliver documents to Bortolon rather than make them available for inspection by the bank, in exchange for settlement of their personal dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals regarding the contempt findings but allowed the appeals regarding penalty, reducing the custodial sentences from 90 days to 45 days for each appellant.

The appellants were convicted of production of and possession for the purposes of trafficking in marijuana, and possession of proceeds of crime.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the police violated their Charter section 8 rights by obtaining energy consumption data from their electricity provider, Horizon Utilities, without consent or judicial authorization.

The appellants contended that this data was used to obtain a search warrant for their residence.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the energy consumption data, and that the police examination and use of that data without judicial authorization constituted a breach of section 8.

However, the court found that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the police had acted reasonably given the state of the law at the time, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits outweighed the Charter breach.

The appeal was dismissed.

RBC Dominion Securities and Royal Bank of Canada Europe sued Crew Gold Corporation for a Success Fee under an investment banking engagement letter.

The parties' dispute centered on whether RBC was entitled to a Success Fee following an unanticipated takeover of Crew by Severstal, in which RBC played no role.

The trial judge found that a causal link between RBC's services and the transaction was required for the Success Fee to be payable, and dismissed RBC's action.

On appeal, RBC argued the trial judge committed extricable errors of law in interpreting the Agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the Agreement contemplated RBC's involvement in the transaction process and that the Success Fee was meant to reward RBC for its success in completing a transaction through its financial advisory services.

A foster-to-adopt mother sought party status in child protection proceedings concerning a child placed in her care at seven months of age.

The child's biological parents' rights had been terminated, and the child protection society initially supported the foster-to-adopt mother's adoption plan but later changed course to support the paternal aunt's adoption plan.

The motion judge granted the foster-to-adopt mother party status.

The Divisional Court reversed, holding that foster parents should only be added as parties in exceptional circumstances and that the foster-to-adopt mother's existing participatory rights under the legislation were sufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, reinstating the motion judge's order granting party status, finding that the paramount consideration of the child's best interests supported the foster-to-adopt mother's involvement as a party.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that imposed a constructive trust over their properties, declared that Venanzio Pingue was not a shareholder of the respondent company, and removed him as an officer and director due to breach of fiduciary duties.

The trial judge found that Venanzio had misappropriated $592,671.43 from the company and never paid for his shares.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the parties' written agreements and in refusing to admit their expert report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement or her discretionary decision to exclude the late expert report.

The court also dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence and the motion for leave to appeal the costs order.

The accused was convicted of child luring by means of computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code after engaging in sexual conversations with a police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl on Craigslist.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of three provisions: the presumption of belief in section 172.1(3), the reasonable steps requirement in section 172.1(4), and the mandatory minimum one-year sentence in section 172.1(2)(a).

The trial judge found section 172.1(3) violated the presumption of innocence under section 11(d) of the Charter and was not justified under section 1.

The trial judge upheld section 172.1(4) as constitutional under section 7 of the Charter.

The trial judge found the mandatory minimum sentence grossly disproportionate under section 12 of the Charter and imposed 75 days intermittent incarceration instead.

Both the conviction appeal and Crown's sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellants, two insurance companies, appealed the summary dismissal of their action against respondents for breach of an alleged oral agreement and inducement of breach of contract.

The motion judge dismissed the action on the basis that the parties had agreed that no binding contractual relationship would exist without a signed written agreement (the "Precondition").

The Court of Appeal found this conclusion was a palpable and overriding error.

The evidence only supported that the parties intended to eventually document their agreement in writing, not that execution of a written contract was a precondition to legal obligations.

The court allowed the appeal against the Vancity respondents and directed the matter to trial, but dismissed the appeal against the Co-operators respondents on alternative grounds.

Members of Branch 1-7 of the Polish Alliance of Canada sought to withdraw from the organization and take with them a property held in trust for the branch members.

The trial judge found that 100% of the branch members had voted to leave and applied the "clubman's veto" doctrine, permitting them to depart with the property.

The Polish Alliance of Canada appealed, arguing that the clubman's veto did not apply because PAC was incorporated under the Corporations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the clubman's veto applied to the unincorporated branch and that there was no statutory displacement of the common law rule.

This appeal concerns a class action by General Motors of Canada Limited (GMCL) dealers against the law firm Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP for breach of fiduciary and contractual duties.

