Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

Three appellants challenged mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for unauthorized production of marijuana under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act as violating s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (cruel and unusual punishment).

The Court of Appeal found that certain mandatory minimum provisions were grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonably foreseeable circumstances, including cases involving minimal involvement, mistaken licensees, and situations lacking culpability regarding statutory aggravating factors.

The court struck down provisions imposing two and three-year mandatory minimums for production of more than 500 plants and the statutory aggravating factor provision.

The court reduced one appellant's sentence and dismissed appeals in the other cases.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing death after a head-on collision on Highway 17 that killed the other driver.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of expert opinion evidence from a police accident reconstruction officer, arguing the evidence was tainted by bias and that the Crown failed to disclose draft reports.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while there were concerns about the expert's independence, the trial judge properly circumscribed the scope of admissible evidence and that any disclosure violation did not impair the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the shooting death of Jonathan Chambers on March 7, 2007, north of Barrie.

The Crown's case relied heavily on evidence from three accomplices who had entered into plea agreements: Tafari Williams, Terrence Walker, and Gregory Millar.

The appellant appealed on grounds that the trial judge improperly relied on evidence from Walker and Millar to confirm Williams' testimony despite potential tainting, and that the trial judge misapprehended certain evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the Vetrovec principles and that any errors in misapprehension were not material to the conviction.

L'appelante a interjeté appel d'une décision de la Cour supérieure la déclarant coupable d'outrage au tribunal pour non-respect d'ordonnances relatives à la résidence de l'enfant.

Elle a contesté la décision en alléguant que les ordonnances avaient été obtenues par fraude et que les juges n'avaient pas compétence.

La Cour d'appel a rejeté ces arguments, confirmant que les ordonnances demeuraient en vigueur et que la peine imposée était raisonnable.

The appellant brought a motion on the day of the appeal hearing to remove counsel for the respondent from the record and to strike a paragraph from an affidavit dated January 9, 2017.

The appellant also requested an adjournment of the appeal to permit cross-examination of the respondent on his affidavit.

The court rejected the adjournment request and declined to hear the motion due to insufficient notice, having been filed on the same day as the appeal hearing.

The appeal proceeded as scheduled and the appellant's motion was dismissed with costs awarded to counsel for the respondent.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The unsuccessful appellants (Essar entities and GIP entities) were ordered to pay costs to the successful respondents (the Monitor and Algoma Steel).

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs but disagreed on whether liability should be several or joint and several.

The court awarded costs on a several basis, allocating 25% to GIP and 75% to Essar, finding that GIP had a more limited role with different issues and less oral argument time than Essar.

The appellants brought a motion seeking to appoint the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee as litigation guardian for one appellant, to require a mental examination, to remove counsel, to extend time to perfect the appeal, and to seal evidence concerning mental health.

The motion judge addressed the sealing and confidentiality issues under the two-part test from Sierra Club v. Canada (Minister of Finance).

The court ordered redaction of solicitor-client communications and certain historical medical information as reasonable alternatives to confidentiality orders.

However, the court declined to grant a confidentiality order for current observations of the appellant's mental state, finding insufficient evidence of necessity under the Sierra Club test.

References to a non-party's health information were also redacted as unnecessary and irrelevant.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference arising from a single incident involving a six-year-old complainant.

The trial judge stayed the sexual assault conviction under the Kienapple principle and sentenced the appellant to 15 months in custody followed by one year probation.

On appeal, the Court found that the trial judge erred by using evidence of the complainant's emotional and psychological problems as a teenager to bolster the reliability of her testimony regarding the assault.

The trial judge improperly relied on the absence of alternative explanations for the complainant's behaviour and engaged in circular reasoning by using the complainant's acceptance of the causal link between the assault and her subsequent problems to support the reliability of her evidence of the assault itself.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellants appealed three orders arising from long-standing estate litigation concerning business interests, bank accounts, and real property of the deceased father's estate.

The appellants sought to vary a prior settlement order, obtain leave to commence a new action regarding Swiss bank accounts, and challenge the motion judge's refusal to recuse himself and transfer proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three appeals, finding no merit to the appellants' arguments regarding palpable error, abuse of process, statute-barred claims, or bias allegations.

The court upheld the lower court's decisions and awarded costs to the respondents.

Appeal from a Superior Court judgment dismissing an appeal of an arbitrator's preliminary award.

The franchisor appealed the arbitrator's determination that the limitation period for arbitration had not expired.

The dispute arose from a franchisee's notice of rescission of a franchise agreement based on alleged non-disclosure by the franchisor.

The central issue was whether a mediation requirement in the franchise agreement constituted a precondition to arbitration that suspended the running of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The arbitrator severed the requirement that mediation occur in Delaware, finding it contrary to the Arthur Wishart Act, and determined that the limitation period commenced only after mediation was deemed completed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the arbitrator's decision, applying a reasonableness standard of review.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her defamation action following a five-day trial.

