Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant did not attend for argument of the appeal and advised the respondents' counsel that she would not be attending.

The appellant was self-represented, having filed a Notice of Intention to Act in person.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned, and the respondents were awarded costs in the amount of $9,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking following a search of his residence conducted pursuant to a warrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The warrant did not specify a date for execution but authorized entry "at any time." The appellant appealed, arguing the warrant was invalid because it failed to specify an execution date, rendering the search a violation of Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while the warrant did not expressly state an execution date, an execution date could be implied from the date of issuance.

The court rejected the appellant's characterization of the warrant as expressly non-expiring and held that the absence of an express date was a technical fault that did not invalidate the warrant.

The appellant tenant appealed an order quashing its appeal from an arbitration award determining fair market rental under a 99-year ground lease.

The central issue was whether the parties' appeal rights were limited to questions of law with leave, as provided in the Arbitration Act, 1991, or whether broader appeal rights existed under the original Lease provisions referencing the Arbitrations Act, R.S.O. 1970.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the Arbitration Agreement was a stand-alone agreement governing appeal rights and that the parties' appeal rights were limited to questions of law with leave under the 1991 Act.

The appellants, operators of hookah lounges in Toronto, challenged the validity of City of Toronto By-Law 1331-2015, which prohibits the use of hookah devices in licensed premises.

The application judge upheld the by-law as a valid exercise of municipal authority to protect public health and safety.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: (1) that the by-law's true purpose was to prohibit hookah lounges rather than protect health; (2) that the by-law impermissibly infringed property and civil rights; and (3) that the by-law conflicted with the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the by-law's purpose was clearly the protection of public health and safety, that any economic impact was incidental rather than determinative of purpose, that the by-law was not confiscatory, and that it did not conflict with provincial occupational health and safety legislation.

The appellant Allto Construction Services Ltd. appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim for $163,202.98 owed under a subcontract to install a sewage system for a pool construction project.

The respondent Aplus General Contractor Inc. denied owing the amount and asserted a counterclaim for damages to an irrigation system and overbilling.

The trial judge dismissed both the claim and counterclaim, finding that Allto failed to prove the amount owed through invoices or accounting.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle.

The court held that Allto's oral evidence of non-payment, combined with Aplus's admission of the contract and performance of work without deficiencies, was sufficient to establish the outstanding claim without requiring further documentary proof.

The respondent's counterclaim for irrigation system damage was rejected as unreliable and unsupported.

The applicant sought to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of his appeal for delay and requested a 30-day extension of time to perfect his appeal from Superior Court orders dated June 11 and August 7, 2013.

Justice Cronk dismissed the motion and granted the respondent's cross-motion prohibiting the applicant from bringing further motions in the proceeding, except for a motion to a full panel to review Cronk J.A.'s decision.

This panel decision confirms Cronk J.A.'s order, finding no merit to the applicant's submissions regarding lack of competent jurisdiction or denial of due process.

Motions for leave to appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing a motion to require Algoma to resume payments under a Cargo Handling Agreement in the context of CCAA proceedings.

The applicants sought to invoke section 11.01(a) of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to compel payment for post-filing services.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion three times on the same legal grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave motions, finding no prima facie merit due to issue estoppel and no significance to the practice, as the issues were specific to the unique agreements underlying the Port Transaction.

An appellant appealed a disposition decision of the Ontario Review Board dated June 7, 2016, which declined to modify the conditions of his detention order to provide broader community access privileges.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for second degree murder and was detained at a mental health facility.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the Board failed to consider readily available and relevant information from the original NCR hearing; and second, that the disposition was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable and that the NCR hearing information was not material to the narrow issue before the Board regarding whether the appellant's risk could be managed through modified detention terms.

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court decision upholding a trial judgment in a matrimonial case.

The trial judge had imposed a restraining order, prohibited the appellant from initiating further court proceedings without leave, awarded costs of $52,899.32 to the respondent, and the appellant alleged judicial bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions were appropriate and designed to clarify evidence and maintain trial control in a high-conflict case involving a self-represented litigant.

The restraining order was justified by findings of persistent abusive behaviour and threatening communications.

The prohibition on further proceedings was grounded in the litigation history and the appellant's admitted future litigious intentions.

The costs award was properly reasoned and not plainly wrong.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking offences and firearm-related offences, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the application judge's Charter ruling regarding the sufficiency of the information to obtain for a search warrant and the application of s. 24(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the application judge's analysis.

On the sentence appeal, the Court granted leave and allowed the appeal in part, reducing the sentence for the s. 86(1) firearm offence from two years to one year imprisonment concurrent, as the original sentence exceeded the statutory maximum for a first offender.