During the 2009 financial crisis, Cassels represented three potentially conflicting clients: the Saturn Dealers, Industry Canada (regarding GMCL bailout financing), and GMCL dealers generally regarding a potential restructuring or insolvency.

The trial judge found that Cassels breached its duties by failing to disclose the conflict of interest with Industry Canada to the dealers and by failing to provide proper advice regarding Wind-Down Agreements (WDAs) offered by GMCL.

The dealers lost the opportunity to negotiate collectively for better compensation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability findings but reduced the damages award from $45 million to approximately $41 million (subject to further calculation regarding class composition).

This appeal arises from the 2009 General Motors of Canada bailout and the termination of franchise dealerships.

The franchisor offered Wind-Down Agreements to 240 dealers, providing payment in exchange for comprehensive releases of all claims, including those under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The dealers were required to obtain independent legal advice before signing.

A class action was subsequently brought by terminated franchisees claiming breaches of statutory rights.

The trial judge found the releases valid under the Tutor Time exception to section 11 of the Wishart Act, as they constituted settlements of known and existing claims entered into with legal advice.

The trial judge also held that covenants not to sue and indemnity provisions were void for public policy reasons but were severable from the release.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the validity of the releases and the severance of the covenant not to sue.

The appellant was convicted of importing marijuana into Canada following a judge-alone trial.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on the grounds that the guilty verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in finding that the appellant's exculpatory statement to police was deliberately concocted.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by making a finding of concoction based solely on evidence that proved the statement false, without independent evidence of fabrication as required by R. v. O'Connor.

Although the court found sufficient evidence to support a conviction on other grounds, the error in law regarding the treatment of the exculpatory statement warranted a new trial.

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision that imposed concurrent victim surcharges on an offender convicted of two counts of theft under $5,000.

The central issue was whether sentencing judges have discretion to impose victim surcharges concurrently or whether surcharges must be imposed separately for each offence.

The Court of Appeal held that victim surcharges are imposed automatically by statute for each and every offence, and sentencing judges have no discretion to order concurrent surcharges.

The court distinguished surcharges from time-based sentences and fines, finding that the legislative history and statutory language clearly demonstrate Parliament's intent that surcharges be imposed for each conviction.

These consolidated appeals arise from related class actions certified in 2012 concerning bingo license and administration fees charged by two municipalities.

The appellants, charitable organizations, sought to amend their pleadings after the opt-out period expired to claim disgorgement of all allegedly illegal fees received by the municipalities, including those paid by persons who had opted out of the class.

The Court of Appeal quashed appeals of interlocutory orders lifting protective orders that had shielded the identities of opt-outs during a reconsideration period, and dismissed appeals of orders refusing leave to amend the statements of claim.

The court held that the proposed amendments would fundamentally alter the nature of the certified claims and lacked reasonable prospect of success.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violates sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellants were impoverished offenders with mental and physical disabilities, unemployment, and substance abuse issues.

The trial judges had refused to impose the surcharge, finding it unconstitutional.

The Crown appealed and the Superior Court judges overturned these decisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge, finding that while it engages the appellants' liberty interests, it does not violate section 7 because impoverished offenders cannot be imprisoned for non-payment (inability to pay is a reasonable excuse), extensions of time to pay are available, and the deprivation is not grossly disproportionate to the important objectives of the surcharge regime.

The court also found the surcharge does not violate section 12 of the Charter as it is not cruel and unusual treatment, being disproportionate but not grossly disproportionate.

A unionized Crown employee appealed the dismissal of his claim arising from his employment termination in 2014.

The employee pleaded conspiracy to injure, unlawful means conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, abuse of process, defamatory libel, and slander against the Crown and several Crown managers.

The motion judge dismissed the claim under Rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that the essential nature of the claim arose out of the collective agreement and therefore fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Grievance Settlement Board.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the legal test or characterization of the pleadings.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment that found a binding agreement for the purchase and sale of their Brampton home and ordered specific performance.

The appellants argued the application judge erred in concluding there were no material facts in dispute, that the respondents' offer was null and void, and that there was no evidence supporting a finding of counteroffer.

The Court of Appeal rejected all arguments, finding that the appellants' signing and returning of the offer, combined with subsequent conduct consistent with a binding agreement (accepting a deposit cheque and restricting home revisits to those permitted by the offer terms), established a binding contract.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.