The trial judge found that while the respondent's statements were defamatory and made in the context of an employment reference, they were protected by qualified privilege.

The trial judge also found that the appellant failed to prove malice, which would have defeated the privilege.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision on liability, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The court also addressed the appellant's challenge to costs, granting leave to appeal costs and reducing the award by $8,275.00 to exclude costs for voluntary mediation.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent $247,247.93 plus interest and costs under a mortgage, and requiring delivery of possession of the mortgaged property.

The respondent had advanced monies to the appellants to assist in running a charitable organization.

After the first two advances were repaid, the latter two were not, and the appellants subsequently executed a mortgage and promissory note to secure the outstanding amount.

The motion judge rejected the appellants' defences that the monies were a gift, that they did not understand the mortgage despite receiving independent legal advice, that they signed under duress, and that the transaction was unconscionable.

On appeal, the appellants limited their argument to the quantum of the judgment, challenging the motion judge's reliance on Schedule A for determining the amount due.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error and dismissed the appeal.

This appeal concerns a dispute between two insurers regarding the payment of statutory accident benefits (SABS) to an injured claimant.

The central issue is whether an insurer's failure to notify the claimant of a priority dispute between insurers within 90 days of receiving the SABS application precluded the insurer from pursuing the dispute.

The arbitrator determined that while notice to the claimant was mandatory, no specific time limit was prescribed by regulation.

The Superior Court reversed this decision, applying a correctness standard of review.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the reasonableness standard of review applies to arbitrator decisions on SABS priority disputes, even where questions of law are engaged.

The arbitrator's interpretation that late notice did not bar the priority dispute was reasonable.

The respondent slipped and fell on a wet floor in the vestibule of a department store operated by the appellants, fracturing her kneecap.

The trial judge found the appellants liable for negligence under the Occupiers' Liability Act, concluding that the wet floor caused the fall and that the appellants lacked an effective inspection or maintenance system.

The appellants appealed, arguing the trial judge failed to require proof that the wet floor created an unreasonable risk of harm and erred in rejecting expert evidence about the safety of the tile flooring.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding the trial judge properly applied the statutory duty of care and reasonably rejected the expert evidence.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated June 30, 2017.

The appellant did not contest the Board's finding that he remained a significant threat to public safety or the disposition that he remain detained at the General Forensic Unit at CAMH.

However, he contended the Board acted unreasonably by not including a delegation of authority permitting community living in supervised accommodation when the Hospital deemed it appropriate, as had been included in the previous 2016 disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and entitled to deference, as the evidence clearly showed the appellant was not ready for community living at the time of the hearing.

The appellant was convicted after a judge-alone trial of nine historical sexual offences against his two biological daughters and his step-daughter, and was acquitted of two charges relating to a third biological daughter.

He received a concurrent sentence of six years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence across counts; (2) the trial judge improperly admitted evidence of uncharged bad conduct; and (3) the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in methodology and relied on uncharged acts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and allowed the sentence appeal in part, removing an administrative error from the ancillary order.

In supplementary reasons following an appeal regarding property ownership, the Court of Appeal addressed outstanding financial issues between former spouses.

The court ordered the respondent to reimburse the appellant for mortgage and property tax payments she made on his half-interest in a jointly owned property, finding he would otherwise be unjustly enriched.

The court also awarded the appellant additional occupation rent for the post-trial period.

Given divided success on the main appeal issues, the court ordered the parties to bear their own costs for both the trial and the appeal.

This is a costs decision following a successful appeal by the appellants.

The appellants sought recovery of costs from the respondents, specifically requesting the same amounts that had been awarded to them at first instance ($51,885.55 from Christine DeJong Medicine Professional Corporation and $14,017.28 from Dennis and Peggy Condos).

The respondents sought no costs, arguing that all parties were victims of fraud and that the contest was between victims.

The court awarded costs to the appellants as requested, finding this to be a just and fair disposition given that the appellants were successful on all aspects of the appeal and that no costs of the appeal had been awarded to them despite their success.

On appeal from a Superior Court decision, the appellant challenged the application judge's interpretation of a management agreement and the restated articles of incorporation concerning Class C shares of an investment fund.

The appellant argued that a payment it made to itself should be characterized as debt rather than an unauthorized performance dividend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error or extricable error in law.

The court affirmed that the payment was an undeclared and unauthorized performance dividend, and that nothing in the fund's articles converted it into debt.

L'intimé a déposé une motion en vertu de la règle 61.06 des Règles de procédure civile pour obtenir une ordonnance de cautionnement pour dépens d'un montant de 10 000 $.

La motion découlait d'une procédure matrimoniale où les parties avaient résolu la plupart des questions en litige, la question principale au procès étant le partage des biens familiaux.

Le juge de première instance avait rendu un jugement obligeant l'appelante à payer l'intimé 128 560 $ pour sa part du foyer conjugal et obligeant l'intimé à faire un paiement d'égalisation de 144 934,47 $ par roulement de pension.

L'appelante a interjeté appel de cette décision.