Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

Appeal from trial judgment in matrimonial proceedings concerning ownership of property.

The trial judge found that the appellant's 50% interest in Knapton Farms Ltd. (a corporation holding farm property) and 100% interest in lot 8 (adjoining land) were beneficially owned by the respondent through resulting trust.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge correctly applied resulting trust principles to the Knapton shares but erred regarding lot 8.

The court held that the initial 1994 transfer of lot 8 to the parties as joint owners created a presumption of joint beneficial ownership under the Family Law Act, which the respondent failed to rebut.

However, the court upheld the resulting trust finding regarding the 1996 transfer of the respondent's half-interest to the appellant.

The court also corrected the valuation of farm real estate and addressed equalization, occupation rent, and pre-judgment interest issues.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order enforcing a settlement agreement between the parties.

The motion judge found that the parties had agreed to material settlement terms, including a payment of $850,000 from the respondent to the appellant, the filing of a proposal to creditors under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, dismissal of actions without costs, mutual releases, and confidentiality.

The appellant challenged the inclusion of the proposal requirement and the payment into court mechanism.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no extricable errors of law and dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable with respect to treatment with psychotropic medication.

The Board had limited the appellant's cross-examination regarding the side effects of Clozapine, ruling it irrelevant because the respondent physician had stated he intended only to administer Abilify (Aripiprazole), not Clozapine.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, amending the Board's order to narrow the scope of authorized treatment to specifically "Aripiprazole" rather than all psychotropic medications, thereby curing the procedural fairness concern without requiring a new hearing.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Kenneth Mark.

The Crown's theory was that the killing was retaliatory in nature, motivated by the victim's breach of the code of silence by identifying the appellant in connection with a prior attempted murder.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: (1) the admissibility of evidence regarding the prior attempted murder and the victim's fear of retaliation; (2) the admissibility of rap lyrics authored by the appellant; and (3) errors in the Crown's closing address regarding the appellant's late disclosure of an alibi and the false testimony of Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and affirmed the conviction.

The appellant, a numbered company controlled by Ali Karimi, appealed a motion judge's decision to stay civil proceedings for abuse of process.

The civil actions sought damages for alleged theft against the respondents.

The respondents had previously been victims in a 2011 criminal trial where Karimi was convicted of extortion and criminal harassment based on false theft allegations against them.

The motion judge found that permitting the civil actions to proceed would constitute an abuse of process, as it would allow Karimi to continue the persecution for which he had been criminally convicted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the stay, finding that the motion judge properly applied the abuse of process doctrine and that it was open to conclude the jury implicitly found no theft had occurred.

The appellant was charged with violations of the Building Code Act for failing to comply with six orders to comply issued in 2013.

At trial, the appellant sought disclosure of prior charges and prosecutions, including orders to comply issued in 1995 and 1996 that had resulted in withdrawn charges.

The justice of the peace granted the disclosure order.

The respondent municipality applied for certiorari to quash the disclosure order.

The Superior Court granted certiorari, finding the earlier orders were distinct due to different compliance deadlines.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred by failing to apply the substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice test and by prematurely determining the relevance issue mid-trial.

The respondent, Krates Keswick Inc., purchased and took assignments of three loans made to the appellants and related companies.

The motion judge granted judgment against the appellants on all three loans, granted possession of the Marko Lands to the respondent, dismissed the appellants' counterclaim, and refused to stay enforcement of the judgment.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the motion judge's decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment on all three loans and the dismissal of the counterclaim.

However, the court partially allowed the appeal by staying enforcement of the judgment relating to the two secured loans pending determination of what credit, if any, the appellants might be entitled to based on the value of the Marko Lands, which had been subject to a resulting trust determination in subsequent proceedings.

Enforcement of the unsecured loan was not stayed.

Appeal from a trial judge's order resolving custody, access, support, and equalization issues following an 11-day trial.

The appellant challenged four issues: the award of sole custody to the respondent, the failure to apply the maximum contact principle, the equalization award regarding the valuation of a business interest, and the costs award.

The appellate court upheld the trial judge's findings on all issues, finding no reversible error and affirming the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding custody arrangements and financial matters.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement.

The respondents had commenced an action claiming specific performance of an agreement to purchase shares and damages for misrepresentation, alleging they had invested $283,500 to purchase shares that were never delivered.

The appellants made a written settlement offer on September 9, 2016 for $428,537.

The respondents countered on October 5, 2016 with an offer for $900,000.

On November 23, 2016, the appellants' solicitor wrote indicating the shares had been registered in the respondents' names.

