Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to find the respondent in civil contempt for failing to comply with multiple court orders requiring financial disclosure and an accounting in aid of execution of a $3.5 million judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to properly apply the three-part test for civil contempt from Carey v. Laiken, erred by treating the self-represented respondent's unsworn oral submissions as evidence without allowing cross-examination, and erred by discharging the respondent from his obligations under prior orders without such relief being requested.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for determination by a different judge.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance after police found him with crack cocaine in a bathroom of an apartment.

He appealed the convictions, arguing that the police violated his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) by unlawfully entering the apartment and detaining him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the appellant lacked standing to assert a section 8 claim as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment, and that his brief detention and subsequent arrest did not violate his section 9 or 10 rights.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant, brought a motion to vary an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal.

The single judge had declined to direct the issuance of a notice of appeal, grant a declaration regarding a previous order, and consolidate appeals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to vary, finding that the moving party failed to identify any sustainable legal basis to interfere with the order and had brought the motion without leave, contrary to a previous order.

The appellant appealed his convictions related to a drive-by shooting, arguing that the trial judge's factual findings were unreasonable.

Specifically, he challenged the findings that the stolen vehicle apprehended in a church parking lot was the same vehicle involved in the shooting, and that he was in the vehicle during the incident, citing differing evidence on the number of occupants and insufficient fingerprint and saliva evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge reasonably relied on a constellation of direct and circumstantial evidence to support his conclusions and eliminate alternative inferences.

The appellant's property was sold in a municipal tax sale, resulting in a surplus of over $76,000 which was paid into court.

The appellant missed the one-year statutory deadline to apply for payment out of court by three weeks, resulting in a deemed forfeiture of the funds to the municipality under s. 380(6) of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The application judge held he lacked jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act provides jurisdiction to grant relief from the deemed forfeiture, as the statutory scheme does not expressly or implicitly preclude it.

The court granted relief from forfeiture and ordered the surplus paid to the appellant.

The self-represented appellant, who is subject to the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board, brought a motion to review a single judge's order refusing his request to adjourn his appeal hearing.

The appellant argued the single judge misapprehended facts and considered irrelevant factors, and claimed he could not prepare his factum due to poisonous gas being injected into his condominium.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no basis to interfere with the single judge's decision.

The court noted the statutory obligation to hear such appeals as soon as practicable and that the appellant was not required to file a factum.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving his former common-law stepson, as well as assault and breach of recognizance.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, specifically regarding inconsistencies, motive to fabricate, collusion, and implausibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or application of the burden of proof, concluding that the trial judge adequately addressed the defence's arguments and properly applied the W.(D.) framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to change a final custody order that had granted him sole custody of his two sons and required them to attend a reunification program.

The younger son had repeatedly run away and refused to live with the appellant or attend the program.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the son's extreme resistance constituted a material change in circumstances and that it was no longer in his best interests to enforce the custody order.

The court also dismissed the son's cross-appeal seeking a declaration that he had withdrawn from parental control, finding the motion judge's order that no person had custody or access rights over him was sufficient.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their claims as statute-barred and granted the respondents' counterclaim for the amount outstanding under a mortgage.

The self-represented appellant requested an adjournment to obtain counsel, which the Court of Appeal refused due to a history of delay.

The Court found no reviewable error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the trial judge's preference for the respondents' evidence or the calculation of the mortgage debt based on an expert report.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her detention in a hospital.

The appellant argued the Board's finding that she posed a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and that her risk could be managed in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant's history of violence, mental illness, substance abuse, and noncompliance with medication and court orders.

The Court relied on expert evidence that the appellant continued to suffer from a significant mental illness and lacked community support, justifying the detention order.

The appellant appealed a judgment declaring valid a continuing power of attorney for property executed by his father in favour of the respondent, and the dismissal of a motion to consolidate the respondent's application with pending proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred by treating the respondent's application as separate from the pending proceedings, which involved the same parties and raised identical issues of undue influence and suspicious circumstances.

The appeal was allowed, the application judge's decision was set aside, and the application was converted to an action and consolidated with the pending proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession of child pornography.

He argued that his inculpatory statement to the police was involuntary due to an unrecorded period at the station and his utterances regarding bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the statement was voluntary and not induced by police promises.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had appropriately considered the appellant's strict pre-trial bail conditions as a mitigating factor.

The appellant, a bank employee, pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 after disclosing clients' personal financial information to fraudsters, causing significant losses.

He appealed his sentence of two years less a day and a DNA order, seeking a conditional sentence or a reduction to 18 months.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly weighed mitigating factors, gave sufficient reasons, and appropriately prioritized general deterrence and denunciation for a large-scale fraud involving breach of trust.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault after engaging in sexual intercourse with the sleeping complainant.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in her credibility analysis, misapplied the W.(D.) framework, and misinterpreted forensic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility analysis was reasonable, she properly applied W.(D.) without shifting the burden of proof, and the forensic evidence was neutral.

The 30-month sentence was upheld as fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug offence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and made inconsistent findings of fact regarding his head injury when assessing his credibility.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant knew a package he received contained cocaine.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehension of evidence and no inconsistency between the trial judge's reasons for judgment and reasons for sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing that the trial judge's questioning of him at the end of his evidence rendered the trial unfair and that the trial judge erred in assessing a witness's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's questions were primarily for amplification and did not impair the fairness of the trial.

The Court also deferred to the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the witness, concluding they were fully supported by the record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple firearms offences, including weapons trafficking.

The Court of Appeal held that agreeing to purchase a firearm does not constitute a 'transfer' under s. 99 of the Criminal Code, quashing that conviction.

The Court also applied the Kienapple principle to stay three of the remaining five convictions, finding they arose from the same transaction and constituted a single criminal wrong.

The appellant's total sentence was reduced by three years.

The appellant, a commercial truck driver, appealed his conviction for criminal negligence causing death and his sentence of five years' imprisonment and a fifteen-year driving prohibition.

The appellant had fallen asleep at the wheel, drifted into oncoming traffic, and caused a fatal head-on collision after falsifying his driving logs to avoid rest obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the elements of the offence and the distinction from dangerous driving causing death.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's deliberate disregard for safety rules and the need for specific deterrence.

The appellant tenant commenced an application for a declaration of a valid lease after the respondent landlord terminated the tenancy and took possession of the premises.

Three years later, the appellant moved to direct a trial of the issues and amend its pleadings to claim damages for wrongful termination and loss of inventory.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the proposed amendments raised new causes of action that were statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the proposed damages claim was an alternative remedy arising from the same factual nexus originally pleaded in the application and supporting affidavit, and therefore did not constitute a new cause of action.

The appellant was convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He appealed the conviction, arguing his arrest was unlawful, evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

He also appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding there were objective grounds for the arrest based on the totality of circumstances, including a confidential informant tip and police surveillance.

The court also upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis and found no error in the assessment of evidence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the four-year term was fit and within the appropriate range.