Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellants appealed a decision of Justice MacDonnell of the Superior Court of Justice, which had dismissed their application for mandamus relating to a ruling by a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, agreeing with the analysis provided by MacDonnell J. The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of three sexual offences committed against different complainants during a professional relationship and was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment to be served in the community.

The appellant appealed his convictions while the Crown appealed the sentence.

Following the appellant's death during the appeal process, the court considered whether to proceed with the appeals or dismiss them as moot.

The court dismissed both appeals as moot, finding no exceptional circumstances warranting departure from the general rule that an accused's death renders an appeal moot.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed on February 1, 2011 by Justice Gary T. Trotter of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal for Ontario varied the sentence in one respect only: the credit for presentence custody was reduced from 6 months to 6 months less one day.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud over $5,000 and possession of property obtained by crime exceeding $5,000.

The trial judge found that the appellant became wilfully blind to the fraudulent nature of funds deposited into his business account.

The appellant claimed he was unaware of the fraud and that the funds originated from identity theft of a third party.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the trial judge properly applied the doctrine of wilful blindness based on inherently suspicious circumstances and cumulative circumstantial evidence, including the pattern of deposits, frequent cash withdrawals, and purchases unrelated to any legitimate business purpose.

The appellant purchased a home constructed by the respondent in 1997.

Mould was discovered in 2002 due to faulty construction and water leakage.

The mould was remedied and the house was sold without loss in value.

The appellant claimed damages for psychological and emotional injuries and out-of-pocket expenses.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the psychological injuries were too remote and not reasonably foreseeable.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in dismissing the claims for psychological and emotional injuries and that the contractual warranty limitations were irrelevant to the negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the motion judge properly applied the test from Mustapha v. Culligan and correctly concluded that a person of ordinary fortitude would not have suffered the serious psychiatric injury claimed in these circumstances.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm offences arising from a shooting incident on January 31, 2015.

The primary issue at trial was identity.

The Crown alleged the appellant discharged a firearm in a residential street and fled to his girlfriend's apartment.

The defence contended the appellant was asleep in the apartment and that two other men were the ones who fled and entered the building.

The trial judge rejected the defence theory as implausible and accepted identification evidence placing the appellant as the shooter.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the reliability of a key identification witness, citing concerns about cross-racial identification, limited description, initial misidentification in a photo line-up, and the witness's impaired state at the time of the incident.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's careful treatment of the identification evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of six counts of fraud over $5,000, one count of uttering a forged document, and one count of personation.

He appealed on two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence of a deceased witness under section 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and second, that the trial judge failed to adequately relate the evidence to the individual counts in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in admitting the hearsay evidence and that the jury charge, while not ideal, was adequate in the context of the trial as a whole.

The Municipality of the Northern Bruce Peninsula appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that had quashed convictions for breaches of the Building Code Act, 1992.

The appeal judge had applied an outdated limitation period under section 36(8) of the BCA, relying on R. v. Pickles, which held that the one-year limitation period ran from the date construction was completed.

However, section 36(8) had been amended on July 1, 2010, to provide that the limitation period commenced from the date the facts first came to the knowledge of an officer or chief building official.

The Court of Appeal found that the prosecution was instituted within one year of the Municipality's initial knowledge of the structure and that the appeal judge had erred in law by applying the wrong limitation period.

The convictions and sentences were reinstated.

This appeal concerns the admissibility of participant expert evidence in a civil jury trial involving allegations of sexual assault.

The respondent sued for damages for sexual assaults allegedly committed in the mid-1990s.

A mental health clinician who treated the respondent in prison was permitted to give evidence as a participant expert.

The trial judge admitted the clinician's unredacted reports and allowed him to testify about their contents.

The Court of Appeal found that the clinician exceeded the proper scope of a participant expert by providing opinions on whether the alleged sexual assaults occurred and whether the respondent suffered harm caused by such assaults.

The court held that these opinions failed to meet the threshold requirements for admissibility under the Mohan/White Burgess test and that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking her claim under a Rule 21 motion without leave to amend.

The dispute arose from a collective agreement between unionized workers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the dispute was entirely regulated by the collective agreement and that the arbitrator possessed the necessary remedial powers to address the wrong.

The court also declined to grant leave to appeal the costs award.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

A mortgage broker appealed the dismissal of its negligence claim against the Crown arising from fraud perpetrated by an individual who filed a fraudulent notice of change with the Ministry of Government and Consumer Services, falsely identifying himself as a director and officer of a corporation.

The appellant relied on a corporation profile report obtained from the Ministry when advancing $1.8 million in loans.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that no duty of care arose at the first stage of the Anns/Cooper test.

The governing legislation did not contemplate a private law duty of care, and the payment of a fee for access to public corporate records was insufficient to establish proximity.