The Court upheld the trial judge's characterization of the appellant as a mid-level drug dealer based on the evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence for break and enter to commit theft and break and enter with intent.

He had pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence with two years' probation, with pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5:1 (198 days from 132 days).

The enhanced credit resulted in a custodial sentence exceeding 180 days, triggering mandatory deportation as a convention refugee and barring him from appealing the deportation order.

Fresh evidence on appeal demonstrated that trial counsel failed to appreciate the immigration consequences of the enhanced credit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on consent of the Crown and reduced the pre-sentence custody credit by 19 days to 179 days, thereby avoiding the immigration consequences.

The estate of a deceased tenant brought an action in Superior Court for $500,000 in damages for injuries suffered when the deceased allegedly slipped and fell over a damaged carpet in a residential rental unit.

The motion judge dismissed the action, concluding the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the claim fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Landlord and Tenant Board and was outside the one-year limitation period prescribed under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act does not grant the board exclusive jurisdiction over all claims of non-repair.

Where damages exceed the board's monetary jurisdiction, a party may commence proceedings in Superior Court.

Additionally, the one-year limitation period for board applications does not apply to Superior Court actions for non-repair; instead, the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applies.

The appellant was convicted of unlawfully importing cocaine into Canada contrary to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed on two grounds: that the trial judge failed to address his defence meaningfully and failed to undertake proper analysis under the third step of the R. v. W.(D.) inquiry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the defence theory that the appellant was an unwitting "blind mule" and properly applied the reasonable doubt standard.

The evidence established that cocaine was found in the appellant's luggage, and the only live issue was knowledge.

The trial judge rejected the defence assertion that unknown baggage handlers planted the drugs, finding it speculative and unsupported by evidence.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice referring his solicitor's account dated February 28, 2016 for assessment under the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the order was interlocutory rather than final in nature.

The order concerned a preliminary procedural matter directing referral for assessment, not the substantive determination of the account's quantum.

The appellant retained the right to defend the quantum of his account during the assessment process.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

This appeal concerns whether a partial stay of proceedings should be granted in favour of arbitration in a class action involving both consumer and non-consumer claims against TELUS Mobility for alleged undisclosed billing practices (rounding up calls to the next minute).

The appellants argued that the motions judge erred in refusing to stay the non-consumer claims pursuant to section 7(5) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The appellants contended that the Court of Appeal's decision in Griffin v. Dell Canada Inc. had been overtaken by the Supreme Court's decision in Seidel v. TELUS Communications Inc. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Griffin remains binding authority in Ontario and has not been overtaken by Seidel, as the two cases were decided in materially different legislative contexts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, and sought leave to appeal his sentence of five years' imprisonment less nine months' credit for restrictive bail conditions.

The appeal raised four grounds challenging the trial judge's disposition of a Garofoli application regarding the legality of a search warrant: whether the ITO established reasonable and probable grounds for a firearm offence, whether the trial judge erred in refusing leave to cross-examine the ITO affiant, whether the conditions for a telewarrant were satisfied, and whether the CI's information was sufficiently corroborated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment concerning contract interpretation.

The trial judge found that the appellant had confirmed agreement with the respondent regarding a new termination date and tail period for the contract, and that this agreement, along with the respondent's emails, satisfied the requirements of clause 10 of the contract.

The trial judge also found that the appellant's March 1, 2002 letter was consistent with a telephone call of February 21, 2002, in which it was agreed that the appellant would send a new cut-off date by letter.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant failed to identify any extricable errors of law and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its action for breach of a licensing agreement and patent infringement.

The trial judge found that the respondent's accused products did not infringe the appellant's U.S. patent for a self-ligating orthodontic bracket because the accused products' locking shutter moved primarily through rotation rather than the purely sliding motion required by the patent claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no error in the trial judge's construction of the patent claims within the context of the specification.

The court also upheld the costs award against the appellant.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his action due to failure to pay security for costs.

The motion judge had dismissed the appellant's cross-motion to vary the security order and subsequently dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge correctly determined it was inappropriate to revisit the security for costs order or circumvent it after appeal rights had been exhausted.

The court found no error in principle and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellants (Mastron entities) appealed a motion judge's order that refused to dismiss third and fourth party claims and granted leave nunc pro tunc to Genivar to issue its fourth party claim.

The motion judge held that an order by Hackland J. dated December 10, 2013 was intended to continue the proceedings under the ordinary track rather than under the Construction Lien Act.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in granting leave nunc pro tunc because the two-year limitation period for commencement of the fourth party claim had expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly interpreted Hackland J.'s order as continuing the action on the ordinary track, since the third party claim included claims for breach of contract and negligence in addition to contribution and indemnity, which could only proceed under the ordinary track.