Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed her conviction for fraud and forgery on two grounds: (1) that the verdict was unreasonable, and (2) that the Crown had the burden to disprove the defence of complicity by the complainant once an air of reality was raised.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment and his treatment of the complainant's evidence.

The trial judge was entitled to accept only part of the witness's testimony and gave clear reasons for his conclusions.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal her sentence based on delay in proceedings, but this was dismissed as the trial judge had properly considered the delay argument and noted it would be relevant at parole eligibility review.

The appellant was convicted of several offences involving the possession of a firearm and a dangerous weapon following a trial by judge and jury.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the validity of search warrants obtained under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Criminal Code, which were based on information from a confidential informant, police database checks, and surveillance.

The Crown conceded that the redacted information affidavit could not support the warrants and sought review of the unredacted affidavit under step six of the Garofoli procedure.

The application judge dismissed the section 8 Charter application and admitted the evidence.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: first, that he was not permitted to challenge the sub-facial validity of the redacted portions of the information to obtain; and second, that amicus curiae should have been appointed during the ex parte process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was permitted to make a sub-facial challenge and that the judicial summary provided a meaningful basis to challenge the reliability of the confidential informant's information.

The court also held that the appointment of amicus curiae is discretionary and exceptional, not a constitutional necessity.

Appellants J.V. and M.V., maternal grandparents of a child apprehended at birth, appealed from a Superior Court decision dismissing their appeal of a trial judgment declaring the child a Crown ward without access.

The child had been in continuous foster care since ten months of age with prospective adoptive parents.

The appellants sought to have the child placed in their care, but the trial judge found their plan was not in the child's best interests due to concerns including the biological mother's permanent disability (Alcohol Related Neurodevelopmental Disorder), unresolved conflict between the biological mother and the appellants, and the lack of permanence in their proposed arrangement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Crown wardship order, finding the trial judge's decision was soundly based on evidence and that the child's need for permanence and stability outweighed the appellants' desire to parent.

The court considered whether a superior court has jurisdiction to order costs against a non-party beyond the traditional "person of straw" scenario.

The respondent Azzopardi caused his company (131) to commence an action against the appellant for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from alleged tax consulting services.

The trial judge dismissed both actions and refused to award costs against Azzopardi personally, finding that 131 was not a person of straw put forward to shield Azzopardi from costs liability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that courts have inherent jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties who commit abuse of process, separate from and broader than the statutory "person of straw" test.

The court found that Azzopardi's conduct in bringing a fictitious action through a nominal plaintiff constituted an abuse of process warranting a costs award against him personally.

The appellants were convicted of possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a jury trial.

They appealed on four grounds: (1) breach of s. 11(b) Charter rights to trial within a reasonable time; (2) erroneous admission of expert opinion evidence from a police officer involved in the investigation; (3) an unreasonable Corbett ruling excluding certain prior convictions; and (4) unfairness in the trial judge's charge to the jury regarding the defence witness.

The Court of Appeal rejected the s. 11(b) argument but found merit in the other three grounds, concluding that the cumulative effect of these errors denied the appellants a fair trial.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court refusing to enjoin the sale of a development property under power of sale.

The appellants sought to have the court find that the property was sold in bad faith and for an undervalue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was not open to the court to grant the relief sought as the appeal was from the order, not the findings of the application judge.

The court noted that the appellants could pursue an improvident sale action, which had been expressly left open by the application judge.

The court upheld the costs award to the respondent.

The appellant appealed from a Superior Court order dismissing his appeal of a contempt finding by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The contempt was based on the appellant's failure to comply with an access order granting the respondent mother access to the children on two consecutive occasions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding and the $10,000 costs award, but set aside a provision requiring the appellant to cooperate with counselling involving the respondent's partner, who was subject to a 500-metre restraining order.

The Court found it was an error of law to order counselling involving the restrained party while maintaining the restraining order.

An appeal by solicitors regarding the approval of contingency fee agreements in an infant settlement involving both a tort claim and an accident benefits claim arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The motion judge approved the contingency fee agreement for the tort claim but reduced the fees for the accident benefits claim, and declined to award GST/HST.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to consider the two claims separately and to reduce the accident benefits fees based on the lower risk and complexity of that claim compared to the tort claim.

However, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in not awarding GST/HST on the approved fees, as the contingency fee agreement explicitly provided for such taxes in addition to the fee amount.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed all outstanding motions brought by the appellant in a matter that originated as a Small Claims Court action for professional negligence in dental treatment.

The appellant had persistently brought multiple motions and proceedings before various courts over several years, repeatedly failing to comply with procedural requirements and time limits.

The court found that the appellant's conduct constituted a frivolous, vexatious abuse of process and imposed restrictions on future filings, requiring leave of court and proof of service on respondent's counsel, as well as satisfaction of outstanding costs orders totalling $3,500.00.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of Karina Neff.

He did not deny killing the deceased but claimed he lacked the mens rea for murder and was therefore guilty of manslaughter.

The appeal raised two issues: (1) whether the trial judge erred in admitting a video-recorded statement of a witness with a disability under section 715.2 of the Criminal Code when the witness could not confirm the truth of the statement from present recollection; and (2) whether the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for mistrial after the Crown made prejudicial remarks in closing address regarding the defence's expert evidence and the issue of intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the adoption test under section 715.2 is the same as under section 715.1 and does not require present recollection, and that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing a mistrial and addressing any prejudice through corrective jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a young woman (A.Y.) and sentenced to two years less one day.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on the ground that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's prior consistent statement—an anonymous email sent to police the morning after the alleged assault—as corroboration of her trial testimony.

