Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

An appeal of a wrongful dismissal judgment where the trial judge awarded an investment banker 18 months' reasonable notice damages following his dismissal without cause due to the closure of his employer's Mergers & Acquisitions division.

The principal issue on appeal concerned whether damages should include the deferred portions of the employee's bonus (60% of annual bonuses paid as notional shares that would vest over time).

The appellants also challenged the trial judge's awards for vacation pay, prejudgment interest, and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision in all respects.

The appellants sought to challenge legal accounts rendered by the respondent law firm to their creditor, Sun Life, in connection with enforcement of a secured loan.

The appellants had signed three successive release agreements that purported to preclude assessment of the accounts.

The motion judge held that the releases were effective to bar assessment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but on different grounds.

While expressing concerns about the motion judge's reasoning regarding the Solicitors Act, the appellate court held that the appellants failed to establish special circumstances required under section 11 of the Solicitors Act to justify assessment of accounts already paid by a third party.

The Ontario Nurses' Association appealed a Divisional Court decision that had set aside an arbitrator's award regarding the interpretation of a collective agreement between the ONA and Toronto East General Hospital.

The dispute arose from the Hospital's closure of beds in a unit, which reduced available work hours for regular part-time nurses.

The Hospital spread the reduction across all part-time nurses without regard to seniority.

The arbitrator found this constituted a lay-off triggering the collective agreement's lay-off provisions, which require seniority-based reductions.

The Divisional Court reversed, finding the arbitrator's decision internally inconsistent and contrary to the collective agreement's terms.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the arbitrator's interpretation reasonable and consistent with the collective agreement's language and purpose.

The appellant Economical Insurance appealed a motion judge's determination of the priority in which three insurance policies would respond to a motor vehicle accident claim.

The driver was covered under the vehicle owner's State Farm automobile policy, the owner's State Farm personal liability umbrella policy, and the driver's own Economical automobile policy.

The motion judge ordered that the State Farm auto policy respond first, followed by the Economical auto policy, and then the State Farm umbrella policy.

Economical argued that the umbrella policy was an owner's first loss policy under section 277(1) of the Insurance Act and should respond before the Economical policy, or alternatively, that both policies should respond rateably under section 277(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the umbrella policy was not an owner's first loss policy as defined by the Act and that section 277(2) did not apply to the Economical policy.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence on a motion to extend time to perfect an appeal.

The fresh evidence demonstrated that counsel's inadvertence had prevented important evidence from being presented to the motion judge regarding the test for extending time to perfect the appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the interests of justice required admission of the fresh evidence and that it called into serious question the motion judge's conclusions on the merits, particularly regarding whether a reasonable explanation for the appellant's delay existed.

The Court set aside the motion judge's order dismissing the appeal for delay and extended the time to perfect the appeal to February 16, 2018.

Two consolidated appeals concerning the standard of review applicable to insurance arbitral decisions resolving priority disputes under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The first appeal involved a claimant listed as an excluded driver on his parents' policy who was injured as a passenger in another vehicle.

The second involved a claimant similarly listed as an excluded driver who was injured while driving an uninsured motorcycle.

The central issue was whether excluded drivers could qualify as "insured persons" under the SABS definition and thus trigger priority coverage under their parents' policies.

The Court of Appeal held that the appropriate standard of review for such arbitral decisions is reasonableness, not correctness, and that arbitrators' interpretations of the SABS and insurance policies within their specialized expertise warrant deference.

The appellant, Turtle Creek Landscape Inc., appealed the dismissal of its action on summary judgment.

The appellant had sued the respondents for damages alleging defects in a truck it claimed to have purchased.

The motion judge found that the actual purchaser of the vehicle was Roberto Imbiscuso, not Turtle Creek, as evidenced by the vehicle purchase agreement, warranty documentation, and title registration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of summary judgment principles and no evidence supporting the appellant's claims regarding required repairs, payment for repairs, or odometer tampering.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his action against the Toronto Police Services Board and an insurance company on the basis that the claims were barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge found that the appellant was aware of all facts supporting his claims by June 2010 (regarding the insurance company) and January 2011 (regarding the police board), and that he commenced his action more than two years after those dates.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that discoverability for limitation purposes is based on knowledge of the facts necessary to support a claim, not knowledge of the applicable law.

An appeal from a trial judgment concerning a construction contract dispute.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings regarding responsibility for drywall deficiencies and the labour rate credited to the appellant.

The appellate court found the trial judge's determination that the appellant assumed responsibility for drywall installed by third parties was fully supported by evidence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the labour rate issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

This complex appeal arises from a multi-million dollar commercial real estate fraud perpetrated by Norma and Ronauld Walton over several years.

The appellants (DBDC Applicants) and respondents (Schedule C investors) were all victims of the fraud.

The central issue on appeal concerns the priority of claims against proceeds from the sale of properties acquired as part of the fraudulent scheme.

The appellants sought damages against the Listed Schedule C Companies on the basis of knowing assistance in breach of fiduciary duty, while the respondent DeJong sought constructive trusts over certain properties.

The majority allowed the appeal in part, finding the Listed Schedule C Companies jointly and severally liable for $22.6 million in damages for knowing assistance, but set aside the constructive trust awards to DeJong.

The dissent disagreed with the knowing assistance finding, arguing the net transfer analysis was insufficient to establish participation by the Listed Schedule C Companies in the breach of fiduciary duty owed to the appellants.

A utility company and rural municipality disputed cost-sharing for gas pipeline relocation necessitated by municipal drainage works.