This is a costs decision arising from a custody and access appeal concerning three children.

The father's appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on all four grounds.

The court awarded the mother costs fixed at $25,000, representing 60-70% of her actual costs.

The decision addresses the presumption of costs in favour of successful parties in family law matters, the application of the Family Law Rules cost framework, and the impact of unreasonable conduct by both parties.

The court also addressed costs related to an unsuccessful appeal to the Divisional Court, declining to award costs for that stage due to the confusing nature of family law appeal routes in Ontario.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and related firearm offences.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction as unreasonable, arguing that no properly instructed trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was the shooter.

The appellant raised two main arguments: first, that police committed procedural missteps in obtaining the complainant's identification, and second, that the trial judge erred by focusing on credibility rather than reliability of the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments and dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the reliability of the identification evidence and made no error in principle or palpable and overriding error of fact.

The appellant appealed a costs award of over $300,000 made by the motion judge in family law proceedings.

The motion judge had awarded costs to the respondent following a successful motion to strike the appellant's answer on the basis that a constitutional issue was not properly pleaded.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the merits, which provided the appellant with the opportunity to amend his answer.

The respondent remained entitled to costs of the original motion, but the costs award was reduced from over $300,000 to $200,000.

The court found that the motion judge erred in principle by adopting a "close to full recovery" approach, giving undue weight to settlement offers in circumstances where settlement was not practically possible, inappropriately increasing costs based on the appellant's ability to pay and the respondent's financial need, and failing to apply the proportionality principle required by the Family Law Rules.

The appellant appealed his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and his 12-month conditional sentence including eight months of house arrest.

The appeal raised three grounds: the validity of the search warrant, the admissibility of utterances made upon arrest, and jury instruction discrepancies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's validation of the search warrant, no error in admitting the spontaneous and voluntary utterances despite a Charter breach under section 9, and no legal error in the jury instructions.

The court upheld the conditional sentence as appropriate given the serious nature of the offence and the need for general deterrence and denunciation.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of aggravated assault arising from a shooting incident.

The respondent was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and firearms offences.

The Crown's theory was that the respondent intended to shoot another individual and that transferred intent applied.

The respondent's defence was that the gun fired accidentally while being waved to calm those present.

The trial judge refused to instruct the jury on liability for assault through threat of force under s. 265(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, finding it inconsistent with the Crown's primary theory and unduly complex.

The appellate court found this refusal was an error, as the Crown was entitled to have the jury instructed on alternative legal routes to liability even if accepting the respondent's version of events.

Two members of the Haudenosaunee (Six Nations of the Grand River) brought a family law dispute regarding custody, child support, and spousal support.

The respondent raised a constitutional claim under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, asserting an Aboriginal right to have the dispute resolved through Haudenosaunee governance processes and laws rather than Ontario family law.

The motion judge struck the constitutional claim without leave to amend and dismissed it as lacking standing and justiciability.

The appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the dismissal of the constitutional claim and permitting the appellant to seek leave to amend his pleading.

The court held that while the constitutional claim faced serious obstacles, it was premature to dismiss it summarily at an early stage of proceedings.

The court also refused to stay the family law proceedings and permitted interim support orders to continue pending resolution of the constitutional claim.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder in connection with the fatal shooting of a man leaving a New Year's Eve party.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant or his associate, Baptists Bernier, fired the fatal shot.

Bernier testified as a Crown witness after pleading guilty to being an accessory after the fact to murder.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) failure to instruct the jury that Bernier's guilty plea could not be used as evidence against the appellant; (2) failure to give an adequate Vetrovec instruction regarding Bernier's evidence; and (3) failure to adequately relate evidence to the issue of intent for the included offence of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three grounds and upheld the conviction.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of dangerous driving causing death.

The respondent drove his vehicle onto a sidewalk, colliding with multiple objects and fatally striking a pedestrian.

The trial judge found the respondent had suffered a momentary lapse of attention and that the Crown failed to prove the requisite mens rea.

The sole ground of appeal concerned whether the respondent's status as a suspended G1 driver who violated the conditions of his licence by driving unaccompanied and during prohibited hours was relevant to establishing mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the G1 licence restrictions were irrelevant to the modified objective test for dangerous driving unless they indicated an incapacity to appreciate or avoid the specific risk involved.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a trial where the sole issue was whether the complainant had the capacity to consent and whether she in fact consented to sexual intercourse.

The complainant was a self-described alcoholic who had consumed significant alcohol in the 48 hours preceding the incident.

The appellant did not testify at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant was denied effective representation by trial counsel, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The court determined that trial counsel prevented the appellant from testifying or making his own decision about whether to testify, failed to conduct an effective cross-examination of the complainant, and failed to introduce an expert toxicologist's report that was part of Crown disclosure.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.