The trial judge had explicitly stated that the email was "corroboration of her evidence." The Court of Appeal held that while the email was admissible for limited purposes (to rebut the defence theory regarding motive and to assess the complainant's credibility through her conduct), it could not be used as corroboration in the legal sense because it was not from an independent source and could not confirm the veracity of the complainant's testimony unless improperly used for the truth of its contents or by treating consistency as confirmatory.

The court found the trial judge erred in law and allowed the appeal, quashing the conviction and ordering a new trial.

The appellant was detained awaiting trial on charges under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act for advising on immigration matters without authorization.

She appealed the denial of habeas corpus relief by the Superior Court.

The Crown preferred a direct indictment on all charges, and the original charges were stayed.

The Court of Appeal addressed four issues: the validity of the preferred indictment, the continued validity of the detention order, the statutory authority for arrest, and the duration of pre-trial custody compared to potential sentence.

The court found no defect in the direct indictment under current Criminal Code provisions, confirmed the detention order continues to apply to the new indictment, and determined that the duration of pre-trial custody issue was best addressed through a bail review rather than habeas corpus.

The court set aside the application judge's decision for inadequate reasons and ordered a new bail review hearing.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 12 years imprisonment following his guilty plea to counselling to commit murder and criminal harassment of his estranged wife.

The appellant also challenged a non-communication order imposed under s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code that prevented him from communicating with his minor son while incarcerated.

The Court of Appeal upheld both the sentence and the non-communication order, finding the 12-year sentence was within the appropriate range given the aggravating circumstances and that the trial judge was entitled to impose the communication restriction for safety protection reasons.

The appellant was charged with several offences following execution of a search warrant at a residence that uncovered a marijuana grow-operation and a handgun.

At trial, the appellant challenged the validity of the search warrant under a sub-facial analysis, arguing that the information to obtain contained erroneous information and that police conduct in seeking the warrant was subversive of the pre-authorization process.

The trial judge found the warrant was valid after excising improper portions of the information to obtain, and declined to exercise a residual discretion to quash the warrant despite identifying deficiencies in the affiant's conduct.

The appellant was convicted and appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in applying a "clearest of cases" standard rather than a lower threshold for setting aside a valid warrant based on subversion of the pre-authorization process.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's decision to strike paragraph 25 of their statement of claim, which alleged that the respondent West Face distributed a defamatory report to unnamed third parties whose identities were known to West Face.

The appellants had already established a prima facie case of defamation by alleging publication to named persons at a specified time and place.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in striking the paragraph, finding that the appellants had demonstrated they were proceeding in good faith with a prima facie case and were not on a fishing expedition.

The court allowed the appeal and set aside the order striking paragraph 25.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to facilitate terrorist activity and participation in the activities of a terrorist group, and acquitted of possessing explosive substances with intent to endanger life in association with a terrorist group.

He was sentenced to a global sentence of 12 years imprisonment (5 years for conspiracy, 7 years consecutive for participation in terrorist group activities).

The Crown appealed seeking a 20-year sentence and delayed parole eligibility.

The appellant cross-appealed seeking a 5-8 year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the gravity of the offences, application of sentencing principles including parity and totality, treatment of mitigating factors including rehabilitation and remorse, and determination of parole eligibility.

The moving party sought to review a decision of Justice Brown of the Court of Appeal dated November 24, 2015, which dismissed his motion for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal from a May 20, 2014 order of the Superior Court of Justice in a matrimonial case.

The moving party also requested an adjournment on grounds of illness and inability to obtain counsel.

The panel denied the adjournment request due to lack of proper medical evidence, unconfirmed legal aid status, and unexplained delay in bringing the review motion.

On the merits, the panel found no basis to interfere with the original decision, as Justice Brown had properly applied the governing legal principles, reviewed the evidentiary record, and reached a reasonable conclusion.

The review motion was dismissed, and costs of $1,000 were awarded to the respondent.

Conviction appeal from a judge-alone trial for break and enter and robbery.

The sole issue was identification.

The appellant was identified by two witnesses who knew him as "Mack Truck" from a social group.

The witnesses identified him despite being masked and partially obscured during the incident.

The trial judge accepted the identification evidence based on recognition rather than identification of a stranger, and rejected the appellant's denial and his co-accused's claim of amnesia.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly considered the frailties of identification evidence while recognizing that recognition evidence by acquainted witnesses carries different considerations than stranger identification.

The appellant appealed the summary dismissal of a medical malpractice action arising from the death of his common law spouse from terminal brain cancer.

The appellant alleged that the defendant physicians breached the standard of care by terminating the drug dexamethasone without tapering and by failing to obtain informed consent.

The motion judge dismissed the action after finding that the appellant's expert evidence was insufficient to establish a genuine issue requiring trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the appellant failed to provide qualified expert evidence on standard of care and causation, and that the evidence supported informed consent had been obtained.

The plaintiff was seriously injured when attacked by a rival gang member in a provincial jail.

The plaintiff sued Ontario and others, alleging that a correctional officer was negligent in placing the plaintiff and the assailant in the same unit despite the jail's policy of separating members of the same gang.

The trial judge found for the plaintiff.

On appeal, Ontario argued that the policy negated any duty of care and that the trial judge erred in applying the standard of care and finding causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the policy did not negate the common law duty of care, that the correctional officer breached the standard of care by failing to consider inmate incompatibility, and that the negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries.