Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing her claims against Minto Group Inc. (her penthouse landlord) and Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP (her lawyers).

The appellant had been defrauded by a man she met online who misrepresented his age, wealth, and background.

She sought damages from various parties, alleging they failed to protect her from the fraudster.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the appellant's claims against both Minto and Faskens lacked merit.

Against Minto, the court found no genuine issue requiring trial on claims for intrusion upon seclusion, breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, or infliction of mental distress.

Against Faskens, the court found that the lawyer had no obligation to conduct background investigations on the appellant's fiancé absent explicit instructions, and that the scope of the retainer did not include such duties.

The appellants retained Birkshire Group Inc. to perform home renovation work.

After the relationship deteriorated, Birkshire registered a construction lien and sued for the balance owing.

The appellants counterclaimed and sued other respondents.

At trial, the judge awarded Birkshire damages and recognized a lien.

The appellants appealed, arguing the trial judge failed to address evidence from two witnesses called after the close of evidence.

The trial judge had determined this evidence was material to credibility issues but made no reference to it in his reasons.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons deficient and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking his statement of claim against the Crown without leave to amend.

The claim arose from the appellant's failed attempt to initiate a private prosecution and alleged that Crown employees instructed a court reporter to provide a false transcript and refused to assist with complaints about the transcript.

The motion judge struck the claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the motion judge correctly applied the test under Rule 21 and that the appellant was attempting to re-litigate issues that should have been addressed in his abandoned appeal.

Manorgate, a residential home builder, retained Kirkor, an architectural consulting firm, to provide design services for a construction project.

After the City of Toronto requested a higher density development, the parties entered into a second agreement for a larger project.

Manorgate alleged that Kirkor made a negligent misrepresentation regarding the cost per square foot of the larger project, which turned out to be significantly higher than represented, rendering the project financially unviable.

Kirkor moved for summary judgment, relying on an Entire Agreement Clause in the second agreement that precluded reliance on pre-contractual representations.

The motion judge granted summary judgment, finding that the second agreement was a separate contract and that the Entire Agreement Clause excluded the alleged misrepresentation.

Manorgate appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in giving effect to the Entire Agreement Clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no extricable error of law and affirming that the Entire Agreement Clause was broad enough to exclude the alleged misrepresentation.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action arising from an assault during a soccer game.

Brandon Gomes punched Michael Da Silva during a match, resulting in injury.

The appellants claimed negligence in supervision and breach of the Occupiers Liability Act against the respondents.

The motion judge found no evidence that Gomes' prior conduct was predictive of violent behaviour, that the respondents breached any standard of care, or that the playing field was unsafe.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding the motion judge made no palpable and overriding errors and that the appellants failed to present sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues for trial.

The appellant tenant sued the respondent commercial landlord for damages arising from roof leaks and a non-functioning gas line.

The landlord obtained summary judgment dismissing the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to resolve material factual disputes regarding when the tenant's obligation to insure commenced and whether the premises were insurable.

The motion judge also committed extricable errors of law in interpreting the 'as is' provisions of the lease by conflating 'Premises' and 'Building' and ignoring a relevant schedule.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment set aside.

Appeal of a motion to change order concerning spousal support and a contempt motion.

The trial judge terminated spousal support for approximately two years and awarded support below the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAGs) range, relying on an unimplemented settlement agreement reached during trial.

The trial judge also dismissed a contempt motion regarding the cancellation of a required life insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by departing from the SSAGs without adequate justification and by using the negotiated settlement as a reference point.

The court also found the respondent in contempt for deliberately cancelling the life insurance policy without consent or court order.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that declared the respondents had a right of way "in, over, and upon" a portion of the appellant's property, including the right to maintain drainage infrastructure (a catch basin and lateral pipe).

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide adequate assistance and by improperly interpreting the scope of the easement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no procedural unfairness and that the drainage infrastructure constituted an ancillary right reasonably necessary to the use and enjoyment of the right of way.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 14 months' imprisonment and two years' probation.

The conviction arose from a second trial following a mistrial on a charge of aggravated assault of Tim Runge.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in leaving assault causing bodily harm as an included offence to the jury, contending that the uncontested expert evidence of a serious and permanent brain injury established the elements of aggravated assault as a matter of law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge properly left the included offence with the jury as there was an air of reality to it, and that defence counsel had requested the instruction.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings regarding aggravating factors.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 26 months imprisonment.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The trial judge found that the complainant, a 17-year-old first-year university student, was incapable of consenting to sexual activity due to her level of intoxication and unconsciousness during portions of the assault.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in understanding the distinction between "blacking out" and unconsciousness, in equating pain with lack of consent, and in drawing inferences about the complainant's intoxication.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction and sentence, finding the trial judge's findings were supported by evidence and that the verdict was reasonable.

The applicant and its affiliates carried out a series of transactions in December 2007 designed to realize a tax loss to offset unrealized foreign exchange gains in the same taxation year.