On December 22, 2016, the respondents accepted the September 9, 2016 offer.

The motion judge found a settlement had been reached and enforced it.

The appellants appealed, arguing enforcement would result in double recovery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellants failed to lead evidence establishing double recovery.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to order his surrender to the United States of America pursuant to the Extradition Act.

The applicant, a Mohawk of Akwesasne with Aboriginal heritage, argued that the Minister failed to give proper consideration to Gladue principles and his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Minister's decision, finding that she had properly considered all relevant factors, including the applicant's Aboriginal background and Gladue principles, and that the applicant's circumstances were distinguishable from prior cases.

The court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found the Minister's decision fell within a range of acceptable outcomes.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for impaired driving from the Superior Court's dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the proposed appeal and dismissed the application for leave to appeal.

The court determined that the case had no significance for the general administration of justice and denied the request for costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction on various drug offences, challenging the validity of a search warrant on the grounds that material misstatements and omissions were made in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The appellant contended that the warrant breached his Charter rights under section 8.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the omissions and alleged misrepresentations were not material to the issuance of the warrant and that a reasonable inference could be drawn that drugs would be found at the residence based on police observations and evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug-related offences, challenging the trial judge's assessment of eyewitness identification evidence and the lawfulness of police entry into his home.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the evidence was not based solely on eyewitness identification but rather on a combination of circumstantial evidence and observations by experienced police officers conducting surveillance.

The court also found that exigent circumstances justified the initial police entry to prevent destruction of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference of a 14-year-old complainant.

The Crown sought leave to appeal the sentence.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on the complainant's allegation of intercourse on multiple occasions, despite both the appellant and complainant initially denying sexual contact when discovered spooning on the appellant's bed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the conviction appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's reasons were infected by impermissible reliance on evidence of bad parenting, which was used to characterize the appellant as the type of person likely to commit the alleged offence.

This is a motion to vary the Court of Appeal's decision in a solicitor's negligence case.

The moving party sought to clarify the trial judge's discretion regarding the final quantification of damages and the process for calculating the damages award, subject to a ceiling of $36.9 million.

The respondent opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party could not bring itself within the applicable rules permitting reconsideration of appellate decisions, and that it was not in the interests of justice to invoke the court's narrow jurisdiction to reconsider.

The appellant appealed her conviction from the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to make more detailed inquiries into the appellant's mental status while she was testifying.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the trial judge had made sufficient inquiries, the appellant had confirmed she was able to continue and had no difficulty with her memory, and defence counsel did not pursue the issue at trial.

No fresh evidence was produced to support the appellant's claim that her mental status would have interfered with her ability to testify.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed two decisions granting habeas corpus relief to an individual detained on account of an outstanding deportation order.

The applicant had been detained for approximately 25 months on immigration grounds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision to release the applicant on habeas corpus, finding that the detention was lengthy and of uncertain duration and could no longer be justified as furthering the machinery of immigration control.

However, the Court found that the application judge erred by assuming jurisdiction to supervise any subsequent re-incarceration by immigration authorities.

The Court struck the problematic supervisory clause and provided guidance on appropriate conditions for release in immigration detention cases.

The appellant challenged the validity of a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued under the Mental Health Act on the grounds that not all participants in the Community Treatment Plan (CTP) signed it within 72 hours of the medical examination.

The Consent and Capacity Board found the CTO valid, holding that only the examining physician was required to sign within the 72-hour period.

The Superior Court appeal judge reversed, finding that all participants must sign within 72 hours.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 72-hour requirement applies only to the examining physician's entry into the CTP, not to other service providers who indicate their agreement to the plan.

A neighbour who provided assistance to an elderly woman for nearly 15 years sought to enforce a $100,000 cheque given to him by the woman shortly before her death.

The woman had also made a bequest of $100,000 to the neighbour in her will.

The cheque was returned by the bank due to insufficient funds in the account, and the woman died before the shortfall could be remedied.

The court held that a gift by cheque is not complete until the cheque is cashed or has cleared.

Since the woman lacked sufficient funds in her account and died before the cheque could be presented for payment, the gift failed for lack of delivery.

The court also rejected arguments based on the Bills of Exchange Act, estoppel by convention, and equitable principles.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The conviction was based on the appellant's assault of a bar patron with a pool cue, causing serious and permanent injuries.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's acceptance of the bar owner's identification evidence and the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant admitted to the assault.

The appellant also challenged the dangerous offender designation, arguing that the two incidents relied upon did not constitute a sufficient pattern of repetitive or persistent aggressive behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's findings of fact or application of law.