The utility sought 35% cost contribution from the municipality under a franchise agreement, while the municipality argued the utility should bear the full cost under section 26 of the Drainage Act.

The application judge held that section 26 of the Act overrode the franchise agreement's cost-sharing provisions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act does not prohibit contracting out of its cost-allocation provisions and that the franchise agreement's cost-sharing mechanism applies to drainage works undertaken by the municipality.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the trial judge for breach of a court order.

The sentencing judge imposed a sentence exceeding the Crown's position without providing the appellant's counsel an opportunity to make further submissions regarding the trial judge's inclination to impose a greater sentence.

The Court of Appeal found this to be an error in procedure.

On review of the fitness of the sentence de novo, the court determined that the Crown's requested sentence was fit and varied the sentence to 12 months less pre-trial custody of 219 days.

The appellant appealed from an order dismissing his motion to set aside a default judgment in a land banking fraud scheme.

The appellant was served with the Statement of Claim on March 5, 2014, but took no steps to defend and was noted in default on August 1, 2014.

After an undefended trial, judgment was rendered against him for fraudulent misrepresentation in the amount of $276,031.06 plus pre-judgment interest, punitive damages of $25,000, and costs of $25,000.

The appellant did not learn of the judgment until September 15, 2016.

The motion judge refused to set aside the default judgment, finding that the appellant provided an inadequate explanation for his default, consciously decided not to participate, had no arguable defence on the merits, and that setting aside the judgment would undermine the integrity of the justice system.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

A CCAA monitor brought an oppression action under the Canada Business Corporations Act against the parent company (Essar Global) and related entities, alleging that a port transaction transferring critical assets to an Essar-controlled entity was oppressive to Algoma's stakeholders (trade creditors, employees, pensioners, and retirees).

The trial judge found the monitor had standing as a complainant, the action was properly brought as an oppression remedy rather than a derivative action, and the port transaction and its change of control provision were oppressive.

The court granted a remedy modifying the transaction to remove the change of control veto and provide Algoma with termination rights after GIP's loan was repaid.

The appellants appealed on multiple grounds, including standing, characterization of the claim, reasonable expectations analysis, and the appropriateness of the remedy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment in all respects.

The appellant, Western Troy Capital Resources Inc., retained the respondent, Genivar Inc., an engineering consulting firm, to conduct a feasibility study for a mineral property at MacLeod Lake in Northern Quebec.

The trial judge found that Genivar breached its duty of care and made negligent misrepresentations, awarding damages of $1.25 million.

On appeal, Western Troy sought to increase the award to approximately $2.97 million or $2.15 million, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately explain his damages assessment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's award, finding it was firmly grounded in evidence and that the trial judge properly considered speculative elements including the timing of when the resources estimate should have been completed, which expenses would have been incurred regardless, and the likely reaction of Western Troy's management to a timely report.

The appellant sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing its appeal for delay.

The respondent City consented to setting aside the dismissal but sought security for costs as a condition.

The appellant opposed the security for costs order, arguing it was impecunious and that the appeal had merit.

The court considered whether the appeal was frivolous and vexatious, whether the appellant was impecunious, and the merits of the appeal.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous and vexatious, the appellant was impecunious, and while the appeal had little chance of success, ordering security for costs would effectively prevent the appeal from proceeding.

The court dismissed the motion for security for costs and set aside the Registrar's dismissal.

The appellant, a 54-year-old man with schizophrenia and a history of violence and harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to order his continued detention at a forensic psychiatric facility rather than grant a conditional discharge.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible in 2008 and lived in the community until December 2015, when he decompensated after stopping his antipsychotic medication.

The Board found he posed a significant threat to public safety due to his lack of insight into his mental illness, likelihood of discontinuing medication if discharged, and history of assaultive behavior.

The Court of Appeal upheld the detention order, finding it was the least onerous and least restrictive alternative available.

The appellant appealed her convictions on four offences relating to marijuana grow-operations and one count of breach of recognizance, as well as seeking leave to appeal her sentence.

She argued that her guilty pleas were invalid because she was uninformed of immigration consequences, that the facts did not support her pleas, that her counsel was in a conflict of interest, and that she was deprived of effective assistance of counsel.

She also challenged the sentence as unfit due to failure to consider immigration consequences and claimed the forfeiture orders were grossly disproportionate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and denied leave to appeal sentence, finding the guilty pleas were informed, no conflict of interest existed, the appellant received effective assistance of counsel, and the forfeiture orders were part of the accepted plea offer.

The appellant, a contractor, challenged an international commercial arbitral award arising from a US$258 million pipeline construction project in Madagascar.

The appellant sought to set aside portions of the award on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over counterclaims, failure to exercise jurisdiction over prolongation costs, denial of procedural fairness regarding retention monies, hydro seeding costs, and costs awards, and violation of public policy regarding alleged double recovery from forfeiture of tranche payments and liquidated damages.

The application judge dismissed all claims.

On appeal, the court upheld the dismissal, finding that the tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the counterclaims, that the prolongation costs claim was addressed by the tribunal, that procedural fairness was afforded on all issues, and that the award did not violate public policy.

The appellant was convicted after a three-day trial of nine domestic violence offences against his wife, including two counts of assault, three counts of assault with a weapon, two counts of uttering death threats, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement.

The charges were based on five alleged incidents occurring between September 2010 and August 2012.

The appellant was sentenced to 35 months in prison.

On appeal, the sole ground raised was ineffective assistance of counsel at trial resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the alleged deficiencies in counsel's representation did not result in an unfair trial or an unreliable verdict.