The Canada Revenue Agency disallowed the claimed loss on the basis that section 98(5) of the Income Tax Act applied, rendering the transaction a tax-deferred rollover.

The applicant sought court orders to retroactively alter the transaction to achieve its intended tax purpose, relying on rectification and equitable jurisdiction to relieve against mistakes.

The application judge granted the order, but the Supreme Court's decision in Fairmont Hotels restricted rectification to written agreements.

The Court of Appeal held that the court will not exercise its equitable jurisdiction to retroactively alter corporate transactions to achieve tax objectives, whether characterized as rectification or relief from mistake.

The court also rejected rescission as an available remedy, finding it was not a voluntary disposition but a commercial contract, and that rescission is an all-or-nothing remedy that cannot be used for partial unwinding to achieve a specific tax outcome.

The appellant was convicted of two counts each of sexual touching and invitation to sexual touching involving his then nine-year-old granddaughter.

He was sentenced to 30 months concurrent.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the grandmother's testimony and alleged inconsistencies between the complainant's and her mother's evidence regarding disclosure.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal the sentence based on fresh evidence regarding the victim impact statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, no error in the trial judge's analysis of inconsistencies and collusion allegations, and that the fresh evidence was inadmissible and would not have affected the sentence.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for offences including break and entry, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, escaping lawful custody, and robbery, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his detention at a forensic mental health facility.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge, arguing the Board unreasonably concluded detention was necessary and improperly considered the risk of illicit drug use and the ease of readmission as factors in its decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that supervision of housing and readmission capability are relevant considerations for the Board in determining appropriate dispositions.

A lessor of vehicles sought to establish that it was entitled to third-party liability insurance coverage under an automobile insurance policy issued by the respondent insurer.

The dispute centered on whether an OPCF 5 endorsement, which permits lessors to lease vehicles and provides coverage to both lessors and lessees, was part of the Certificate of Automobile Insurance.

The application judge found the endorsement was not part of the policy.

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the Certificate contained the phrase "AS PER OPCF 5 FORMS" which the insurer had added to its standard form, and that this language, combined with the commercial context of the transaction, demonstrated the insurer's intent to provide liability coverage to both the lessor and lessee.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board declaring him unfit to stand trial and ordering his detention at the Brockville Mental Health Centre.

The appellant did not contest his unfitness or the finding that he posed a significant risk to the community due to serious mental illness, but argued he should be transferred to the Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre instead.

The Court of Appeal found the Review Board erred by failing to investigate when the complainant would be discharged from the Royal Ottawa Centre, which was the primary basis for the transfer order.

The court also identified unresolved questions regarding the appellant's linguistic rights under the Criminal Code and the French Language Services Act.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the Review Board for a new hearing.

The appellants, Smiles First Corporation and Union Health and Dental Centre Inc., appealed the dismissal of their application under section 21 of the Commercial Tenancies Act and section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The core dispute involved a head lease assignment dated October 31, 2016, from the intermediate tenant to Smiles First, and the effect of the intermediate tenant's subsequent abandonment of the head lease on Smiles First's sublease.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the head lease assignment was ineffective due to lack of landlord consent, Smiles First remained entitled to possession of the premises as a subtenant under the sublease, which survived the head lease surrender.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a claim for adverse possession against the respondent property owner.

The appellant argued that the application judge erred by departing from agreed facts in concluding that adverse possession had not been established, particularly regarding whether the respondent had been excluded from the disputed property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the application judge's findings were fully supported by the agreed facts, affidavits, and cross-examination evidence.

The court distinguished between exclusion of uninvited persons and exclusion from the owner's intended use of the property.

The appellant appealed from trial decisions determining unresolved issues in a family law matter, including spousal support duration and quantum, child and spousal support arrears, equalization of post-valuation-day increases in corporate shares, disposition of a recreational property, and costs.

The trial judge determined the appellant's income for support purposes by excluding losses from a corporation used to fund his personal lifestyle, assessed the value of corporate shares considering personal benefits provided by the corporation, ordered payment for a recreational property, and awarded substantial costs to the respondent based on the appellant's unreasonable conduct and inadequate disclosure.

The Court of Appeal upheld all findings.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside a default judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The appellants' statement of defence had been struck after they failed to attend a motion hearing, and they were subsequently noted in default.

The motion judge dismissed their motion to set aside the default, finding that the circumstances leading to the default had not been adequately explained and that setting aside the judgment would prejudice the respondent and impair the integrity of the justice system.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the appellants' pattern of delay and failure to attend court proceedings justified the refusal to set aside the default judgment.

The appellant lender advanced a mortgage secured by a commercial property in Kingston, Ontario, paying off a prior first mortgage and tax arrears but not the respondent's second mortgage.

When the borrower defaulted and the property was sold under power of sale, the appellant claimed priority over the respondent's mortgage based on equitable subrogation.

The motion judge granted summary judgment in favour of the respondent, finding that the appellant knew the respondent would not postpone her mortgage and that it would be inequitable to grant subrogation for a mortgage more than double the value of the one replaced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's discretionary decision to deny equitable subrogation.